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The first essay analyzes mutual funds’ proxy voting records on shareholder 
proposals. The results indicate that mutual funds support shareholder proposals and vote 
against management for proposals that are likely to increase shareholders’ wealth and 
rights, in firms with weaker external monitoring mechanisms, in firms with entrenched 
management, and when funds have longer investment horizon. Mutual funds mostly take 
management sides on executive compensation related proposals, when they have higher 
ownership concentration, and when they belong to bigger fund families. The results 
further indicate that there is a positive reputational effect for the funds undertaking a 
monitoring role. Moreover, mutual funds reduce holdings when they disapprove of 
managements’ policy, but before doing so they take on an activist role by supporting 
shareholder proposals. The second essay investigates institutional investors’ trading 
behavior of acquiring firm stocks surrounding merger activities. We label investment 
companies and independent investment advisors as active institutions and banks, nonbank 
trusts and insurance companies as passive institutions. We find active institutions 
increase holdings of acquiring firm stocks for mergers with higher wealth implications. 
However, active institutions overreact to stock mergers at the announcement, which they 
appear to correct at the resolution quarter of the merger. The trading behavior of passive 
institutions suggests that these institutions disregard the market response of merger 
announcement in trading acquiring firm stocks at the announcement quarter. The passive 
institutions gradually update their beliefs and trade on the basis of merger wealth effect at 
the resolution quarter. The third essay examines relation between executive compensation 
structure with the existing level and changes of takeover defense mechanisms of firms. 
According to “managerial entrenchment hypothesis,” higher managerial power from 
adoption of takeover defense mechanisms would lead to generating higher rents for 
 xii
executives. “Efficient contracting hypothesis” argue that higher anti-takeover provisions 
would contribute in achieving efficient contracting by deferring compensation into the 
future due to the low possibility of hostile takeover. The results support managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis with regard to existing level of takeover defense mechanisms. 
With regard to changes in anti-takeover provisions, the existing level of managerial 












 Various corporate governance mechanisms have been established to reduce the 
agency conflict between management and shareholders. External monitoring mechanisms 
involve market for corporate control, legal and regulatory rules, proxy voting contests, 
managerial labor market. Internal monitoring mechanisms consist of board of directors, 
concentrated shareholdings by institutions or by block-holders, corporate charter, and 
debt policy. Jensen (1993) argues that external monitoring mechanism work in concert 
with the internal monitoring mechanisms to control agency costs between shareholder 
and managers. This dissertation examines two very important corporate governance 
mechanisms – monitoring by institutional investors and market for corporate control. 
Institutional investors now hold 66 percent of all U.S. publicly traded stocks. The mutual 
funds industry alone has grown dramatically in the last few decades. The total assets of 
mutual funds have soared from $2 billion in 1950 to more than $8 trillion in recent 
years.1 This change of ownership structure of U.S. corporations, from individual 
ownership to ownership through intermediaries, has changed the dynamics of the agency 
problem. With this ownership substitution, the individual owners are at the mercy of 
institutions to assert their ownership rights. However, whether these institutions place 
their own interests over the interests of the shareholders they are supposed to serve is an 
intriguing question. The first part of the dissertation investigates the monitoring role 
played by institutions with regard to their proxy voting behavior. The second part of the 
dissertation analyzes how institutional investors respond to one of the most important 
investment decisions of corporations – mergers and acquisitions. The last part of the 
dissertation analyzes the extent to which market for corporate control undertakes 
                                                 
1 John C. Bogle, “The battle for the Soul of Capitalism.”  
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monitoring role in reducing the agency problem in the context of executive compensation 
structure.  
 The analysis of mutual funds’ proxy voting records on shareholder proposals is 
presented in chapter 2. Shareholder voting rights is an important corporate governance 
mechanism to reduce the agency problem. Usually institutional investors take part in 
proxy voting on behalf of individual investors who are the owners of their portfolio 
shares. The fiduciary responsibility of institutions obliged them to vote in the best 
interests of shareholders. However, there are concerns whether these institutions place 
their own interests over the interests of the shareholders they are supposed to serve. 
Especially, mutual funds, being the investment choice of most investors, are under 
greater scrutiny with regard to their proxy voting behavior. The massive ownership of 
mutual funds gives them an overwhelming power to guard shareholders’ interests and 
reduce the agency problem by exercising their voting rights judiciously and by 
undertaking an activist role in the governance mechanism of the firm. However, the 
perception in the investment community is that mutual funds tend not to be in forefront of 
shareholder activism. Recent press article portray the concern investors have regarding 
mutual funds’ monitoring role in guarding shareholders’ interests.2 We investigate mutual 
funds voting behavior on shareholder proposals and address the following three issues. 
First, we study the determinants of mutual funds’ voting policies across firms. Next, we 
examine the incentive structure of mutual funds to undertake an activist role in their 
proxy voting behavior. Last, we investigate the trading behavior of mutual funds after the 
release of voting records to analyze whether mutual funds engage in “Wall Street Walk”, 
that is sell off their shares when dissatisfied with firms’ management. We analyze proxy 
                                                 
2 On September 22, 2006 an article in Wall Street Journal reports how mutual vote in their proxies. The 
article reports the findings of a study done by corporate library that mutual funds vote in favor of 
management 92 percent of the time on management sponsored proposals and they favor shareholder 
proposals less than 30 percent of the time. Another article in Business Week on October 16, 2006 expresses 
concern why Fidelity being the world’s largest mutual fund is not exercising their voting power to guard 
shareholders’ interests. 
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voting records on shareholder proposals for the period July 1, 2003, to June 30, 2004. 
The data consist of the voting records of 433 mutual funds from 24 fund families. The 
final sample includes over 29,000 shareholder proposals covering 528 firms. Our results 
indicate that mutual funds undertake a monitoring role for proposals that are likely to 
increase shareholders’ wealth and rights, in firms where they are likely to have higher 
influence, and in firms with a weaker external monitoring mechanism. Moreover, mutual 
funds’ motivation to take on an activist role does not come from their ownership 
concentration, but rather from their long-term investment goal. The results further 
indicate that there is a positive reputational effect for the funds undertaking a monitoring 
role in their voting strategies. The trading behavior of mutual funds after the release of 
the voting records suggests that mutual funds reduce holdings when they disapprove the 
managements’ policy, but before doing so they take on an activist role by supporting 
shareholders’ proposals. 
 The third chapter investigates institutional investors’ trading behavior of 
acquiring firm stocks surrounding merger activities for the period 1992 to 2001. By 
examining the trading behavior of institutions at merger announcement and at the final 
resolution of merger, we draw inferences on information environment of institutions and 
their ability to respond quickly and correctly with regard to new information released in 
the market upon merger announcement. We investigate how institutions process 
information released upon announcement of a merger and how they incorporate this new 
available information into their trading strategies. Furthermore, we examine whether they 
update their information set as more information arrives in the market and how they 
adjust their trading strategies. The paper also sheds light on whether there is 
heterogeneity among institutional investors with regard to skill and informational 
advantage surrounding merger activities. In a recent study, Almazan, Hartzell and Starks 
(2005) find differences in costs of monitoring across two categories of institutions in the 
context of executive compensation. The authors refer investment companies and 
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independent investment advisors as “potentially active” institutions and show that they 
face lower cost of monitoring than banks and insurance companies whom they refer to as 
“potentially passive” institutions. The authors state that “potentially active” institutions 
are more likely to have informational advantage and also likely to have competitive 
advantage with regard to employee skill, as compared to “potentially passive” 
institutions. We also group institutions into similar two categories and analyze their 
trading behavior in the context of merger announcement and its final resolution. Our 
results indicate that active institutions significantly increase their holdings of acquiring 
firm stocks for mergers with higher announcement period abnormal return and this 
increase is more pronounced for stock mergers than cash mergers. Active institutions 
display preference for stock proposals at the merger announcement on the basis of their 
prior beliefs and this is explained by the “overreaction phenomenon.” Finally, active 
institutions appear to correct their overreaction behavior by displaying their greater 
preference for cash proposals as compared to stock proposals at the quarter of eventual 
outcome. The trading behavior of passive institutions suggests that these institutions 
disregard the market response of merger announcement in trading acquiring firm stocks 
at the announcement quarter. The passive institutions gradually update their beliefs and 
utilize the information released at the announcement in rebalancing their portfolios at the 
final resolution. 
The fourth chapter examines relation between executive compensation structure 
with the existing level and changes of takeover defense mechanisms of firms. Market for 
corporate control is considered to be an external monitoring mechanism to discipline 
managers and reduce the agency problem. In this paper we examine the extent to which 
market for corporate control undertake monitoring role in overseeing one of the most 
important and debatable corporate decisions – executive compensation. We investigate 
the following questions: Whether executive compensation structure depends on level of 
external monitoring mechanism represented by takeover vulnerability of the firm. In 
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particular, we examine whether managerial power in firms with high level of anti-
takeover provisions (ATP) contribute in establishing higher compensation for executives. 
Next, we examine whether changes in takeover vulnerability cause any subsequent 
changes in executive compensation structure. How executive compensation structure is 
adjusted with increase and decrease in managerial power resulting from changes in anti-
takeover provisions of the firm. We test two competing hypothesis relating anti-takeover 
provisions with executive compensation structure. According to “managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis,” higher managerial power from adoption of takeover defense 
mechanisms would lead to generating higher rents for executives. “Efficient contracting 
hypothesis” argue that higher anti-takeover provisions would contribute in achieving 
efficient contracting by deferring compensation into the future due to the low possibility 
of hostile takeover. The results support managerial entrenchment hypothesis with regard 
to existing level of takeover defense mechanisms. With regard to changes in anti-
takeover provisions, the existing level of managerial power influence the future pay 
structure. Increase in takeover vulnerability of firms already strong in shareholder rights 
lead to decrease in compensation and increase in pay-for-performance sensitivity, 
supporting managerial entrenchment hypothesis. Whereas, increase in takeover 
vulnerability of firms already strong in managerial power lead to increase in 
compensation, supporting efficient contracting hypothesis. We argue that managerial 
power and not the takeover defense mechanism itself contribute in establishing 
compensation schemes following changes in anti-takeover provisions in firms which are 
already high in managerial power. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PROXY VOTING BY 
MUTUAL FUNDS ON SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS 
 
2.1. Introduction 
An important corporate governance mechanism is the voting rights of 
shareholders. This allows shareholders to assert their ownership rights and reduce conflict 
of interests between management and shareholders. Shareholders not attending a 
company's annual meeting may choose to vote their shares by proxy by allowing 
someone else to cast votes on their behalf. Institutional investors take the responsibility to 
vote on behalf of individual investors, who are the owners of their portfolio shares.3 This 
gives the institutions the responsibility to cast votes in the direction that would maximize 
their shareholders’ wealth and rights. However, without the requirement of the disclosure 
policy on how institutions vote on their proxies, shareholders are unable to assess 
whether the agents they hire vote consistent with their interests. Given that institutional 
investors hold approximately 66 percent of all U.S. publicly traded stocks, this issue has 
become increasingly more important in recent years. On January 23, 2003, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) voted to adopt a new rule requiring mutual funds to 
disclose their proxy voting records on an annual basis.4 A Morningstar representative’s 
comment was, “I hope that will put more pressure on funds to be more activist, at least in 
terms of how they vote their proxies.” 5 
                                                 
3 Voting behavior of institutions is studied by Brickley, Lease, Smith (1988), DeJong, Mertens and 
Roosenboom (2005), Gillan and Starks (2000), and Parino, Sias and Starks (2003), and Van Nuys (1993) 
among others.   
4 Davis and Kim (2006) present an overview of the events that lead to the SEC regulation on proxy vote 
disclosure for mutual funds.   
5 The New York Times, January 15, 2006. 
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This recent regulatory requirement for mutual funds to disclose their proxy votes 
allows us to investigate the monitoring role of mutual funds on shareholder proposals.6 
We investigate the following three issues. First, we study the determinants of mutual 
funds’ voting policies on shareholder proposals across firms. Next, we examine the 
incentive structure of mutual funds that could act as a motivational force for them to 
undertake an activist role in their proxy voting behavior. Last, we investigate the trading 
behavior of mutual funds and analyze whether mutual funds engage in “Wall Street 
Walk,” that is, sell off their shares when dissatisfied with firms’ management.   
There are concerns that the voting behavior of mutual funds could be influenced 
by the potential or existing business relationship with the firms, arising from the conflict 
of interests between fund holders and fund management. Rothberg and Lilien (2005) 
provide an in-depth analysis of the proxy voting policies of the largest 10 fund families. 
They report that proxies are voted as a block across all the funds in a fund family and are 
voted in accordance with the policies that are laid out in the proxy voting disclosure. 
Their results do not support the notion that conflicts of interest cause a difference in 
voting behavior. The authors report that index funds vote against management more often 
than the more actively managed funds, although the difference is small and mostly driven 
by to the Vanguard Group of funds. Davis and Kim (2006) analyze the issue of conflicts 
of interest in more detail and show that the voting pattern across firms by the funds is 
determined by the voting policies of the respective fund families and is independent of 
client ties or ownership concentration. However, they find that fund companies with a 
                                                 
6 A debate surrounds around the effectiveness of shareholder activism through shareholder proposals. 
Karpoff (2001) provide a survey on shareholder activism and conclude that shareholder proposal is 
effective in changing the governance structure of firms; however it has negligible impact on share value 
and earnings. Other survey includes Black (1998), Gillan and Starks (1998), Gillan and Starks (2000), and 
Romano (2001). Despite the debate, shareholder proposals are getting increasing attention in recent years. 
Ertimur, Ferri and Stubben (2005) find that frequency of implementation of shareholder proposals has 
increased from 16% in 1997 to over 40% in 2003-2004 and likelihood of implementation increase with 
better governance structure of firm. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) find that six anti-takeover 
provisions have negative valuation consequences and they are also most common in shareholder resolution. 
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larger client base tend to adopt voting strategies that are more supportive of management 
compared to fund companies with a smaller client base. This supports the notion that the 
risk of alienating current and future clients is more for fund families with a larger client 
base and outweighs any benefits from a higher portfolio valuation or better reputation 
through shareholder activism.   
This paper significantly extends the literature by further investigating the issue of 
mutual funds’ voting policies and shedding light on what factors--other than business 
ties--contribute to their voting strategies across firms for different shareholder proposals. 
We examine whether mutual fund family voting is influenced by the family 
characteristics, characteristics and performance of the firm, governance structure of the 
firm, type of proposals, and ownership structure of the firm. We also investigate whether 
mutual funds engage in a differential monitoring role based on their investment horizon. 
We also extend the literature by examining the incentive structure of mutual funds that 
could act as a motivational force for them to undertake an activist role in their proxy 
voting behavior. Finally, we analyze the trading behavior of mutual funds and investigate 
whether mutual funds engage in “Wall Street Walk,” that is, sell off their shares when 
dissatisfied with firms’ management.7 Our data consist of the voting records of 433 
mutual funds from 24 fund families. The final sample on shareholder proposals includes 
more than 29,000 observations covering 528 firms. 
Gordon and Pound (1993) examine the voting outcome on shareholder proposals.8 
They find that proposals receive more votes when they propose a direct restoration of 
shareholders’ voting rights; when long-run stock performance has been poor; when the 
corporation has in the past enacted a large number of takeover defenses; when the insider 
                                                 
7 This paper does not analyze the effect of vote trading on mutual fund voting behavior due to 
unavailability of data. Christoffersen, Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2005) document the causes and 
consequences of vote trading. They show that demand for borrowed shares increases on voting record date 
and vote trading corresponds to support for shareholder proposals and opposition to management proposals.  
8 Gillan & Starks (2000) also examine voting outcome and show that both the voting outcome and stock 
market response of the proxy proposals depend on the proposal type and sponsor identity.  
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ownership is low and outside blockholder ownership is high; and when they are 
sponsored by large institutional investors or active dissidents. In light of this study, we 
examine whether mutual fund families’ voting policies are influenced by the family 
characteristics, characteristics and performance of the firm, governance structure of the 
firm, type of proposals, and ownership structure of the firm.  
Our results suggest that bigger fund families tend to take management’s side on 
shareholder proposals. We find smaller firms receive more shareholder support from 
mutual funds.9 As the manager of Olstein Financial Alert said, “We want to focus on 
small companies, where we can have more influence.”10 Mutual funds favor shareholder 
proposals in firms with better past performance, which contradicts the results of the 
voting outcome as documented by Gordon and Pound (1993). We argue that higher 
visibility and the likelihood of greater valuation consequences through improved 
governance provisions make the good performing firms more attractive for monitoring by 
mutual funds.  
Mutual funds’ voting policies are also influenced by the existing governance 
structure of the firm. Specifically, the existing anti-takeover provisions of the firms have 
a positive effect on funds’ percentage support for shareholders’ proposals, suggesting that 
mutual funds undertake a monitoring role in firms that have a higher resistance to market 
for corporate control and hence that are more likely to have entrenched management.11 
This suggests that in the absence of an external governance mechanism through a 
takeover market, an internal governance mechanism through voting provisions 
undertakes a substitute monitoring role in order to discipline managers. A higher level of 
internal monitoring mechanism through blockholder ownership leads to a higher 
                                                 
9 Amzaleg, Ben-Zion, and Rosenfeld (2005) also find that smaller firms receive greater shareholder support 
by mutual funds in Israel.  
10 The New York Times, January 15, 2006. 
11 Another competing argument is that higher anti-takeover provisions increase bargaining power of target 
board. However, the literature suggests that managerial entrenchment dominates the enhanced bargaining 
effect (Becht, Bolton, and Roell (2002)).  
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percentage support for shareholder proposals by mutual funds. This implies that mutual 
funds undertake a complementary monitoring role in their voting decision with the level 
of internal monitoring mechanism through blockholder ownership. In addition, the 
possibility of management entrenchment through a higher level of managerial ownership 
leads to superior monitoring by mutual funds. However, the presence of higher voting 
rights of insiders in dual-class shares discourages mutual funds to vote against 
management, as their voting is unlikely to change the outcome of the proposal. The 
results further indicate that mutual funds engage in an active monitoring role by 
supporting shareholder proposals in firms with higher market dissatisfaction and higher 
possibilities of improving governance structure.  
Literature suggests that because of the free-rider problem, only investors with a 
large stake in the firm have incentives to undertake monitoring activities, since their gain 
from monitoring is likely to surpass the associated monitoring cost.12 We investigate 
whether mutual funds with large holdings engage in costly monitoring in enhancing the 
governance mechanism of firms. Our results on the effects of ownership on voting 
decision indicate that mutual funds take management’s side more when they have a large 
ownership stake in a firm.13 This could be due to the causality problem that mutual funds 
are likely to have larger stakes in firms where they are supportive of management 
policies. However, we observe that mutual funds vote against management more when 
they have a longer investment horizon. This suggests that, since the turnover of portfolios 
of the mutual funds industry is typically higher compared to other institutional investors, 
their motivation to take an activist role does not come from the ownership structure, but 
rather from their long-term investment goal.   
The voting behavior of mutual funds is also influenced by the types of proposals. 
The proposals related to the repeal of anti-takeover provisions, which have a direct 
                                                 
12 Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Grossman and Hart (1980), Huddart (1993) and Gillan and Starks (2000),   
13 Amzaleg, Ben-Zion, and Rosenfeld (2005) also find that firms with higher ownership concentration 
receive less shareholder support by mutual funds in Israel.  
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positive effect on shareholders’ wealth and rights, receive higher support.14 Mutual funds 
predominantly seem to side with management on issues related to executive 
compensation. However, for poorly performing firms they penalize management by 
supporting shareholder sponsored executive compensation related proposals.  
 Next, we observe the incentive structure of mutual funds if they undertake a 
monitoring role in shareholders’ resolution. Davis and Kim (2006) argue that if fund 
management’s activism increases portfolio value through better governance provisions, 
this will eventually lead to a better reputation and higher revenues.15 An intriguing 
question arises: Would mutual funds experience a direct reputational effect for supporting 
shareholder proposals? In particular, we investigate whether mutual funds’ release of the 
voting records of shareholder proposals affects the funds’ future asset flow. If mutual 
fund activism improves the funds’ reputation, then higher support for shareholder 
proposals by the funds would likely increase funds’ asset flow after the release of voting 
records. This direct effect would act as a stronger incentive for funds to actively engage 
in shareholder activism and support shareholder proposals. Our results suggest that funds 
that take on an activist role in shareholder proposals by providing higher support 
experience a positive net asset flow in the following year of the voting record release 
date. Moreover, the effect is mostly driven by the repeal of anti-takeover-related 
proposals, which have direct positive shareholder wealth implications. This suggests that 
mutual funds would experience a strong and direct positive reputational effect for 
undertaking an activist role in their voting behavior, which would encourage them to 
exercise their voting rights much more prudently. 
 Finally, we investigate the trading behavior of mutual funds surrounding the 
proposal meeting date and voting record release date. The existing notion is that 
                                                 
14 Our proposals related to repeal of anti-takeover provisions are among the six anti-takeover provisions 
identified by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) which have negative valuation consequences.  
15 The causal link between corporate governance and equity price is not fully established, however, there is 
growing empirical evidence that corporate governance can substantially increase shareholder value. See 
Becht, Bolton, and Roell (2002) for an overview of corporate governance.  
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institutional investors sell their shares when they are dissatisfied with management, 
which is called “Wall Street Walk” or “Vote with Their Feet.”16 In 2002 the SEC 
reported: “Funds have often followed the so-called “Wall Street Rule” according to 
which an investor should either vote as management recommends or, if dissatisfied with 
management, sell the stock” (Rothberg and Lilien (2005)). Analyzing the trading 
behavior of mutual funds surrounding the proposal meeting date and voting record 
release date allows us to investigate whether mutual funds display such behavior. Our 
results indicate that mutual funds that provide a higher percentage of support for 
shareholder proposals engage in reducing their holdings after their voting. This suggests 
that mutual funds that are discontent with firm management support shareholder 
proposals in order to improve the governance provisions of the firms; however, they also 
reduce their holdings after the voting process. One could argue that, if mutual funds 
intend to benefit from the better governance provisions that would be implemented if the 
voting outcome were a success, they should increase or at least maintain their holdings. 
The reduction of their portfolio holdings suggests that anticipating a negative outcome, 
mutual funds sell off their shares. Hence, mutual funds’ vote for shareholder rights before 
reducing their holdings suggests that when dissatisfied with management, mutual funds 
undertake a monitoring role before they engage in “Wall Street Walk.” 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we describe our 
sample and data source. In Section 2.3, we present our analysis of determinants of mutual 
funds’ voting policies across firms. In Section 2.4, we examine the reputational effect of 
mutual funds for undertaking an activist role in their proxy voting decision. We 
investigate the trading behavior of mutual funds surrounding proposal meeting date and 
voting records release date in Section 2.5. Finally, we present our conclusion in Section 
2.6.  
 
                                                 
16 Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) study institutions’ “voting with their feet” around forced CEO turnover.  
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2.2. Sample and Data  
In this section we describe our sample and data. In Section 2.2.1, we discuss our 
sample and describe our data source. In Section 2.2.2, we analyze the voting pattern of 
the fund families. In Section 2.2.3, we discuss our categorization of proposals and present 
the voting pattern of sample fund families in these categories. In Section 2.2.4, we 
present the linkage between the voting behavior and the investment decision.   
 
2.2.1. Data 
On January 23, 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) voted to 
adopt a new rule requiring mutual funds to disclose their proxy voting records on an 
annual basis.17 The new voting disclosure rules adopted by the SEC require both mutual 
funds and investment advisers to disclose the policies and procedures they utilize with 
respect to voting portfolio securities. Mutual funds are also required to disclose their 
complete voting record on Form N-PX, which needs to be filed no later than August 31 
of each year and needs to cover the most recent 12-month period ending on June 30 of 
the same year. The N-PX Form contains the following information: the name of the 
issuer of the portfolio security; the exchange ticker symbol and CUSIP number of the 
portfolio security; the shareholder meeting date; a brief identification of the matter voted 
on; whether the matter was proposed by the issuer or a shareholder; whether the fund 
voted on the matter and how the fund voted; and whether the fund voted for or against 
management.  
We obtained the mutual funds’ proxy voting records of shareholders’ proposals 
for 24 fund families for the year 2004. Fund families and the corresponding funds are 
selected on the basis of total net assets. We compute the total net asset value of all funds 
in the year 2004. The size of a fund family is computed by aggregating the total net assets 
                                                 
17 Davis and Kim (2006) present an overview of the events that lead to the SEC regulation on proxy vote 
disclosure for mutual funds.   
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of all the funds in a fund family. We identify the top 24 fund families with respect to the 
aggregate total net assets to collect the shareholder proposals voting records. Among all 
the funds in a fund family, we identify the funds that have more than $1 billion in assets 
in the year 2004. For each of the 24 fund families we select the top 10 funds with voting 
records that have more than $1 billion in assets. Some families with voting records have 
fewer than 10 funds with over $1 billion in assets. For fund families with more than 50 
funds over $1 billion in assets, the number of funds selected is proportional to the number 
within the $1 billion cut-off sample.18 This results in a sample of 433 mutual funds. Of 
these, the total number of funds with voting records is 216. The remaining funds did not 
have any shareholder proposals or did not possess any voting stocks. For this sample of 
mutual funds we obtain voting records for the period July 1, 2003, to June 30, 2004, on 
528 firms. 
Fund-specific data are obtained from the CRSP mutual fund database, and mutual 
fund ownership data are obtained from Thomson Financial mutual funds holdings 
database.  We match the Thomson Financial mutual funds holdings data with the CRSP 
mutual fund data by matching the fund names. Ownership data by each fund family is 
obtained from CDA-Spectrum 13f filings, which report the quarterly holdings of the 
institutions. We match the mutual fund family holdings data in Thomson Financial 13-f 
filings with our voting data by matching the fund family names.  
Returns, shares outstanding, and market capitalization data are obtained from the 
CRSP database. Firms’ earnings data are obtained from the COMPUSTAT database. We 
obtain ownership data for corporate 5 percent blockholders with no obvious management 
affiliation, and a percentage of outstanding stock beneficially owned by managers and/or 
directors from Compact Disclosure SEC data source. We also incorporate Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) governance scores, which 
                                                 
18 Our sample is subject to sample selection bias with respect to family and funds size.  We select the 
biggest fund families as they play larger role in the investment community. Also, we select only the biggest 
funds within a fund family, since funds within a family mostly vote in the same direction.  
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are obtained from their web sites. Table 2.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the 
sample firms. The table reports the number of observations, mean, median, standard 
deviation, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile values of the firm characteristics, as well as 
performance, governance, and ownership variables. The variables are defined in detail in 
Appendix A.  
 
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Sample Firms 
The table provides the descriptive statistics of sample firms. The table presents Number of 
Observations, Mean, Median, Standard Deviation, 10th Percentile, and 90th Percentile of the firm 
level variables. FIRM SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalization of firm in the 
previous quarter of the proposal. BOOK TO MKT is the book-to-market ratio of the firm in the 
previous quarter of the proposal. RETURN PAST 90 DAYS is the buy-and-hold abnormal return 
of the firm over 90 days prior to proposal meeting date. LONG RUN EXCESS RETURN is the 
buy-and- hold abnormal return of the firm over five years prior to and ending three months prior 
to proposal meeting date. MAJOR STOCK LISTING is a dummy variable, which takes the value 
one if the stock is listed in one of the major stock market. GIM is the Gompers-Ishii-Metrick 
governance score of the firm in the year of the proposal. BCF is the Bebchuk-Cohen-Ferrell 
governance measure of the firm in the year of the proposal. NUMBER OF PROPOSALS is the 
number of shareholder proposals for a particular firm. PERCENT SHARE HOLD is the percent 
of outstanding shares held by the fund family in the quarter of proposal. ALL INST HOLD is the 
percent of outstanding shares held by all institutional investors in the previous quarter of 
proposal. BLOCKHOLDER HOLD is the percent of outstanding shares held by non-management 
5-percent blockholder in the previous quarter of the proposal. INSIDER HOLD is the percent of 













FIRM SIZE 333 8.703 8.728 1.698 6.766 10.955 
BOOK TO MKT 332 0.454 0.430 0.422 0.132 0.827 
RETURN PAST 90 DAYS 353 0.018 0.007 0.178 -0.172 0.195 
LONG RUN EXCESS RETURN 354 0.396 0.013 1.916 -0.768 1.477 
MAJOR STOCK LISTING 437 0.689 1 0.463 0 1 
GIM 309 9.660 10 2.402 7 13 
BCF 319 2.505 3 1.30 1 4 
NUMBER OF PROPOSALS 437 2.613 2 2.375 1 6 
PERCENT SHARE HOLD 285 0.018 0.006 0.026 0.0005 0.061 
ALL INST HOLD 357 0.671 0.717 0.209 0.389 0.889 
BLOCKHOLDER HOLD 381 0.287 0.257 0.225 0.0 0.587 
INSIDER HOLD 381 0.047 0.006 0.113 0.0001 0.143 
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Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics of Voting Records of Sample Fund Families 
This table presents descriptive statistics of voting records of our sample fund families, which are 
the top 24 fund families with respect to total net assets for the year 2004. For each of the fund 
families the table reports Total Number of Voting Records in the sample data. The Table reports 
how these 24 fund families voted on shareholder proposals that appeared in proxy statements for 
the period July 2003 till June 2004. For each of the fund families voting records are obtained 
from the SEC N-PX filings, for 10 or more funds that have over $1 billion in assets. For each of 
the fund families’ sample voting records, the table shows %Vote Cast “for,” %Vote Cast 
“against,” %Vote Cast “abstain,” and %Vote Cast “Unknown.” 
 
Management Name 
Total Number of 
Voting Records in 
Sample 
% Vote Cast 
“for” 
% Vote Cast 
“against” 





Fidelity Management Research 3844 0.167 0.705 0.123 0.005 
Dreyfus Corporation 971 0.192 0.784 0.025 0.000 
Capital Research & Management Co. 2245 0.181 0.774 0.009 0.036 
Deutsche Asset Management 2456 0.321 0.677 0.002 0.000 
Vanguard Group Investment Co. 3350 0.192 0.484 0.324 0.000 
Franklin Advisers Inc. 1290 0.197 0.759 0.031 0.013 
Federated Investment Management Co 623 0.061 0.934 0.005 0.000 
AIM Advisors Inc. 1368 0.185 0.645 0.167 0.002 
Smith Barney Asset Management 1004 0.276 0.713 0.009 0.002 
Putnam Investment Mgmt LLC 1456 0.158 0.830 0.011 0.001 
Alliance Capital Management Corp. 290 0.241 0.710 0.048 0.000 
Prudential Securities Incorporated 1055 0.269 0.572 0.159 0.000 
Allianz Dresdner Asset Mgmt  448 0.467 0.513 0.020 0.000 
Merrill Lynch Investment Managers 817 0.206 0.785 0.010 0.000 
Oppenheimer Funds 1027 0.155 0.472 0.373 0.000 
MFS Investment Management 1587 0.129 0.858 0.013 0.000 
Columbia Management Group Inc. 402 0.356 0.582 0.060 0.002 
Goldman Sachs Asset Management 78 0.244 0.756 0.000 0.000 
Morgan Stanley Investment Advisors  1213 0.153 0.838 0.007 0.003 
American Express Financial Advisors 869 0.119 0.873 0.005 0.003 
ING Investments LLC 460 0.161 0.817 0.022 0.000 
Banc One Investment Advisors 453 0.302 0.671 0.026 0.000 
JPMorgan Fleming Asset Management 970 0.340 0.660 0.000 0.000 
T Rowe Price Associates Inc. 1445 0.241 0.754 0.001 0.005 
Total Number of Proposals 29795 0.221 0.715 0.060 0.003 
 
2.2.2. Voting Pattern  
Table 2.2 presents the percentage of votes cast as “for,” “against,” “abstain,” and 
“unknown” on our sample shareholders’ proposals by the 24 fund families for the period 
July 2003 to June 2004. For all the fund families reported, the percentage of votes cast 
“against” shareholder proposals is higher than the percentage of votes cast “for” or 
“abstain.” We observe that in the aggregate level there is no distinct pattern in voting 
behavior with respect to the fund family size. For our analysis, we consider votes cast 
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“for” as votes against management and votes cast “against” or “abstain” as support 
toward management. We also perform analysis considering votes cast “for” or “abstain” 
as support of the proposals, and the results remain the same.19 For our sample, 
management required a vote “against” the proposals 99 percent of the time. As robustness 
checks we perform an analysis excluding proposals that management required a vote 
“for” the proposals and the results remain the same.  
 
2.2.3. Types of Proposals 
Our sample data includes 75 types of proposals, which are reported in Appendix 
B. We group these proposals into seven broad categories following the existing 
literature.20 The ANTITAKEOVER category consists of proposals that are related to the 
repeal of anti-takeover provisions and includes Repeal Poison Pill, Declassify Board, 
Eliminate Golden Parachutes, Eliminate Supermajority Provision, and Opt-out of State 
Anti-takeover Law. The VOTING ISSUES category consists of proposals concerning 
changes in voting rules and includes Cumulative Voting, Confidential Voting, One-share-
one vote, and Other Voting Relate Issues. The SHAREHOLDER WEALTH AND 
RIGHTS category includes proposals that are likely to increase shareholders’ rights 
and/or wealth and that are not in the anti-takeover or voting provision category. We 
include 21 types of proposals in this category, including Expense Stock Options, Separate 
CEO and Chair of the Board, Insider Notice of Stock and Option Trade, and  Establish 
an Office for Stockholder Communications.21 The next category is EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION, which consists of proposals that are related to executive 
                                                 
19 Through the paper we use phrases “votes against management” and “support of shareholder proposals” 
alternatively.  Rothberg and Lillien (2005) consider votes cast “abstain” as votes against management. 
Fund families also mention in their proxy voting statement that abstain voting policy is an indication that 
mutual funds are not supporting management. 
20 Gillan & Starks (2000), Rothberg & Lilien (2005), Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003).  
21 The wealth implication of all the proposals in this category is not documented in the academic literature. 
We include proposals in this category on the basis of the perception of the proposals by the popular press 
and activist community.  
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compensation and includes proposals such as Limit Awards to Executives, Disclosure of 
Compensation, Performance Based Stock Options, and Submit Executive Compensation 
to Vote.  The DIRECTOR RELATED category consists of proposals related to the board 
and includes issues such as Majority Independent Board, Board Size, and Director 
Compensation. The AUDIT category includes proposals related to the audit committee, 
and the OTHERS category includes all social and ethical related proposals.   
Table 2.3 reports the percentage of votes cast “for” the shareholder proposals by 
the 24 fund families for the seven categories of proposals. The table shows that all 24 
fund families display a higher percentage support for the shareholder proposals for the 
ANTITAKEOVER category compared to all other categories. Proposals in the category 
VOTING ISSUES and SHAREHOLDER WEALTH AND RIGHTS received the second 
and third highest percentage support for some of the fund families. Hence, mutual fund 
families’ support for these proposals highlights the fact that they undertake a monitoring 
role when shareholder proposals are considered as direct restoration of shareholder rights 
and wealth. The results further document that EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION receives 
the second lowest percentage support from most of the fund families. The percentage 
support for the DIRECTOR RELATED and AUDIT categories varies across the fund 
families. The low percentage support on executive compensation issues raises a concern 
as to whether mutual funds are having effective oversight over the firms’ management 
compensation issues and whether their voting behavior is based on its fiduciary 
obligations to its clients.22  Davis and Kim (2006) consider all the proposal categories
                                                 
22 An article in Wall Street Journal on March 28, 2006 reports findings of a study, done by American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees labor union in Washington, and Corporate Library, 
documenting that large mutual fund companies mostly favor management on executive compensation 
issues. The study report that large fund families generally oppose shareholders’ proposals seeking to restrict 
executive pay and provide support only 27.6% of the time. The study did not provide a concrete reason for 
such voting behavior. One reason pointed out is that fund companies believe that executive pay is fair and 
aligned with shareholders’ interests. The other reason provided is conflict of interests of mutual funds due 
to existing or potential business ties with its portfolio firms. 
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Table 2.3:  Percentage of Vote in Support for Different Shareholder Proposals 
The table reports percentage of votes cast “for” the shareholder proposals by the 24 fund families. The sample proposals are categorized into six 
types: ANTITAKEOVER are proposals related to the elimination of anti-takeover measures; VOTING ISSUES are proposals related to voting 
rules; SHAREHOLDER WEALTH AND RIGHTS are proposals related to shareholder wealth and rights; EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION are 
proposals related to executive compensation; DIRECTOR RELATED are proposals related to director independence, compensation, or board size; 
AUDIT are the proposals related to audit committee; OTHERS are general types of proposals. The details of these categories are presented in 
Appendix B.  











Fidelity Management Research 0.756 0.112 0.219 0.087 0.139 0.224 0.007 
Dreyfus Corporation 0.770 0.056 0.172 0.067 0.111 0.250 0.031 
Capital Research & Management Co. 0.680 0.509 0.244 0.022 0.119 0.100 0.053 
Deutsche Asset Management 0.826 0.321 0.515 0.083 0.310 0.200 0.080 
Vanguard Group Investment Co. 0.636 0.041 0.247 0.017 0.065 0.294 0.056 
Franklin Advisers Inc. 0.559 0.433 0.282 0.182 0.385 0.333 0.025 
Federated Investment Management Co 0.472 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AIM Advisors Inc. 0.681 0.450 0.129 0.110 0.239 0.092 0.056 
Smith Barney Asset Management 0.765 0.406 0.342 0.122 0.200 0.143 0.090 
Putnam Investment Mgmt LLC 0.865 0.053 0.072 0.009 0.194 0.000 0.008 
Alliance Capital Management Corp. 0.500 0.250 0.333 0.255 0.200 0.333 0.059 
Prudential Securities Incorporated 0.786 0.424 0.316 0.150 0.377 0.747 0.010 
Allianz Dresdner Asset Mgmt 0.648 0.333 0.512 0.131 0.417 0.250 0.083 
Merrill Lynch Investment Managers 0.548 0.308 0.162 0.147 0.188 0.500 0.062 
Oppenheimer Funds 0.637 0.067 0.167 0.064 0.179 0.000 0.017 
MFS Investment Management 0.847 0.028 0.021 0.028 0.063 0.000 0.000 
Columbia Management Group Inc. 0.735 0.056 0.549 0.229 0.472 0.250 0.133 
Goldman Sachs Asset Management 0.800 0.000 0.357 0.283 0.500  0.135 
Morgan Stanley Investment Advisors 0.467 0.100 0.288 0.074 0.283 0.250 0.027 
American Express Financial Advisors 0.678 0.118 0.193 0.011 0.292 0.000 0.010 
ING Investments LLC 0.708 0.227 0.049 0.006 0.105 0.000 0.024 
Banc One Investment Advisors 0.538 0.600 0.376 0.234 0.179  0.180 
JPMorgan Fleming Asset Management 0.833 0.571 0.400 0.158 0.300 1.000 0.200 
T Rowe Price Associates Inc. 0.813 0.500 0.190 0.255 0.288 0.286 0.043 
Mean Percentage Support 0.690 0.249 0.256 0.113 0.233 0.219 0.058 
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while investigating client ties and voting behavior relationship and find that business ties 
do not influence funds’ voting decision. It is quite possible that fund voting behavior on 
executive compensation issues is influenced by client ties --we leave this for future 
research. 
One of the interesting questions to explore is whether mutual funds vote in 
support of the shareholder proposals more if the sponsor of the proposal is an institutional 
investor. Since we do not have sponsor identity data for our sample shareholder 
proposals, we are unable to address this question directly. However, we shed some light 
on this issue by inferring from the study by Gillan and Starks (2000). The authors show 
that the proposals sponsored by institutions or coordinated groups tend to focus on 
mainly three categories of issues: proposals related to anti-takeover devices, proposals 
related to changes in voting rules, and proposals related to board independence. Table 2.3 
shows that the percentage of votes “for” the shareholder proposals by mutual funds is 
higher for ANTITAKEOVER and VOTING ISSUES, suggesting that mutual funds favor 
shareholder proposals that are more likely to be sponsored by institutions, although we 
are unable to establish a direct link between them. 
 
2.2.4. Variation in Voting Behavior with Investment Horizon 
We investigate whether mutual funds with different investment horizons display 
different proxy voting behavior. We hypothesize that mutual funds with a longer 
investment horizon will tend to be more active in their monitoring role compared to other 
actively managed funds with a shorter investment horizon, since their gain from 
monitoring would be higher as a result of the longer horizon. Typically, value funds have 
a longer investment horizon, and hence we examine whether value funds are more 
vigilant in guarding shareholders’ interests in their proxy voting behavior. Table 2.4 
reports the distribution of voting records on shareholder proposals by mutual funds in 
different investment styles. All funds are categorized according to five different styles 
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based on Standard & Poor’s Style Code: Value, Growth, Blend, Balanced, and Others. 
For each category of style, the table reports the percentage of votes cast “for” the 
proposals, percentage of votes cast “against” the proposals, percentage of votes cast as 
“abstain,” and percentage of votes cast as “unknown.” The table shows that the 
percentage of votes cast “for” the shareholders’ proposals is higher for value funds 
compared to any other styles. The percentage of votes cast “against” show that value 
funds provide lower support to management compared to most other fund style 
categories. Only the blend funds display lower percentage support of management than 
value funds. This supports the notion that value funds are more involved in shareholders’ 
activism. A managing director at Tweedy Brown said, “The primary reason value 
investors are more often involved is that they tend to have longer holding periods than 
other types of actively managed mutual funds.”23 
 
Table 2.4: Shareholder Proposals Voting Records Based on Fund Style 
The table reports the distribution of voting records on shareholder proposals by mutual funds in 
different investment styles. All funds are categorized according to five different styles based on 
Standard & Poor’s Style Code: Value, Growth, Blend, Balanced, and Others. For each category 
of style the table reports percentage of votes cast “for” the proposals, percentage of votes cast 






% Vote Cast 
“for” 
% Vote Cast 
“against” 
% Vote Cast 
“abstain” 


























0.192 0.740 0.053 0.014 
                                                 
23 The New York Times, January 15, 2006. 
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We test the fund voting behavior with respect to investment horizon by using fund 
portfolio turnover ratio as another proxy for the investment horizon. The fund portfolio 
turnover ratio is computed by dividing the minimum of aggregate sales or aggregate 
purchase of securities by the average 12-month total net assets of the funds.  We consider 
the average turnover ratio of funds over the five years prior to shareholder proposals as a 
proxy for the funds’ investment horizon, where higher (lower) turnover ratio implies 
funds with a short (long) investment horizon. Funds are ranked in 10 deciles based on 
turnover ratio in ascending order, with decile 1 has the funds with least turnover ratio and 
decile 10 has the funds with most turnover ratio. We computed the average percentage 
votes cast “for” and “against” on shareholder proposals across these 10 deciles. Figure 
2.1 shows the voting pattern for the 10 turnover deciles. Figure 2.1A shows the average 
percentage of votes cast “for” by the 10 turnover deciles. We observe that the higher the 
turnover decile, the lower the percentage of votes cast for shareholder proposals. This 
suggests that mutual funds with a shorter (longer) investment horizon tend to be less 
(more) supportive of shareholder proposals. Figure 2.1B shows the average percentage of 
votes cast “against” by the 10 turnover deciles. The figure shows that low turnover decile 
funds tend to oppose shareholder proposals less often compared to funds in high turnover 
deciles. This again suggests that mutual funds with a longer (shorter) investment horizon 
tend to be less (more) supportive of management and more (less) supportive of 
shareholders. The difference between the two extreme deciles 1 and 10 is presented in 
Table 2.5. The table shows the mean and median of the percentage votes cast “for” and 
“against,” their differences, and statistical significance of the differences between the two 
extreme deciles. We observe that both the mean and median differences are statistically 
significant. The results reiterate the notion that mutual funds with a longer investment 
horizon tend to be more supportive of shareholder proposals compared to funds with a 
shorter investment horizon.  
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Figure 2.1: Fund Voting Behavior with Respect to Investment Horizon  
The fund portfolio turnover ratio is a proxy for the investment horizon. The fund portfolio 
turnover ratio is computed by dividing the minimum of aggregate sales or aggregate purchase of 
securities by the average 12-month total net assets of the funds. Funds are ranked in 10 deciles 
based on turnover ratio in ascending order, with Decile 1 the least turnover funds (long 
investment horizon) and Decile 10 the most turnover funds (short investment horizon). The 
average percentage votes cast “for” and “against” shareholders’ proposals by these 10 decile 
portfolio of funds is plotted. Percentage vote casts “for” shareholder proposals vs. fund turnover 
deciles is presented in Figure 1A. Percentage vote casts “against” shareholder proposals vs. fund 
turnover deciles is presented in Figure 1B.  
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Table 2.5: Shareholder Proposals Voting Records Based on Fund Turnover Decile 
The table reports mean and median percentage of votes cast for and against shareholder proposals 
on fund turnover Deciles 1 and 10.  Funds are ranked in 10 deciles based on turnover ratio in 
ascending order, with Decile 1 the least turnover funds and Decile 10 the most turnover funds. 
The table reports mean, median, number of observation, difference in mean and median, and p-
value for the differences. Fund turnover ratio is computed by dividing the minimum of aggregate 
sales or aggregate purchase of securities by the average 12-month total net assets of the funds. 
The average turnover of the previous five years of shareholder proposals is considered to 
construct the deciles. 
 














p-value for difference 
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difference) 























2.3. Determinants of Mutual Funds’ Voting Policies across Firms   
The voting records of mutual funds suggest that their voting pattern varies across 
firms. For example, for a shareholder proposal on “repeal of poison pill,” a mutual fund 
could vote “for” the proposal for a particular firm, but vote “against” the proposal for 
another firm. This variation in voting pattern across firms is our rationale for 
investigating the determinants of the mutual fund voting behavior. Davis and Kim (2006) 
report that among the 10 largest fund families, Fidelity, Vanguard, Putnam, American 
Funds, Morgan Stanley, and Oppenheimer vote consistently across funds, whereas funds 
in the T. Rowe Price, AIM/Invesco, Janus, and Franklin families voted differently in 
certain instances (same company proposals). Rothberg and Lilien (2005) examine the 
proxy voting policies of the 10 largest fund families and report that funds vote according 
to their proxy policy guidelines, which are established by the higher management of the 
fund families. If a fund manager intends to vote contrary to the guidelines, the case would 
go to a committee or top management, which would oversee the matter. Since the 
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variation of voting pattern for a particular proposal across funds in a family is not a 
dominant feature, we analyze the voting behavior at the fund family level. 
Davis and Kim (2006) show that mutual fund voting behavior is not influenced by 
the business ties with the firm. The authors state that “mutual funds may have to bite 
some feeding hands in order to appear even-handed; yet they also have incentives to 
create policies that lead to less hand-biting.” The question we address is what determines 
which hands they are going to bite and which hands they are going to let go. That is, we 
further investigate the issue of their voting policies and shed light on how mutual fund 
families’ voting pattern varies across firms for different shareholder proposals.  In 
Section 2.3.1, we examine the variation of voting behavior in extreme portfolios based on 
firm characteristics, performance, and existing anti-takeover provisions. In Section 2.3.2, 
we present our empirical findings on determinants of mutual funds’ voting policies across 
firms. In our analysis we do not include the proposals related to environment, social, and 
ethical issues that are categorized as OTHERS in the paper, as the implications of these 
proposals to shareholder value are not clear. Additionally, we perform analysis (not 
shown in the table) only on proposals that are likely to have positive wealth implications 
such as repeal of anti-takeover proposals, voting-related proposals, and other shareholder 
wealth and rights related proposals; the results remain qualitatively the same.      
 
2.3.1. Variation of Voting Behavior in Extreme Portfolios 
A. Firm Characteristics and Performance 
We first examine whether funds’ voting behavior varies in extreme portfolios 
based on firm characteristics and performance variables; the results appear in Table 2.6.24 
FIRM SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalization of a firm in the previous 
quarter of the proposal.  We construct 10 portfolios based on size, where P1 represents 
                                                 
24 Gordon and Pound (1993) analyze voting outcome of shareholder proposals with respect to firm 
characteristic and performance variables.  
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the portfolio with the smallest firms and P10 represents the portfolio with the largest 
firms.  BOOK TO MKT is the book-to-market ratio of the firm in the previous quarter of 
the proposal. Similar to size, we construct 10 portfolios based on book-to-market ratio, 
where P1 represents portfolio of glamour stocks and P10 represents portfolio of value 
stocks. As a measure of historical long-run performance of the firm, we introduce 
HISTORICAL LONG RUN EXCESS RETURN, which is the buy-and-hold abnormal 
return of the firm over the five years prior to and ending three months prior to the 
proposal meeting date. P1 represents portfolio of worst performing firms and P10 
represents portfolio of best performing firms. Table 2.6 shows the mean and median of 
the percentage support for shareholder proposals and the statistical significance of the 
differences between the two extreme portfolios. In Panel A, votes cast “for” or “abstain” 
are considered as votes against management and in Panel B only votes cast “for” are 
considered as votes against management.  We observe that in both panels, the mean 
support for shareholder proposals on portfolios of small firms (P1) is higher than the 
mean support on portfolios of large firms (P10), and their difference is statistically 
significant. This suggests that on average small firms receive higher support for 
shareholder proposals as compared to large firms.25 The mean difference in support 
between extreme portfolios based on book-to-market ratio indicates that mutual funds 
provide higher percentage support for shareholder proposals of glamour stocks. 
On the basis of performance, we observe that the mean percentage support for the 
lowest performance portfolio (P1) is higher than that of the highest performance 
portfolios (P10), although the difference is significant only when both “for” or “abstain” 
votes are considered to be support of shareholder proposals. We further test the difference 
in voting behavior between the two extreme portfolios based on past performance on 
executive compensation issues. 
                                                 
25 Amzaleg, Ben-Zion, and Rosenfeld (2005) find that smaller firms receive greater shareholder support by 
mutual funds in Israel. Gordon and Pond (1993) also find that smaller firms receive higher percentage of 
votes cast in favor of proposals. 
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Table 2.6: Percentage Support for Shareholder Proposals in Extreme Portfolios Based on 
Size, Book-to-Market and Performance 
The table presents the mean and median percentage support for shareholder proposals for extreme 
portfolios of stocks based on size, book-to-market, and performance. The number of observations 
is presented in the bracket. FIRM SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalization of the 
firm in the previous quarter of the proposal. Ten size-based portfolios are formed, where P1 
represents the portfolio with the smallest firms and P10 represents the portfolio with the largest 
firms.  BOOK TO MKT is the book-to-market ratio of the firm in the previous quarter of the 
proposal. Ten portfolios based on book-to-market ratio are formed, where P1 represents the 
portfolio of glamour stocks and P10 represents the portfolio of value stocks. HISTORICAL 
LONG RUN EXCESS RETURN is buy-and-hold abnormal return of the firm over five years 
prior to and ending three months prior to the proposal. Performance based portfolios represent P1 
the worst performing firms and P10 the best performing firms. For each portfolio of stocks, the 
table reports the mean and median of the percentage support for shareholder proposals by all the 
fund families in the sample and the statistical significance of the differences between the two 
extreme portfolios. In panel (A), votes cast “for” or “abstain” are considered as support of 
shareholder proposals. In panel (B), votes cast “for” are considered to be support of shareholder 
proposals.  
 













































































On average, firms in the worst performing portfolio receive higher support (mean 
0.235) on executive compensation issues than firms in the best performing portfolio 
(mean 0.073). The difference in mean between the worst and best performing portfolios 
is statistically significant (P-value 0.08). This suggests that mutual funds side with 
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shareholders more on executive compensation issues for the extreme underperforming 
firms, thereby penalizing management for poor performance.26  
 
B. Governance Mechanism 
Cremers and Nair (2005) investigate how the market for corporate control, which 
is the external governance mechanism, interacts with shareholder activism, which is the 
internal governance mechanism. They show that external and internal governance 
mechanisms complement to each other, which results in long-term abnormal returns and 
profitability of firms. They use percentage of share ownership by public pension funds 
and by the largest blockholders as the proxy for the internal governance mechanism. As a 
proxy for the external governance mechanism they use the anti-takeover provisions 
(ATP) incorporated by the firms.27 Higher anti-takeover provisions (ATP) imply higher 
resistance for market for corporate control. Hence, these firms are more likely to have 
entrenched management, as they are less likely to be disciplined by the takeover market. 
We investigate how the internal governance mechanism in the form of mutual funds’ 
voting behavior interacts with the external governance mechanism in the form of market 
for corporate control. We test whether mutual funds engage in disciplining management 
through their voting behavior in the absence of an external monitoring force through the 
takeover market. In particular, we investigate whether mutual funds undertake a greater 
monitoring role in high ATP firms by providing higher support for shareholder proposals 
in order to reduce the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders.   
We use the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance score of the firm in 
the year of the proposal as a measure of anti-takeover provisions of firms. The 
construction of the score predominantly considers anti-takeover provisions and hence the 
measure is accepted as an anti-takeover provision (ATP) rather than a representation of 
                                                 
26 The details of these results are available upon request.    
27 Coates (2000) and Bhagat and Romano (2001) provide a survey of the literature regarding takeover 
defenses.  
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the overall governance of the firm. The study documents that the GIM index is negatively 
related to firm value and stock return.  The GIM index is constructed by 24 anti-takeover 
provisions published by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), giving each 
provision equal weight. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) argue that not all 24 IRRC 
provisions contribute equally to the negative correlation between GIM index and firm 
value. They identify six provisions among the 24 that reduce shareholders’ protection: 
classified boards, poison pills, golden parachutes, limit to amend by-laws, and 
supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. The authors provide an 
entrenchment index (BCF) based on these six provisions and show that they have 
negative valuation consequences in firms, both individually and at the aggregate level. 
The authors further state that the other 18 provisions are not significantly negatively 
correlated with firm value.  
We investigate the effect of existing anti-takeover provisions of firms on voting 
behavior of mutual funds using both GIM and BCF indices. We construct “Low ATP” 
and “High ATP” portfolios based on both GIM and BCF indices. In the case of GIM, we 
classify firms with a GIM index below 10 (sample median) as “Low ATP” portfolio and 
firms with a GIM index equal to or higher than 10 as “High ATP” portfolio. Following 
Masulis, Wang, and Xi (2006), we do not construct portfolios on the basis of a cut-off 
GIM index, as mentioned in Gompers-Ishii-Metrick (2003), as this would reduce our 
sample size significantly. We also construct high and low ATP portfolios on the basis of 
BCF index, with a BCF index equal to or greater than three as “High ATP” portfolio and 
a BCF index less than three as “Low ATP” portfolio. In Table 2.7, we present the mean 
and median percentage support for shareholder proposals for the portfolio of stocks 
constructed using governance indices. In panel A, we consider votes cast “for” or 
“abstain” as support for shareholder proposals (votes against management) and in panel B 
we only consider votes cast “for” as support for shareholder proposals. We observe that 
at the aggregate level, the mean and median percentage of votes cast in favor of the 
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Table 2.7: Percentage Support for Shareholder Proposals and Governance Indices  
The table presents the mean and median percentage support for shareholder proposals for 
portfolio of stocks based on governance index. The number of observations is presented in the 
bracket. GIM is the Gompers-Ishii-Metrick governance measure and BCF is the Bebchuk-Cohen-
Ferrell governance measure. For GIM index High ATP Portfolio is formed by stocks with 
GIM>=10 and Low ATP Portfolio is formed by stocks with GIM<=9. For BCF index High ATP 
Portfolio is formed by stocks with BCF>=3 and Low ATP Portfolio is formed by stocks with 
BCF<=2. For each portfolio of stocks the table reports the mean and median percentage support 
for shareholder proposals by all the fund families in the sample. In panel A votes cast “for” or 
“abstain” are considered as support of shareholder proposals. In panel B votes cast “for” are 
considered to be support of shareholder proposals.  
 















































































































































































































































































shareholder proposals is higher for the “High ATP” portfolio compared to the “Low 
ATP” portfolio, for both GIM and BCF indices in both panels. Moreover, the difference 
in both the mean and median is statistically significant. We further test whether this 
difference in voting behavior is due to support for the proposals related to repeal of anti-
takeover provisions only or whether this persists in all proposal categories. We observe 
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that for all categories of proposals, except for executive compensation issues, the “High 
ATP” portfolio receives higher percentage support compared to the “Low ATP” portfolio 
for both the GIM and BCF indices, although not all are statistically significant. This 
implies that mutual funds side with shareholders more in their voting decisions on most 
types of proposals in firms with higher anti-takeover provisions compared to firms with 
low anti-takeover provisions. This suggests that mutual funds undertake a stronger 
activist role in firms with entrenched management who are less likely to be disciplined by 
the takeover market. However, for executive compensation issues, the results suggest that 
for both GIM and BCF indices, the “High ATP” portfolio receives lower support than the 
“Low ATP” portfolio. This suggests that “management power” plays a role in the voting 
decision of mutual funds in the context of executive compensation; this requires further 
investigation in the future. 
 
2.3.2. Empirical Models and Results 
In this section, we examine mutual funds’ voting behavior across firms for 
different shareholder proposals. Since the variation of voting patterns for a particular 
proposal across funds in a family is not a dominant feature, we analyze voting behavior at 
the fund family level. We examine whether mutual fund family voting is influenced by 
the family characteristics, characteristics and performance of the firm, governance 
structure of the firm, type of proposals, and ownership structure of the firm. Table 2.8 
presents the analysis of voting records of shareholder proposals by fund families. The 
dependent variable is PERCENT SUPPORT BY FAMILY pif , which is the percentage 
of votes cast in support of shareholder proposal p of firm i by all funds in family f. In 
Table 2.8, votes cast “for” are considered to be support of shareholder proposals and a 
vote against management. We run results considering votes cast “for” or “abstain” as 
support of shareholder proposals; the results (not reported) are qualitatively similar.  
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Table 2.8: Analysis of Voting Records of Shareholder Proposals by Fund Families 
This table presents the analysis of voting records on shareholder proposals by 24 sample fund 
families. The dependent variable is PERCENT SUPPORT BY FAMILY pif , which is the 
percentage of votes cast in support of shareholder proposal p of firm i by all funds in family f. 
Votes cast “for” are considered to be support of shareholder proposals. Descriptions of the 
variables are provided in the Appendix A. The p-value is in parenthesis. The Statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. 
 

















































































































































































































Family Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
2R  0.12 0.14 0.37 0.12 0.14 0.37 
Number of Observations 5814 4395 4395 6133 4392 4392 
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Table 2.8 reports results of six regression models. In models 1, 2, and 3 we use 
the Gompers-Ishii-Metrick (GIM) index and in models 4, 5, and 6 we use the Bebchuk-
Cohen-Ferrell (BCF) index as a measure of firms’ existing anti-takeover provisions.  In 
all models we incorporate family level fixed effects.  In models 2 and 5, we introduce 
firm ownership variables. In models 3 and 6, in addition to ownership variables, we 
control for types of proposals.   
 
A. Family Characteristics 
We investigate whether larger fund families are more supportive of management 
on shareholder proposals. To test this, we introduce an independent variable, FAMILY 
SIZE, which is the logarithm of the total net assets of all the funds in the family in the 
year of the shareholder proposal. In Table 2.8, we observe that FAMILY SIZE has a 
negative significant effect even after controlling for the types of proposals and ownership 
data. This implies that larger fund families are more supportive of management on 
shareholder proposals. We observe the effect of business ties by introducing a dummy 
variable BUSINESS TIES FAMILIES, which is equal to one if the fund family is among 
one of the conflicted ones as defined by Davis and Kim (2006).28 The negative and 
significant coefficient of the indicator variable BUSINESS TIES FAMILIES  reconfirms 
that conflicted fund families tend to be less supportive of shareholder proposals and tend 
to side with management more often.29  
 
B. Firm Characteristics and Performance 
                                                 
28 Davis and Kim (2006) identify the six most conflicted fund companies in terms of business ties. These 
are Fidelity, Vanguard, American Funds, Putnam, AIM/Invesco, and T. Rowe Price. 
29 The correlation between FAMILY SIZE and the indicator variable BUSINESS TIES FAMILIES is 0.59; 
thus negative significant coefficient of FAMILY SIZE could be due to bigger fund families having more 
business ties.  
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Gordon and Pound (1993) show that the voting outcome of shareholder proposals 
is influenced by firm characteristics and performance variables. We examine the effect of 
firm characteristics and performance variables on the voting behavior of mutual fund 
families. As a firm characteristics variable, we analyze the effect of firm size, book-to-
market, and major stock listing on the voting pattern. We observe that FIRM SIZE has a 
negative significant effect in all six models, suggesting that smaller firms receive higher 
support on shareholder proposals. As the manager of Olstein Financial Alert said, “We 
want to focus on small companies, where we can have more influence.”30 We observe 
that BOOK-TO-MKT has a negative significant effect, suggesting that value stocks 
receive less support and glamour stocks receive more support on shareholder proposals.  
In order to examine the effect of the information environment of firms, we 
introduce a dummy variable, MAJOR STOCK LISTING, which is equal to one if the 
firm is listed in one of the major stock exchanges (NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX) and 
zero otherwise. Exchange-listed firms have a more transparent information environment 
and therefore marginal gain for undertaking a monitoring role in these firms would be 
higher. We observe that the effect of MAJOR STOCK LISTING is positive and 
significant, suggesting that listed firms are more likely to receive higher support on 
shareholder proposals.   
Karpoff, Maletesta, & Walkling (1996) argue that poorly performing firms attract 
shareholder proposals more. Smith (1996) reports that activist pension funds CalPERS 
consider poor performers as targets. We test whether mutual funds provide higher support 
for shareholder proposals in poorly performing firms in order to discipline management. 
As a measure of past performance of the firm we introduce HISTORICAL LONG RUN 
EXCESS RETURN, which is the buy-and-hold abnormal return of the firm over five 
years prior to and ending three months prior to the proposal meeting date. The results in 
Table 2.8 show that HISTORICAL LONG RUN EXCESS RETURN has a positive 
                                                 
30 The New York Times, January 15, 2006. 
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significant effect, implying that the higher the past long-run performance of the firm, the 
higher the support for shareholder proposals by mutual funds. This result contradicts the 
argument presented by Gordon and Pound (1993) that shareholder proposals would gain 
higher support when the firms’ performance has been worse, which raises a question 
about management competence. It is not clear why mutual funds provide higher support 
for shareholder proposals in better performing firms, but do not have an oversight in 
poorly performing ones.31 We explain this phenomenon by providing two arguments. 
Firms with good performance have higher visibility and a superior informational 
environment as a result of more coverage. This would lead to a low cost of monitoring, 
since information gathering would be less costly, thereby causing higher support for 
shareholder proposals of these firms. Another explanation could be the higher valuation 
consequence resulting from monitoring. Mutual funds follow good performing firms 
more closely and are more eager to improve the performance of these firms through 
better governance provisions, as these firms are likely to have a higher impact in their 
overall portfolio valuation. However, we are unable to state what actually contributes to 
such voting behavior.     
 
C. Governance Structure of the Firm. 
In order to investigate the effect of governance structure of the firm on voting 
behavior, we introduce the GIM (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)) and BCF 
(Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004)) indices, which measure the existing anti-takeover 
provisions of firms.32 In Table 2.8, the GIM index is used in models 1, 2, and 3, and the 
BCF index is used in models 4, 5, and 6. We also include DUAL CLASS, a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if the firm has dual-class shares and zero otherwise. In a 
recent paper, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2005) refer to dual-class stock as the “most 
                                                 
31 Only in executive compensation related proposals, we find that mutual funds vote against management in 
poorly performing firms Results described in section 3.2(F).    
32 We explain the indices in more detail in section 4.1(B) 
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extreme example of anti-takeover protection.” The authors state that dual-class stock is 
much more powerful as an anti-takeover measure than other types of protections such as 
poison pills, staggered boards, or golden parachutes. The study shows that insiders in an 
average dual-class firm have approximately 60 percent of the voting rights and 40 percent 
of the cash flow rights. We examine whether the presence of dual-class shares influences 
funds voting behavior. We also introduce the NUMBER OF PROPOSALS, which is the 
number of shareholder proposals received in a firm, as an indirect measure of governance 
provision of the firm.33 A higher number of shareholder proposals in a firm is likely to 
represent shareholders’ discontentment with the overall governance structure of the firm 
and their view regarding the improvement potential in the firms’ governance provisions. 
 We observe that in Table 2.8, both the GIM and BCF indices have a positive 
significant effect on percentage support in all models. Our results therefore imply that 
firms with a higher number of anti-takeover provisions (ATP) are likely to receive higher 
support for shareholder proposals. This suggests that mutual fund families engage in 
monitoring by supporting shareholder-sponsored proposals in firms that have a higher 
resistance for market for corporate control.  Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2006) state that the 
conflict of interest between managers and shareholders is more severe at firms with 
higher ATPs. They argue that managers in firms with higher ATPs are more likely to 
engage in acquisitions for empire building, as they are less likely to be disciplined by the 
market for corporate control. We argue that by supporting shareholder proposals more for 
higher ATP firms, mutual fund families engage in disciplining managers of the firms with 
a weaker external monitoring mechanism in place and where shareholder-manager 
conflict of interest is likely to be higher.  
The DUAL-CLASS variable has a negative and significant effect, suggesting that 
mutual funds side with management in firms with dual-class shares. The negative effect 
                                                 
33 Gordon and Pound (1993) use number of shareholder proposals as a proxy for governance structure of 
firm.  
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of the indicator variable DUAL CLASS can be explained by the notion that mutual funds 
realize that their support for shareholder proposals in dual-class firms would not likely 
change the final outcome, due to higher probability of receiving management support 
because of a higher presence of insiders’ voting rights, and therefore they take a passive 
role in these firms. This is along the same line of argument presented in Stulz (1988), 
where the author argues that higher voting rights of insiders decrease the probability of a 
hostile takeover attempt, as it reduces the probability of success. A similar argument is 
also presented in Mikkelson and Partch (1989).  
The effect of NUMBER OF PROPOSALS in all models in Table 2.8 is positive 
and significant. This indicates that mutual funds engage in an active monitoring role by 
supporting shareholder proposals in firms with higher market dissatisfaction and higher 
possibilities of improving governance structure.  
 
D. Ownership Structure of Fund Family  
The literature suggests that because of the free-rider problem, only investors with 
a large stake in the firm have incentives to undertake monitoring activities since their 
gain from monitoring is likely to surpass the associated monitoring cost.34 Davis and Kim 
(2006) examine whether mutual funds undertake a costly monitoring role in firms in 
which their holdings are over-weighted relative to a market portfolio. By investigating 
each individual fund’s voting, they find that the fund-voting decision is independent of its 
portfolio weight. We analyze the effect of ownership structure in the fund family level 
since the fund-voting guidelines are established at the fund family level. We examine 
whether mutual fund families engage in monitoring when they have a higher ownership 
stake in the firm. To investigate the effect of ownership concentration we introduce the 
variable PERCENT SHARE HOLD, which is the percent of outstanding shares held by 
the fund family in the quarter of the proposal. The regression results in Table 2.8 show 
                                                 
34 Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Grossman and Hart (1980), Huddart (1993) and Gillan and Starks (2000),   
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that PERCENT SHARE HOLD has a negative significant effect after controlling for the 
different types of proposals. This suggests that higher ownership concentration would 
lead to higher support toward management by a fund family.35 This could be due to the 
causality problem that mutual funds are likely to have larger stakes in firms where they 
are more supportive of management policies. A Wall Street Journal article in September 
22, 2006, report that “fund companies argue that it shouldn’t come as a surprise that they 
back management. If they didn’t like a company’s direction, they wouldn’t have bought, 
or they would sell.”  
 
E. Other Ownership Structure 
We include INSIDER HOLD, which is the percent of outstanding stock 
beneficially owned by managers and/or directors in the previous quarter of the proposal. 
In Table 2.8, INSIDER HOLD has a positive and significant effect even after controlling 
for type of proposals. This implies that the higher the ownership concentration by 
managers and/or directors, the higher the percentage support by mutual funds for 
shareholder proposals. This emphasizes the notion that mutual funds undertake active 
monitoring role in firms with higher management ownership concentration. This is along 
the same line of the argument as the management entrenchment hypothesis and supports 
that firms with higher management ownership concentration require more monitoring 
rules in place, as managers in these firms are likely to pursue empire building rather than 
maximizing shareholders’ wealth.36 
                                                 
35 The evidence of the relation between institutional holdings and outcome on shareholder proposals is 
mixed. Gordon and Pound (1993) and Gillan and Starks (2000) suggest higher institutional holdings lead to 
higher positive outcome of shareholder proposals. Romano (2001) finds no significant relationship between 
institutional investors’ holdings and shareholder proposals support. Amzaleg, Ben-Zion, and Rosenfeld 
(2005) find negative significant correlation between fund ownership concentration and votes cast to support 
shareholders by mutual funds in Israel  
36 Demsetz (1983), Fama & Jensen (1983), Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny (1988), McConnell & Servaes 
(1990) 
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We introduce BLOCKHOLDER HOLD, which is the percentage of outstanding 
stock owned in the previous quarter of the proposal by 5-percent blockholders with no 
obvious management affiliation. Blockholder ownership is considered to be a part of the 
internal monitoring mechanism. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that the presence of 
large outside blockholders increases the likelihood of a firm being targeted for activism. 
Shivdasani (1993) finds a positive relation between ownership by unaffiliated 
blockholders and the likelihood of a hostile takeover attempt. Hartzell and Starks (2003) 
find a positive relation between the five largest institutional concentrations and the pay-
for-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation. They also show that the top five 
institutional investor concentrations have a negative relation to the level of executive 
compensation. Moreover, often times, activist shareholders undertake a high ownership 
stake before launching a proxy fight or becoming involved in shareholder activism. These 
activists carry out a wide range of campaign to obtain more support, which might lead 
mutual funds to take part in a similar role. Our results on BLOCKHOLDER HOLD show 
a positive and significant effect on percentage of support. This suggests that higher 
blockholder ownership concentration would lead to higher support for shareholder 
proposals by mutual funds. This implies that the presence of a higher internal governance 
mechanism through unaffiliated blockholder ownership influences funds to vote against 
management.    
 
F. Types of Proposals 
According to Gordon and Pound (1993), proposals that suggest clear restoration 
of shareholder power may receive more support than proposals that are more qualitative 
and difficult to assess.37 We investigate whether the voting pattern of mutual fund 
families varies with types of proposals. In Table 2.8, we observe the effects of proposal 
types in models 3 and 6. We observe that mutual fund families provide significant 
                                                 
37 Gillan and Starks (2000) and Romano (2001) also investigate effect of types of proposals.  
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support for anti-takeover and voting- related proposals. Mutual fund families’ support for 
these proposals highlights the fact that they undertake a monitoring role when 
shareholder proposals involve governance provisions that increase shareholder wealth 
and rights.38 The results also suggest that mutual fund families take management’s side 
on executive compensation issues. With recent scandals and debates over executive 
compensation issues, these proposals should be under greater scrutiny. The AFL-CIO 
web site describes CEO pay as follows: “Every year, shareholders and America’s 
workers learn of new jaw-dropping executive compensation packages that seem to defy 
rational explanation. Too often, the CEO pay system enriches executives without regard 
to their individual performance or realistic contribution to their company.” The web site 
also promotes that proxy voting is the most direct means for shareholders to exercise 
oversight of the companies they own. Union-sponsored funds submitted 43 percent of 
corporate governance proposals in 2004. Many of these proposals were regarding 
executive compensation, which accounted for more than 40 percent of all governance 
proposals. Murphy (1999) provides a detailed study of executive compensation. The 
author reports that the average S&P 500 CEO received 90 times more in cash 
compensation than the average earnings of a factory worker in 1996. The total realized 
compensation of CEOs is 210 times more than the earnings of production workers. This 
is up from 30 times more in 1970. Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005) show that 
institutional ownership concentration is negatively related to the level of executive 
compensation, suggesting that institutions undertake monitoring role in reducing the 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers. Their results also suggest that 
institutions prefer firms with higher pay-for-performance sensitivity. Using the voting 
mechanism, mutual funds could undertake a more direct monitoring role in the 
governance mechanism that is concerned with executive compensation. The question 
                                                 
38 Our proposals related to repeal of anti-takeover provisions are among the six anti-takeover provisions 
identified by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) which have negative valuation consequences.  
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then remains whether mutual funds vote on executive compensation proposals 
considering past performance of firms. We perform regression analysis similar to Table 
2.8 (model 2) only on executive compensation proposals (results not shown in table). The 
results indicate that HISTORICAL LONG RUN EXCESS RETURN, which is the buy-
and-hold abnormal return of the firm over five years prior to and ending three months 
prior to the proposal meeting date, has a negative significant effect with coefficient (-
0.02) and p-value 0.02. This implies that mutual funds vote against management and 
support shareholder proposals on executive compensation issues in poorly performing 
firms. Hence, this indicates that mutual funds take into consideration the past 
performance of firms with regard to their voting decision on executive compensation 
issues. Analyzing mutual funds voting behavior on executive compensation issues in 
much more detail considering pay-for-performance is left for future research. 
 
2.4. Effect of Mutual Funds’ Voting Records of Shareholder Proposals on Fund 
Reputation 
In this section, we investigate the incentive structure of mutual funds for 
exercising their voting power to guard shareholders’ interests. Davis and Kim (2006) 
argue that if fund management’s activism increases portfolio value through better 
governance provisions, this will eventually lead to a better reputation and higher 
revenues. One intriguing research question is, would mutual funds experience a direct 
reputational effect for supporting shareholder proposals, which is not through the 
valuation consequences as a result of the implementation of better governance 
provisions? In particular, we investigate whether mutual funds’ release of the voting 
records on shareholder proposals effect the funds’ future asset flow. If mutual fund 
activism improves the funds’ reputation, then higher support for shareholder proposals by 
the funds would likely to increase the funds’ asset flow after the release of voting records. 
This direct affect would act as a stronger incentive for funds to actively engage in 
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shareholder activism and support shareholder proposals. The dependent variable in our 
analysis is FUND FLOW j , which is the objective adjusted net asset flow of mutual fund 
j over the following year of the mutual fund voting record release date.39 The independent 
variable MEDIAN PERCENT SUPPORT BY FUND j  is the median percentage support 
fund j provides over all shareholder proposals. This is obtained by first computing the 
percentage of support by a fund over all proposals for a particular stock, and then taking 
the median of this percentage over all stocks by the fund.  
We first examine the average FUND FLOW in portfolio of funds based on 
percentage support on shareholder proposals (results not reported in table). Votes cast 
“for” are considered to be support of shareholder proposals. We construct 10 fund deciles 
based on MEDIAN PERCENT SUPPORT BY FUND, where decile 1 corresponds to 
funds with lowest median percentage support and decile 10 corresponds to funds with 
highest median percentage support. We compute the average fund flow of the ten fund 
deciles on the following year after the release of voting records. The average fund flow 
on decile 1 funds is -0.01 and for decile 10 funds is 0.002 and the difference in mean is 
statistically significant (p-value 0.04). This implies that mutual funds that belong to 
lowest percentage support decile experience a negative net asset flow and funds that 
belong to highest percentage support decile 10 experience a positive net asset flow and 
the difference is significant. The regression analysis in Table 2.9 analyzes whether 
mutual funds that provide higher percentage support on shareholder proposals experience 
a positive net asset flow after controlling for other factors that influence funds’ asset 
flow. In Table 2.9, models 1 and 3 consider votes cast “for” as support of shareholder 
                                                 
39 Following Sirri & Tufano (1998) we measure the flow of assets of fund j as follows: 
11 /))1(( −− +−= jtjtjtjtjt TNARTNATNAFlow  
where, 
jtTNA  is the total net asset in fund j at the end of year t and jtR is the return of fund j in year t. 
jtFlow  reflects the growth of the funds that is not due to the rate of return earned on the assets under 
management, but due to new external money. We compute the objective adjusted net asset flow by 
subtracting from
jtFlow  the median asset flow of all funds within the same objective  
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proposals and models 2 and 4 consider votes cast “for” or “abstain” as support of 
shareholder proposals.   
 
Table 2.9: Effect of Mutual Funds’ Voting Records on Fund Flow  
This table presents the effect of mutual funds’ voting records of shareholder proposals on fund 
flow. The dependent variable FUND FLOW j  is the objective adjusted net asset flow of mutual 
fund j over the following year of the mutual fund voting record release date. The independent 
variable MEDIAN PERCENT SUPPORT BY FUND j  is the median percentage support fund j 
provides over all shareholder proposals. This is obtained by first computing the percentage of 
support by a fund over all proposals for a particular stock, then taking the median of this 
percentage over all stocks by the fund. In model 1 and 3 votes cast “for” are considered to be 
support of shareholder proposal. In model 2 and 4 votes cast “for” or “abstain” are considered to 
be support of shareholder proposal. Descriptions of all other control variables are provided in the 
Appendix A. The p-value is in parenthesis. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level 






































































































     
Style Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
2R  0.47 0.46 0.47 0.47 
Number of Observations 210 210 205 205 
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The literature suggests that fund asset flows depend on the fund’s performance.40 
In models 1 and 2 we use objective adjusted return (OAR) to control for fund 
performance.41 Objective adjusted return of fund is measured over the previous year of 
the filing date of the voting records.  We observe that OAR is positive and significant, as 
expected.  In models 3 and 4 we use four-factor alpha to control for fund performance.42 
FOUR-FACTOR ALPHA is also positive and significant. To control for the fund’s 
previous asset flow, we introduce the variable PREV YEAR AVG NAF, which is the 
fund’s objective adjusted net asset flows over the previous 12 months of the filing date of 
the voting records.43 We also observe that PREV YEAR AVG NAF has a positive and 
significant effect.  We introduce FUND AGE, which is the log of the age of a fund, and 
observe that it has an insignificant effect on the fund’s asset flow.44 To control for the 
influence of fees we assume an average of a seven-year holding period for fund investors. 
Hence, we construct the control variable FEES as the sum of the expense ratio and one-
seventh of all load charged by the fund.45 We also observe that FEE has an insignificant 
effect. After controlling for fund size, age, fee, performance, and previous asset flow, our 
results show that MEDIAN PERCENT SUPPORT BY FUND has a positive significant 
effect on dependent variable FUND FLOW. This implies that higher median percentage 
support for shareholder proposals by mutual funds would increase the fund’s future asset 
                                                 
40 Sirri & Tufano (1998), Ippolito (1992). 
41 Following Khorana, Tufano & Wedge (2006) we measure OAR as follows:  
OAR is defined as the annual return of the fund minus the median return of the funds within the same 



























where jtR is the return of fund j in month t and otR is the median return of all funds within the same 
objective in month t, and t=0 is the month of voting record release.   
42 Ippolito (1992), Harless & Peterson (1998), Gruber (1996), Jain & Wu (2000) and Lynch & Musto 
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flow significantly. The implication is very significant, as this suggests that mutual funds 
could experience a direct benefit in their future business potential by engaging in 
shareholder activism through the voting mechanism. This positive impact on the mutual 
funds’ reputation would give them more incentive to monitor and could outweigh the cost 
of alienating the clients in the portfolio firms. We realize that the increased value of the 
fund flow could be due to better reputation of the portfolio firms as a result of the higher 
governance measures implemented by the voting mechanism and might not be a direct 
effect of the mutual fund voting record release. However, the higher reputation due to 
better governance through shareholder proposals would only be achieved if the outcome 
of the proposals were a success. There could be many instances where mutual funds vote 
“yes” for a shareholder proposal and the final outcome is a rejection, or vice versa. We 
argue that whether or not the fund’s reputation is directly influenced by the fund’s voting 
or indirectly through the implementation of better governance, our results imply that the 
mutual funds have higher incentives for actively engaging in shareholder activism.  
Similar to model 1 of Table 2.9, we perform separate regressions for the seven 
categories of proposals in our data. The results indicate that for repeal of anti-takeover 
proposals, higher percentage support on shareholder proposals lead to significant increase 
in fund asset flow, with coefficient 0.012 and p-value 0.01 (results not reported in table). 
For other categories of proposals, fund asset flow is not significantly affected by higher 
percentage support on shareholder proposals. Hence, the results suggest that funds 
experience increased asset flow more when they favor repeal of anti-takeover related 
shareholder proposals which have more definite positive shareholder wealth implications. 
Moreover, as the wealth implications of other categories of proposals are not well 
established, there seem to have no significant positive reputational effect for voting 
against management for these proposals.     
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2.5. Analysis of Mutual Fund Trading Behavior Surrounding Shareholder Meeting 
and Voting Record Release 
In this section, we investigate the trading behavior of mutual funds surrounding 
the shareholder proposal meeting date and voting record release date.46 The existing 
notion is that institutional investors sell their shares when dissatisfied with management, 
which is called “Wall Street Walk” or “Vote with Their Feet.” Mutual funds are often 
criticized for their passive role in the governance mechanism of firms and for following 
the “Wall Street Rule” with respect to their voting process. Analyzing the trading 
behavior of mutual funds surrounding the proposal meeting date and voting record 
release date allows us to investigate whether mutual funds display such behavior. We 
gauge mutual funds’ aversion toward management policy by the votes cast against 
management and hence by support for shareholder proposals. Our analysis would not 
capture the trading behavior of funds that totally liquidate their holdings prior to the 
meeting date if there are any such funds. We investigate trading behavior of mutual funds 
for the following quarters: one quarter prior to proposal meeting, shareholder proposal 
meeting quarter, voting records filing quarter, one quarter after voting records filing. In 
our sample, 99.98 percent of the data are associated with quarter of filing right after the 
shareholder meeting quarter. Therefore the results obtained in quarter of filing correspond 
to one quarter after the meeting quarter.  
First we report mean and median changes in percentage holdings of outstanding 
stock by mutual funds in portfolios based on percentage support for shareholder 
proposals; these results are shown in Table 2.10. Votes cast “for” are considered to be 
support of shareholder proposals. For each fund two portfolios are formed based on mean 
percentage support for shareholder proposals. P1 represents portfolios of stocks with 
percentage support for shareholder proposals above the mean of support over all funds. 
                                                 
46 Trading behavior of mutual funds and institutions are studied by Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), 
Wermers (1999), Wermers (2000), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Sias and Starks (1997), Lakonishok, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1992), and Hartzell and Starks (2003) among others.  
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P2 represents the portfolio of stocks with percentage support for shareholder proposals 
below the mean of support over all funds. For each portfolio P1 and P2, the table reports 
the mean and median changes in percentage holdings of outstanding stock over all 
sample mutual funds for different quarters surrounding shareholder meeting and voting 
record release dates. The mean and median changes of holdings are reported for the 
following quarters: one quarter prior to proposal meeting, shareholder proposal meeting 
quarter, voting record filing quarter (which corresponds to one quarter after meeting), and 
one quarter after voting record filing. 
 
Table 2.10: Changes in Percentage Holdings by Mutual Funds in Portfolios Based on 
Percentage Support for Shareholder Proposals 
The table presents mean and median changes in percentage holdings of outstanding stock in 
portfolios based on percentage support for shareholder proposals. The number of observations is 
presented in the bracket. Votes cast “for” are considered to be support of shareholder proposals. 
For each fund two portfolios are formed based on mean percentage support for shareholder 
proposals. P1 represents portfolio of stocks with percentage support for shareholder proposals 
above the mean support over all funds. P2 represents portfolio of stocks with percentage support 
for shareholder proposals below the mean support over all funds. For each portfolio P1 and P2 the 
table reports the mean and median changes in percentage holdings of outstanding stock by mutual 
funds for different quarters surrounding shareholder meeting and voting record release. The mean 
and median changes of holdings are reported for the following quarters: one quarter prior to 
proposal meeting, shareholder proposal meeting quarter, voting record filing quarter (which is 
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We observe that the difference in the mean of changes in the holdings of mutual 
funds between portfolios P1 and P2 in meeting quarter and one quarter prior to meeting 
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are not statistically significant. The results for the voting records filing quarter show that 
mutual funds engage in reducing holdings significantly more for P1 portfolio of stocks, in 
which they provide higher than average percentage support, as compared to P2 portfolio 
of stocks, in which they provide lower than average percentage support for shareholder 
proposals. This implies that mutual funds engage in reducing their portfolio holdings 
more after voting against management. In the quarter after voting records filing, mutual 
funds seem to increase holdings for P1 portfolio of stocks and reduce holdings in P2 
portfolio of stocks, and the difference in mean is statistically significant. The regression 
analysis in Table 2.11 examines whether voting against management lead to mutual 
funds’ decrease or increase of their portfolio holdings after controlling for other factors 
that affect mutual funds’ trading. 
Table 2.11 reports the changes of holdings of mutual funds for the following 
quarters: one quarter prior to proposal meeting, shareholder proposal meeting quarter, 
voting records filing quarter (same as one quarter after meeting), one quarter after voting 
records filing. The dependent variable FUND PERCENT HOLD CHANGE ijt  is the 
change in percentage holdings of outstanding stock of firm i by the fund j in the quarter t 
compared to the previous quarter (t-1). The independent variable PERCENTGAE 
SUPPORT TO SHRHLD ji  is the percentage of votes cast in support of shareholders by a 
fund j over all shareholder proposals for a stock i. Votes cast “for” are considered to be in 
support of shareholders and voting against management. As control variables, we include 
firm characteristics and performance variables, fund and all other institutions’ ownership 
variables, and firm governance variables. Firm-specific information is obtained in the 
previous quarter of the quarter being analyzed.  Descriptions of all other control variables 
are provided in Appendix A. After controlling for firm characteristics, performance, 
governance, and ownership variables, we observe that the effect of PERCENTAGE 
SUPPORT TO SHRHLD ji  is negative in one quarter prior to meeting, in meeting 
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quarter, and in voting record release quarter. However, the effect of PERCENTAGE 
SUPPORT TO SHRHLD ji  is only significant in the filing quarter, which is also the 
quarter after meeting. This implies that the funds that support shareholder proposals 
decrease holdings significantly after they vote on their shares.  
The question is: Why do the funds that support shareholder proposals reduce 
holdings of the firm in their portfolio? Is it due to the hostility that is created between 
funds and firm management because of the activist role by mutual funds? If mutual funds 
intend to benefit from the higher governance provisions through the voting mechanism, 
then one would expect them to maintain or increase their holdings after they provide 
support for shareholder proposals. We explain the results by arguing that when mutual 
funds do not approve of the management style and dislike the governance structure of the 
firm, they sell their shares and move on. Nevertheless, they undertake an activist role 
before selling their shares in order to promote shareholders’ rights in these firms. The 
question that then arises is: Why do they engage in this costly monitoring if they do not 
intend to benefit from it? One explanation could be that these mutual funds that provide 
support for shareholder proposals are not very optimistic about the final outcome of the 
proposals and therefore reduce their holdings. Shareholder proposals are not binding and 
they are more advisory in nature. Management is not obligated to implement the 
proposals even if the proposals receive majority approval. Karpoff, Malatesta, and 
Walkling (1996) show that the rate of implementation of shareholder proposals for the 
period 1986-1990 was only 2.5 percent. However, in recent years shareholder activism 
has been getting more attention and the success rate of proposals has increased also. In a 
recent study, Ertimur, Ferri, and Stubben (2005) find that the frequency of implementing 
shareholder proposals more than doubled from 16 percent in 1997 to over 40 percent in 
2003-2004 and the likelihood of implementation increases with better governance 
structure of firm. Therefore, it is possible that mutual funds that provide higher 
percentage support for shareholder proposals and vote against management assess the  
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Table 2.11: Mutual Fund Trading Behavior Surrounding Shareholder Meeting and Voting 
Record Release  
This table presents the mutual fund trading behavior at different quarters surrounding shareholder 
meeting and voting record release. The table reports the changes of holdings of mutual funds for 
the following quarters: one quarter prior to proposal meeting, shareholder proposal meeting 
quarter, voting record filing quarter (which is one quarter after meeting), and one quarter after 
voting record filing. The dependent variable FUND PERCENT HOLD CHANGE ijt  is the change 
in percentage holdings of outstanding stock of firm i by the fund j in the quarter t compared to the 
previous quarter (t-1). The independent variable PERCENTGAE SUPPORT TO SHRHLD ji  is 
the percentage of votes cast in support of shareholder proposals by a fund j over all shareholder 
proposals for a stock i. Votes cast “for” are considered to be in support of shareholders. Firm- 
specific variables are obtained in the previous quarter (t-1). Descriptions of all other control 
variables are provided in the Appendix A. The p-value is in parenthesis. Statistical significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. 
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likelihood of the implementation of the proposals after voting and, realizing the lower 
possibility of success, they reduce their holdings. We further test whether mutual funds’ 
trading following proxy voting is significantly different in firms with varying managerial 
power. We proxy managerial power by GIM index and identify high managerial power 
(dictator firms) firms with GIM index greater or equal 14 and low managerial power 
firms (democratic firms) with GIM index equal or smaller than 5. The interaction variable 
with democratic firm and percentage support on shareholder proposal provide a positive 
significant effect (coefficient 0.066 and p-value 0.01) on mutual funds changes of 
holdings at the voting record filing quarter, maintaining the negative significant effect of 
the independent variable PERCENTAGE SUPPORT TO SHRHLD (coefficient -0.016 
and p-value 0.004). This implies that mutual funds increase holdings significantly after 
providing support on shareholder proposals in firms high in shareholder rights and low in 
managerial power. Hence the results indicate that the “Wall Street Walk” by mutual 
funds is mainly dominant in firms with high in managerial power, which are less likely to 
implement the shareholder proposals. Relating mutual funds voting and trading behavior 
to the proposal outcome is left for future research.  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 We investigate the proxy voting behavior of shareholder proposals by 433 mutual 
funds from 24 fund families on 528 firms. We investigate three main questions. What are 
the factors that influence mutual funds’ voting behavior? What is the incentive structure 
of mutual funds for undertaking an activist role in voting for shareholder proposals? 
Finally, how do the funds trade surrounding proposal meeting date and voting record 
release date?   
Our results suggest that bigger fund families are more supportive of management. 
We find that firms with higher visibility receive more support from mutual funds for 
shareholder proposals. The effects of ownership on voting decisions indicate that mutual 
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funds do not undertake a monitoring role when they have a large ownership stake in a 
firm. However, we observe that mutual funds seem to have superior oversight when they 
have a longer investment horizon. This suggests that their motivation to take on an 
activist role does not come from the ownership structure, but rather from their long-term 
investment goal.  
We also find that the existing governance structure of the firm influences the 
funds’ voting policies. Mutual funds undertake a monitoring role through their voting 
behavior in firms that are less likely to be disciplined by the market for corporate control. 
This suggests that in the absence of an external governance mechanism, an internal 
governance mechanism operating through voting provisions provides a substitute 
monitoring role in disciplining managers. The presence of a higher internal governance 
mechanism through outside blockholder ownership influences funds to vote against 
management. In addition, the possibility of management entrenchment through a higher 
level of managerial ownership leads to superior monitoring by mutual funds. However, 
the presence of higher voting rights of insiders in dual-class shares discourages mutual 
funds to vote against management, as their voting is unlikely to change the outcome of 
the proposal. The results further indicate that mutual funds engage in an active 
monitoring role by supporting shareholder proposals in firms with higher market 
dissatisfaction and higher possibilities of improving governance structure.  
Mutual funds’ voting behavior is also influenced by the types of proposals. The 
proposals related to anti-takeover provisions, which have a direct positive effect on 
shareholders’ wealth and rights, receive higher support. Mutual funds predominantly 
seem to side with management on issues related to executive compensation. However, for 
poorly performing firms they penalize management by supporting shareholder sponsored 
executive compensation related proposals.  
We study the incentive structure of mutual funds that could act as a motivational 
force for them to undertake an activist role in their proxy voting behavior. We examine 
 54 
whether the future business potential of mutual funds is likely to be influenced if mutual 
funds engage in guarding shareholders’ interests in shareholder proposals. Our results 
suggest that higher support for shareholder proposals by mutual funds has a positive 
effect on the funds’ future asset flow. Moreover, the effect is mostly driven by the repeal 
of anti-takeover related proposals, which have direct positive shareholder wealth 
implications. This supports the notion that there is a positive reputational effect for 
mutual funds for undertaking a monitoring role in their proxy voting behavior.  
Finally, we observe the trading behavior of mutual funds surrounding proposal 
meeting date and voting record release date. The results indicate that mutual funds 
engage in selling their portfolio shares when they provide higher support for shareholder 
proposals. One explanation could be that mutual funds that provide support to non-
binding shareholder proposals are not very optimistic about the final outcome of the 
proposals and therefore reduce their holdings. This supports the notion that mutual funds 
engage in “Wall Street Walk” when they dislike managements’ policy. Nevertheless, they 
undertake an activist role before selling their shares in order to promote shareholders’ 
rights in these firms.   
 Overall, our study provides a framework for understanding mutual funds’ voting 
patterns across firms. The results indicate that there is intricacy involved in these voting 
decisions. However, the results do not necessarily indicate that the mutual fund industry 
was engaged in a similar voting pattern before the release of the proxy voting records. 
The results only highlight the pattern of mutual funds’ voting when the funds are aware 
that these proxy voting records would undergo close scrutiny. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS’ TRADING BEHAVIOR IN 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
 
3.1. Introduction  
Institutional investors are one of the major investor groups in the U.S.  A recent 
study shows that they own more than half of all U.S. publicly traded equity.47 
Consequently, the way in which these institutional investors affect and respond to 
investment and financial policies of corporations has been receiving increasing attention 
among academicians and regulators.48 
Surprisingly, the role played by institutional investors surrounding acquisition 
decisions by corporations has received limited attention.49 In a recent paper, Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) document that mergers and acquisitions in the late 1990s 
have had a large negative impact on acquiring firm shareholders’ wealth. They show that 
merger announcements during the period 1998 to 2001 resulted in an aggregate wealth 
loss of $240 billion for acquiring firm shareholders.50 Motivated by such significant 
shareholders’ wealth implications, in this paper we document institutional investors’ 
holding and trading behavior of acquiring firm stocks in response to merger 
announcements for the period 1992 to 2001. We investigate how institutions process 
                                                 
47 Institutional Investment Report, The Conference Board, Volume 5, March 2003. 
48  See for example Burch and Swaminathan (2002), Gibson, Safieddene, and Sonti (2004), Grinstein and 
Michaely (2005).   
49 Notable exceptions include recent papers by Chen, Harford, and Li (2006) and Qiu (2006), Gopalan 
(2005). 
50 Extensive literature exists on return patterns of acquirer and target firms in M&A activities. For short 
horizon analysis average abnormal stock market reaction at merger announcement is used as a gauge for 
value creation or destruction. Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) report that the abnormal return for the 
three day window surrounding the announcement is 1.8% on average for the combined firm, 16% for the 
target firm and –0.7% for the bidder firm. The bidder firm return varies with the method of payment. 
Acquirer shareholders earn little or no abnormal return from cash payment mergers and negative abnormal 
return (-2% to –3%) for stock payment mergers. Bruner (2002) presents a survey on the findings of 130 
studies conducted from 1971-2001. 
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information released upon announcement of a merger and how they incorporate this new 
available information into their trading strategies. Furthermore, we examine whether they 
update their information set as more information arrives in the market and how they 
adjust their trading strategies. The paper also sheds light on whether there is 
heterogeneity among institutional investors with regard to skill and informational 
advantage surrounding merger activities.   
Literature on institutional voting and trading behavior categorizes institutions into 
two main groups. Brickley, Lease, Smith (1988) examine voting behavior of institutional 
investors on antitakeover amendments. They argue that investment companies and 
independent investment advisors are more likely to oppose management on antitakeover 
amendments than banks, nonbank trusts and insurance companies. Burch and 
Swaminathan (2002) examine trading behavior of institutions in response to earnings 
news. They also find significant differences in trading behavior between these two 
categories of institutions in their response to earnings news. They find that investment 
companies and independent investment advisors are the most active momentum traders, 
while banks and insurance companies tend to be more passive. Badrinath and Wahal 
(2002) also report that the changes in holdings based on past returns are significantly 
higher for investment advisors and mutual funds than for banks.  
In a recent study, Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2005) find differences in costs of 
monitoring across these two categories of institutions in the context of executive 
compensation. The authors refer investment companies and independent investment 
advisors as “potentially active” institutions and show that they face lower cost of 
monitoring than banks and insurance companies whom they refer to as “potentially 
passive” institutions. The authors state that “potentially active” institutions are more 
likely to have informational advantage and also likely to have competitive advantage with 
regard to employee skill, as compared to “potentially passive” institutions. We also group 
institutions into similar two categories and analyze their trading behavior in the context 
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of merger announcement and its final resolution. We investigate the following questions: 
How active and passive institutions process and update information and incorporate the 
information into their trading strategies surrounding the merger announcement and its 
final outcome? Whether active institutions display superior skill in identifying mergers 
with higher wealth implications as compared to passive institutions? Whether active 
institutions possess informational advantage with regard to merger activities and its 
probable outcome?  
First, we investigate how institutions process information released upon 
announcement of a merger and how they incorporate this new available information into 
their trading strategies. In particular, we analyze the trading behavior of acquiring firm 
stocks by active and passive institutions at the merger announcement and investigate 
whether both types of institutions respond to the market reaction of merger 
announcements in rebalancing their portfolio. We examine whether these two categories 
of institutions display heterogeneity in their expertise in identifying mergers with higher 
wealth implications.  We also investigate how active and passive institutions’ trading 
behaviors are influenced by the method of payment of the merger. The literature suggests 
that stock acquirers experience negative announcement period abnormal returns whereas 
cash acquirers experience flat to slightly positive abnormal returns. Common 
interpretations of the negative stock price reaction are that acquirers use stock as the form 
of payment when their stock is overvalued or that the market perceives the merger to be a 
value destroying investment project. We investigate how active and passive institutions 
incorporate the information released with regard to method of payment of the merger into 
their trading strategies.  
Next, we examine whether certain institutions possess superior knowledge about 
the likelihood of the final outcome of the merger. We argue that the institutions at merger 
announcement assign a probability to the eventual outcome and then trade accordingly. 
We investigate whether active and passive institutions have informational advantages in 
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terms of assessing the likelihood of merger success and failure and how these institutions 
utilize their information in rebalancing their portfolios. 
 Our results reveal that, at the announcement quarter, active institutions increase 
holdings of acquirer’s stock significantly for value increasing proposals. This shows that 
active institutions respond to the merger wealth effect created at the announcement, 
indicating that they are able to extract information from stock price reaction. The results 
also indicate that active institutions support stock proposals as opposed to cash proposals 
at the merger announcement, despite the fact that cash proposals had higher wealth 
implications at the announcement. We explain active institutions’ preference for stock 
proposals by the “overreaction phenomenon;” our results at the final resolution further 
explain this behavior. Moreover, at the announcement quarter, active institutions seem to 
have informational advantage in assessing the likelihood of the merger success.  
 Trading behavior of passive institutions at the announcement quarter indicate 
that, they trade based on fundamentals of the acquiring firm and not with respect to the 
market response of the merger announcement, suggesting they are unable to extract 
information contained in the stock price reaction. Passive institutions do not display any 
significant preference for stock over cash mergers.  In addition, the results do not indicate 
that at the announcement quarter passive institutions possess any superior information 
about the likelihood of the final outcome of the merger. Our results are qualitatively 
unchanged even after we control for percent of stock owned by insiders and owned by 
corporate five-percent blockholders with no obvious management affiliation. 
Finally, we investigate the trading behavior of active and passive institutions at 
the final resolution quarter. By investigating the trading behavior at the final resolution 
quarter we shed light on the issue of whether institutions update their information and 
beliefs between merger announcement and the final outcome of the merger. We observe 
that at the final resolution quarter, active institutions reverse their trading strategy with 
regard to the method of payment of the merger by displaying their aversion for stock 
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mergers at the resolution quarter. We argue that active institutions tend to overreact to 
stock proposals on the basis of their prior beliefs by supporting stock proposals at the 
announcement quarter. However, they update their beliefs between announcement and 
final resolution as more information arrives into the market. Finally, active institutions 
appear to correct their overreaction behavior by displaying their greater preference for 
cash proposals as compared to stock proposals at the resolution quarter. We also observe 
behavioral patterns in passive institutions’ trade. Passive institutions display a strong 
under-reaction to the merger announcement period wealth effect by trading at the 
resolution quarter on the basis of wealth effect created at the announcement. Our results 
thus suggest that at the final resolution quarter both active and passive institutions utilize 
their updated information and then trade accordingly.51  
These results are consistent with behavioral model for under-reaction and over-
reaction presented by Hong and Stein (1999), which is based on gradual diffusion of 
information. The model presents two heterogeneous agents: “news-watchers” and 
“momentum-traders.” Both types of agents possess bounded rationality, indicating that 
they are only able to process some subset of available information. News-watchers are 
unable to draw inference form current or past price and trade based on fundamentals, 
causing under-reaction. Momentum traders make transaction based on recent price trends, 
and since they are unable to asses their entry point into the momentum cycle, excessive 
momentum eventually lead to over-reaction. The trading behavior of institutions 
therefore suggest that in the context of mergers, passive institutions behave more like 
“news-watchers’ and active institutions reflect upon “momentum-traders.”  
                                                 
51 Literature addressing the behavioral pattern of institutional investors or corporate decision makers in the 
context of corporate events is somewhat limited. In a recent paper, Malmendier and Tate (2004) analyze the 
impact of CEO overconfidence on M&A activities. The authors identify CEOs as overconfidence when 
they hold company options until expiration, considering the stocks to be undervalued in the market. They 
show that overconfidence CEOs are more likely to conduct mergers and they are more likely to undertake 
value destroying ones. The results also indicate that market reacts more negatively to merger 
announcements by overconfident managers.   
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the related literature in 
Section 3.1. Data and methodology is described in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3 we discuss 
our empirical analysis and results. We conclude the paper in Section 3.4. 
 
3.2. Literature Review 
We describe the related literature in this section. In section A, we present existing 
literature on institutional investors’ trading and holding pattern with regard to corporate 
events.  In section B, we discuss the literature that examines the monitoring role of 
institutional investors with regard to acquisition decisions. 
 
A.  Literature Related to Institutional Trading Behavior in Various Corporate Events 
The increase in institutional investors’ ownership has attracted many researchers 
to investigate their portfolio holding patterns around various corporate events. Grinstein 
and Michaely (2005) document relations between institutional holdings and payout 
policy. Their results suggest that institutions decrease their holdings after an increase in 
dividends, and increase their holdings after an increase in share repurchase. Their results 
also indicate that firms’ dividend or repurchase policy is not affected by changes in 
institutional holdings. Gibson, Safieddine and Sonti (2004) study institutional holding 
behavior around seasoned equity offerings. They document that seasoned equity issuers 
experiencing the greatest increase in institutional investment around the offer date, 
outperform their benchmark portfolios in the year following the issue, relative to those 
experiencing the greatest decrease. Their results suggest that institutions are able to 
identify above average seasoned equity offering firms at the time of equity issuance and 
thereby increase their holdings in these potential outperformers. Burch and Swaminathan 
(2002) examine institutional trading behavior in response to earnings news. The results of 
their study indicate that institutions do not seem to engage in momentum trading in 
response to past earnings news. They further document that momentum trading in 
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response to past returns is strengthened when past returns are accompanied by earnings 
news in the same direction. Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) document that institutions 
purchase a fairly constant percentage of approximately 70% of the shares offered in IPOs. 
Field (1995) finds that IPOs with high institutional ownership perform better over a 
subsequent three-year period than those with little or no institutional ownership. 
Krigman, Shaw and Womack (1999) show that IPOs with heavy institutional first day 
selling, or flipping, perform the worst in the following year, suggesting that institutional 
investors are better informed than individual investors. Field and Lowry (2005) perform a 
comprehensive study of institutional investment in IPOs. They show that over both short 
and long horizons IPOs with higher institutional holdings outperform those with smaller 
institutional holdings. They document that short horizon superior return is due to 
institutions’ abilities to identify venture-backed firms that subsequently outperform, and 
that the long horizon superior returns come from institutions’ abilities to avoid worst 
performing firms.    
 
B.  Literature Related to M&A Activity and Institutional Trading 
The literature on institutional trading surrounding acquisitions is quite limited. 
There are few studies documenting the monitoring role of institutions with regard to 
merger decisions and post merger performance. Chen, Harford, and Li (2006) identify 
institutions that undertake monitoring role in the context of acquisitions decisions. 
Following Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) the authors define independent institutions 
as the ones without potential or existing business ties. They show that presence of long 
term independent institutions with large holdings results in better post long term merger 
performance in terms of buy-and-hold-return, change in industry adjusted return on assets 
and change in analyst earnings forecasts. High total institutional holdings or large 
holdings by institutions with possible or existing business ties (grey institutions), or short 
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term institutions do not predict post-merger performance.52  Furthermore, firms with high 
long-term independent holdings are less likely to announce worst deals and more likely to 
withdrawal bad merger deals than firms with only large grey or short-term holdings. The 
authors argue that long-term independent institutions do not adjust portfolio immediately 
prior to a bid. However, they increase their holdings in advance of mergers with positive 
wealth implications and reduce their holdings in advance of the worst mergers during one 
year before announcements. This suggests that they benefit from private information 
gathering through monitoring.  
Qiu (2006) focuses her attention on the role of large public pension fund 
shareholders on acquisition activity. The author finds that major public pension funds are 
effective monitors with respect to acquisition decisions of firms. The results indicate that 
presence of public pension funds improves long-term M&A performance. The author also 
finds that the presence of public pension funds reduces the likelihood of bad acquisitions 
driven by managerial incentives, supporting the monitoring role of public pension funds. 
The study further documents that other institutions have no effect or opposite effect. 
Mutual fund ownership concentration is higher in acquiring firms with high level of free 
cash and managerial empire building acquisitions. The results suggest that public pension 
funds are the only effective monitors among all institutions. 
Gopalan (2005) documents that institutional investors’ trading can influence the 
probability of takeover. The author presents a model to show that takeover probability 
increases when a large shareholder sells. The results suggest that blockholders selling 
increases takeover probability by over 35%. The model shows that institutions are likely 
to directly intervene in larger and less liquid firms with higher ownership stake. 
Otherwise, institutions are likely to sell and facilitate intervention through takeovers.  
                                                 
52 Our definition of active and passive institutions corresponds to independent and grey institutions 
respectively as defined in Chen, Harford, and Li (2006). 
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 This paper analyzes a different aspect in understanding institutional investors’ 
role in the context of merger activities. By examining the trading behavior of institutions 
at merger announcement and at the final resolution of merger, we draw inferences on 
information environment of institutions and their ability to respond quickly and correctly 
with regard to new information released in the market upon merger announcement. We 
investigate how institutions process information released upon announcement of a merger 
and how they incorporate this new available information into their trading strategies. 
Furthermore, we examine whether they update their information set as more information 
arrives in the market and how they adjust their trading strategies. The paper also sheds 
light on whether there is heterogeneity among institutional investors with regard to skill 
and informational advantage surrounding merger activities.   
 
3.3. Date and Methodology 
In this section we explain the data and methodology used in our analysis. In 
section A we explain the data sources as well as our process of obtaining the sample. We 
describe the process of identification of active and passive institutions in section B. In 
section C we present the methodology of computing the aggregate change in percentage 
holdings of shares of acquiring firm by institutions. In section D we present the 
methodology for computing combined announcement period abnormal return and the 
process of identification of value increasing and value reducing proposals. 
 
A. Data 
Our data source is Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) M&A database. Our 
sample period is from the years 1992 - 2001.  Since we are interested in observing 
institutional investors reactions to merger announcements we concentrate on deals that 
are over 100 million dollars with publicly traded acquiring and target firms, as large deals 
are likely to have high institutional presence. We only consider merger proposals with a 
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single bidder since multiple bidder proposals would require making simultaneous 
comparisons of institutional behavior for all the bidders for a merger proposal. With this 
exclusion criterion the number of sample mergers is narrowed down to 2863. 
Furthermore, we exclude from our analysis merger proposals with announcement and 
completion or cancellation at the same quarter, since institutional holdings data is 
available on a quarterly basis. In the case of merger proposals that have same bidder firm 
with overlapping windows between merger announcement and completion or 
cancellation, we consider the first merger proposal for the acquirer. With these additional 
screenings our sample size reduces to 2073. The data on the method of payment and the 
eventual outcome of the deal are also obtained from the SDC database.  
Ownership of acquiring firm stock by institutional investors comes from CDA-
Spectrum 13f filings, which reports the quarterly holdings information of institutions. 
Returns, shares outstanding and market capitalization data are obtained from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.  After combining the merger data with 
CRSP and institutional holdings data, our final sample size becomes 1533. We obtain 
ownership data for corporate five-percent blockholders with no obvious management 
affiliation, and percent of outstanding stock beneficially owned by managers and/or 
directors from Compact Disclosure SEC data source. 
 
B. Active and Passive Institutions 
In order to investigate whether different institutions behave differently in 
rebalancing their portfolios after merger announcement, we divide institutions into active 
and passive groups. Brickley, Lease, Smith (1988) argue that non-bank trusts, insurance 
companies and commercial banks generally have current or potential business with 
corporations and are therefore more likely to be pressured by management to provide 
support on controversial issues. Whereas public pension funds, mutual funds, and 
foundations are less influenced by management pressure and oppose management on 
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controversial issues. In a recent paper, Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2005) show that 
investment companies and independent investment advisers, which the authors refer as 
“potentially active” institutions, play a more active monitoring role with regard to 
executive compensation than banks and insurance companies, which they refer as 
“potentially passive” institutions. They show that active institutions have stronger effect 
on pay-for-performance sensitivity than passive institutions and both salary and total 
direct compensation are lower with higher active institutions’ ownership. On the basis of 
these studies we categorize institutions into two similar groups: active and passive 
institutions, and examine whether they display any heterogeneity with regard to their 
expertise in identifying mergers with higher wealth implications. As stated earlier, we 
obtain institutional holdings data from CDA-Spectrum 13f filings, which also contain 
information regarding type of institution. CDA data classifies each institution as one of 
five types: (1) banks, (2) insurance companies, (3) investment companies and their 
managers i.e. mutual funds, (4) independent investment advisors and (5) others, which 
include endowments, foundations, private and public pension funds. We categorize types 
1 and 2 as passive institutions and types 3 and 4 as active institutions. Since type 5 is not 
distinct, we do not include it in either category in our initial analysis. As part of our 
robustness checks we include type 5 in both active and passive category and test how this 
influences the results.  
 
C. Computation of Aggregate Change in Percentage Holdings of Acquirer Shares by 
Institutions 
We compute the aggregate change in percentage holdings of stocks of acquiring 
firm by institutions in different quarters surrounding the merger announcement. For any 
institution m for quarter t  first we compute the percentage of ownership of acquirer stock 







Ownership =%  
Where, imtaresHoldNumberOfSh  is the number of outstanding shares of acquiring firm i 
held by institutions m at quarter t. itsOutstdTotalShare  is the total number of shares 
outstanding of acquiring firm i in quarter t. Percentage change in holdings of acquirer 
stock i  from quarter 1−t  to t  is computed by the following  
1%%% −−= imtimtimt OwnershipOwnershipHoldChange  
The aggregate percentage holdings and aggregate change in percentage holdings of active 
institutions are computed over all active institutions m  for quarter t  for acquirer stock i . 
Similarly the aggregate percentage holdings and aggregate change in percentage holdings 
for passive institutions are computed. 
 
D. Value Increasing and Value Reducing Proposals 
The most important concern regarding M&A proposals is whether the merger 
creates wealth. The wealth effect is estimated by the combined announcement period 
abnormal return of the acquiring and target firms.53 If the combined firms’ announcement 
period abnormal return is positive, the merger is considered to be a value increasing 
proposal; if it is negative, the merger is considered to be a value reducing proposal. We 
use event study methodology using the market adjusted abnormal return to measure the 
price reaction of the merger proposal at the announcement. We estimate the abnormal 
return for both acquiring and target firms for the three day event window around the 
announcement of the takeover. This event window is represented as [-1, +1], where day 0 
is the announcement date. The abnormal return for any acquiring or target firm i on day t  
is 
mtitit RRAR −= , for ]1,1[ +−=t  
                                                 
53 Ostrovsky and Matvos (2006) show that institutional shareholder of acquiring companies also hold 
substantial stakes in the targets.  
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where, itR is the return of firm i on day t and mtR is the return of the CRSP value 
weighted index of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. The cumulative abnormal return 






iti ARCAR  
Therefore for each of the merger announcements in our sample we compute 
acqCAR and tgtCAR over the event window. The combined return is the weighted average 
of the returns of the two parties in the merger, where the weights are the equity values of 











where acquirer and target values are computed using the following: 
AcqValue = Bidder Price * Number of Shares Outstanding 
TgtValue = Target Price * Number of Shares Outstanding 
Both price and number of shares outstanding are obtained two days prior to the 
announcement. On the basis of this tgtacqCAR _ value we determine whether the takeover 
proposal is a value increasing or a value reducing proposal. If tgtacqCAR _ is positive, we 
identify the proposal as value increasing and if tgtacqCAR _ is negative, we identify the 
proposal as value decreasing.  
We present abnormal returns for the sample mergers for different quarters 
surrounding mergers in Table 3.1. We categorize the proposals on the basis of merger 
wealth effect (value increasing vs. value decreasing), method of payment (cash vs. stock), 
and final outcome of the merger (success vs. failure). Table 3.1 shows that in our sample 
there are more stock proposals than cash proposals and there are more value increasing 
proposals than value decreasing proposals. Cash mergers have greater proportion of value 
increasing merges as compared to stock mergers.  We report buy and hold market 
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Table 3.1: Abnormal Return for Merger Proposals for the Period 1992 - 2001 
The table presents market adjusted abnormal return for sample merger proposals for the period 1992-2001. The table reports 8 categories of 
mergers by classifying them with respect to announcement period wealth effect: value increasing (V+) vs. value decreasing (V-), method of 
payment (Cash vs. Stock), and final outcome of merger (Success vs. Failure). For each of the categories the table provides market adjusted 
abnormal return for the following: 2 Qtr prior to merger announcement for acquirer, 1 Qtr prior to merger announcement for acquirer, 
announcement period abnormal return for the acquirer: one day prior to one day after merger announcement (-1, +1),  announcement period 
abnormal return for the target: one day prior to one day after merger announcement (-1, +1), announcement period abnormal return for the 
combined firm: one day prior to one day after merger announcement (-1, +1), abnormal return for the acquirer between announcement to final 
outcome of the merger, final outcome period abnormal return for the acquirer: one day prior to final outcome to one day after the final outcome (-
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Success 406 0.0363 0.0204 0.0258 0.2072 0.0665 0.044 0.0048 -0.0019 0.1163 
Cash 
Failure 66 0.0139 -0.0365 0.0174 0.1944 0.0630 -0.024 0.0080 -0.0583 0.0986 
Success 366 0.2498 0.1291 0.0156 0.2234 0.0541 -0.002 0.0094 -0.0622 0.0314 
V+ 
Stock 
Failure 42 0.2378 0.1521 0.0200 0.1810 0.0673 -0.106 0.0264 -0.1310 -0.0615 
Success 188 -0.0136 -0.0200 -0.0453 0.0925 -0.0367 -0.019 0.0042 0.0013 0.1058 
Cash 
Failure 31 0.0403 0.0168 -0.0423 0.0381 -0.0359 0.048 0.0107 -0.0808 -0.0222 
Success 397 0.2472 0.0676 -0.0753 0.1047 -0.0530 -0.078 0.0076 -0.0641 -0.0286 
V- 
Stock 
Failure 37 0.2273 0.0399 -0.1266 0.0634 -0.0746 -0.154 0.0384 -0.1325 -0.0481 
Total Number of Sample Merger 
Proposals 






adjusted abnormal return for the acquirer for two quarters prior to merger announcement, 
one quarter prior to merger announcement, between merger announcement and final 
resolution, one quarter after final resolution, and two quarters after final resolution. We 
observe that stock acquirers had a huge price run-up both two quarter and one quarter 
prior to merger announcement. In addition, stock acquirers display higher return as 
compared to cash acquirers prior to merger announcement. We also report the 
announcement period cumulative abnormal return for the event window (-1, +1) for 
acquirer, target and combined firm. We observe that for value increasing successful 
mergers cash acquirers have higher announcement period abnormal returns than stock 
acquirers. In case of value decreasing mergers, cash acquirers have higher wealth 
implication irrespective of merger outcome. Moreover, between merger announcement 
and final resolution and also one and two quarter after merger resolution cash acquirers 
have higher return as compared to stock acquirers. Hence, this suggests that prior to 
merger announcement stock acquirers had superior performance in terms of equity return 
as compared to cash acquirers. However, at the merger announcement, between merger 
announcement and final resolution, and after the final resolution of merger cash acquirers 
display higher equity return. One interesting observation is that, the price reaction over 
three days window around merger resolution is positive for acquiring firms’ stocks across 
all scenarios and higher for cancelled deals as compared to successful deals.  
We present the mean percentage holdings of acquiring firm stocks by active and 
passive institutions in Table 3.2 and the changes in percentage holdings in Table 3.3 for 
different quarters surrounding announcement and resolution of merger. As in Table 3.1, 
we categorize the proposals on the basis of merger wealth effect (value increasing or 
value reducing), method of payment, and final outcome of the merger. In Table 3.2, we 
observe that the average percentage holdings of active institutions are higher than those 
of passive institutions. We also observe that for value increasing proposals active 
institutions’ holdings are higher for stock proposals than cash proposals, for all quarters 
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Table 3.2: Institutional Percentage Holdings of Acquiring Firms Stocks 
This table presents institutional investors’ average percentage holdings of acquiring firms stocks for the sample merger proposals between 1992-
2001. The table displays holding information of active institutions (mutual funds, investment advisors) and passive institutions (banks and 
insurance companies). The table reports 8 categories of mergers by classifying them with respect to announcement period wealth effect: value 
increasing (V+) vs. value decreasing (V-), method of payment (Cash vs. Stock), and final outcome of merger (Success vs. Failure). For each of the 
categories the table provides average of institutional percentage holdings of acquiring firms’ stock for 7 different time horizon. For any institution 






Holdings =% . The aggregate percentage 
holding for stock i  for quarter t  for active (passive) institutions is computed by summing 
imtHoldings%  over all active (passive) institutions m . 
For each of the time horizon, the table reports the mean aggregate percentage holdings over all the sample mergers in each category.  





































Success 21.9 20.4 19.9 21.5 19.7 18.7 18.0 
Cash 
Failure 21.6 19.7 19.0 20.8 17.2 16.4 17.0 
Success 24.0 23.6 24.2 18.3 22.1 19.8 18.6 
V+ 
Stock 
Failure 25.6 25.4 24.3 23.2 22.4 22.7 19.4 
Success 20.6 19.3 18.7 19.7 16.8 16.2 15.2 
Cash 
Failure 24.0 22.8 19.0 9.8 18.3 16.4 16.5 




Failure 23.9 22.7 19.9 20.8 18.2 16.2 14.2 
Success 12.1 11.7 11.5 12.6 11.5 11.3 11.3 
Cash 
Failure 11.1 11.2 10.5 13.5 10.3 10.6 9.7 
Success 9.7 9.8 10.0 10.1 9.9 9.8 9.5 
V+ 
Stock 
Failure 11.1 11.0 11.9 14.7 12.1 11.0 10.1 
Success 13.0 12.2 11.9 13.3 11.0 11.4 11.3 
Cash 
Failure 10.4 10.5 9.7 9.3 9.7 11.0 10.7 




Failure 10.1 9.9 9.0 10.8 10.0 9.9 8.9 
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Table 3.3: Change in Percentage Holdings of Acquiring Firms Stocks 
This table presents institutional investors’ change in percentage holdings of acquiring firms stocks for the sample merger proposals between 1992-
2001. The table displays changes in holdings by active institutions (mutual funds, investment advisors) and passive institutions (banks and 
insurance companies). The table reports 8 categories of mergers by classifying them with respect to announcement period wealth effect: value 
increasing (V+) vs. value decreasing (V-), method of payment (Cash vs. Stock), and final outcome of merger (Success vs. Failure). For each of the 
categories the table provides percentage change of holdings of acquiring firms’ stock for 7 different time horizon. For any institution m for quarter 






Holdings =% . The aggregate percentage holding for stock 
i  for quarter t  for active (passive) institutions is computed by summing 
imtHoldings%  over all active (passive) institutions m . For each of the time 
horizon, the table reports the mean aggregate change in percentage holdings with respect to previous quarter over all the sample mergers in each 
category. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 


































Success 0.29 ** 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.28 -0.04 -0.10 
Cash 
Failure -0.19 -0.28 -0.08 -0.05 0.20 -0.24 0.04 
Success 0.39 * -0.02 0.87 *** 0.46 -1.55 *** -1.22 *** -0.24 * 
V+ 
Stock 
Failure -0.89 * 0.12 0.89 * -0.46 -0.03 0.33 0.46 
Success -0.57 -0.28 -0.16 0.09 0.04 0.37 0.24 
Cash 
Failure -0.43 0.49 0.23 -0.12 -0.86 -0.59 -0.22 




Failure 0.09 0.27 0.76 -0.50 -1.14 -0.69 * -1.38 ** 
Success 0.25 ** -0.01 0.06 0.001 0.06 0.07 0.14 * 
Cash 
Failure 0.29 0.34 -0.29 ** 0.15 -1.25 0.13 -0.71 
Success 0.18 ** 0.17 ** 0.21 ** 0.58 *** -0.24 ** 0.07 -0.03 
V+ 
Stock 
Failure 0.35 0.28 0.73 * 0.36 * 0.96 -0.59 -1.10 *** 
Success 0.14 -0.10 0.06 0.05 -0.21 -0.02 -0.13 
Cash 
Failure -0.24 -0.47 -0.48 -0.23 0.57 0.39 ** 0.20 




Failure -0.04 0.42 * 0.27 0.26 -0.13 0.00 -0.82 ** 
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reported in the table. For value reducing proposals, although active institutions’ 
percentage holdings are higher at the announcement quarter for stock proposals, at the 
resolution quarter and the two quarters following resolution their percentage holdings are 
higher for cash proposals. We do not observe any distinct preference in passive 
institutions’ holdings for value increasing cash or stock mergers.  
In Table 3.3 we report the average change in percentage holdings of acquiring 
firm stocks for active and passive institutions. We note that for value increasing 
successful mergers both active and passive institutions increase their holdings 
significantly two quarters prior to merger announcement for both cash and stock mergers. 
This supports the notion that institutions engage in informed trading with regard to 
possible merger wealth implication and final outcome of the merger long before merger 
announcement. One interesting observation is that active institutions reduce holdings two 
quarter prior to merger announcement for value increasing merger proposals that 
eventually fail. Hence, this suggests that active institutions’ selling could be influencing 
the likelihood of merger failure. We also observe that one quarter prior to merger 
announcement active institutions do not engage in significant changes in holdings of 
acquiring stocks.54 This is consistent with the argument presented by Chen, Harford, Li 
(2006) that these institutions do not adjust portfolio immediately prior to a bid. However, 
the main focus of this paper is to examine the trading behavior of institutions at the 
announcement and at the final resolution of merger and examine how they respond with 
regard to the new information that arrives in the market upon announcement of a merger.  
We note that for value increasing stock proposals that are successful, the average 
change in percentage holdings of acquiring firm stocks by active institutions at the 
announcement quarter is positive and significant, while the resolution quarter and the two 
quarters following the resolution show decline in holdings. Passive institutions also 
                                                 
54 We construct similar table using only acquiring firm announcement period abnormal return. The results 
have similar implications, suggesting that active institutions prefer stock acquirers at the announcement 
quarter, however at the resolution quarter they show aversion towards stock acquirers.  
 73 
increase holdings at the announcement quarter for value increasing stock proposals that 
are successful and show a similar reduction in holdings at the resolution quarter. For 
value reducing stock mergers, passive institutions display significant increase at the 
announcement quarter for successful mergers and significant reduction in holdings at the 
resolution quarter. Active institutions’ increase in holdings is not significant for value 
reducing stock proposals at the announcement quarter; however their reduction in 
holdings for successful mergers is significant at the resolution quarter. Hence, this 
suggests strong preference of stock proposals as oppose to cash proposals at the 
announcement quarter by both active and passive institutions and reversal in their 
preference at the resolution quarter. Our regression analysis in the next section examines 
this issue more closely. We observe that for unsuccessful mergers, both active and 
passive institutions do not change their holdings significantly at the resolution quarter. 
This implies that for the withdrawn mergers, most of the acquiring firm shareholding 
adjustment takes place prior to the resolution quarter.  
 
3.4. Results 
In this section we describe our empirical analysis and discuss the results. In 
section A, we investigate the trading behavior of active and passive institutions at the 
announcement quarter and investigate whether they respond to the market reaction of 
merger announcements in rebalancing their portfolio. We examine whether these two 
categories of institutions display heterogeneity in their expertise in identifying mergers 
with higher wealth implications. We also investigate how active and passive institutions’ 
trading behaviors are influenced by the method of payment of the merger. Next we 
perform scenario analysis on the basis of merger announcement period wealth effect, 
method of payment, and final outcome of the merger, and examine whether active and 
passive institutions possess superior knowledge at the announcement quarter with regard 
to the final outcome of the merger. In section B, we investigate the trading behavior of 
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active and passive institutions in the quarters between merger announcement and its 
outcome and also at the final resolution quarter. This allows us to shed light on the issue 
of whether institutions update their information and beliefs between merger 
announcement and the final outcome of the merger.  In section C, we perform some 
additional tests on trading by active and passive institutions in association with the final 
resolution quarter. In section D, we discuss the results of our robustness checks. 
 
A.  Trading Behavior of Active and Passive Institutions at the Announcement Quarter 
We investigate the trading behavior of acquiring firm stocks by active and passive 
institutions around the announcement of the merger in a multivariate regression setting. 
These results are presented in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 respectively for active and passive 
institutions. The dependent variable in the regression is the aggregate change in 
institutional holdings of acquirer stock in the announcement quarter. We include 
independent variable CAR, which is cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return for the 
combined firm at the merger announcement for the event window (-1, +1), to analyze 
whether institutions respond to merger announcement period wealth effect in trading 
acquiring firm stock. In order to examine the effect of method of payment we include 
indicator variable CASH DUMMY, which is equal to 1 if the method of payment for the 
merger proposal is cash only and is equal to 0 if the method of payment is stock or 
combination of stock and cash. SUCCESS is an indicator variable, which is equal to 1 if 
the merger is successful and 0 otherwise. This allows us to investigate whether 
institutions are better informed with regard to final outcome of the merger. 
The control variables included in the regression are following. PREV QTR HOLD 
represents the aggregate percentage holdings of acquirer stocks by active (passive) 
institutions one quarter prior to merger announcement. PREV QTR HOLD CHNG 
represents the aggregate change in active (passive) institutional holdings of acquirer stock 
one quarter prior to merger announcement. ACQ LOG ASSET is the natural logarithm of  
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Table 3.4: Trading Behavior of Active Institutions in the Announcement Quarter 
The table presents active institutional investors’ trading behavior in the announcement quarter of 
merger proposals for the period 1992-2001. ANN QTR HOLD CHNG is the dependent variable, 
which is aggregate change in active institutional holdings of acquirer stock in the announcement 
quarter. CAR is cumulative abnormal return (market adjusted) for the combined firm at the 
merger announcement for the event window (-1, +1). CASH DUMMY is a dummy variable, 
which is equal to 1 if the method of payment for the merger proposal is cash and is equal to 0 if 
the method of payment is stock or a combination of stock and cash. SUCCESS is a dummy 
variable, which is equal to 1 if the merger is successful and is equal to 0 if the merger is 
unsuccessful. PREV QTR HOLD represents the aggregate percentage holdings of acquirer stocks 
by active institutional investors in the previous quarter before announcement. PREV QTR HOLD 
CHNG represents the aggregate change in active institutional holdings of acquirer stock in the 
quarter prior to merger announcement. ACQ LOG ASSET is the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization of acquirer stocks at the quarter of merger announcement. DEAL VALUE 
represents the log dollar value of the merger proposal. ACQ BOOK TO MKT represents the book 
to market ratio of acquiring firm at the announcement quarter. PREV RET 90 DAY represents the 
buy and hold abnormal return of the acquiring firm over 90 days prior to merger announcement. 
BLOCKHOLDER HOLD represents the percentage holdings of acquiring firm stock by five 
percent blockholder in the quarter of merger announcement. INSIDER HOLD represents the 
percentage holdings of acquiring firm stock by corporate insiders in the quarter of merger 
announcement. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 















































































































































2R  0.016 0.022 0.021 0.025 0.021 0.025 
Number of Observations 1216 1049 1216 1049 1216 1049 
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market capitalization of equity of acquirer. DEAL VALUE represents the natural 
logarithm of dollar value of the merger proposal. ACQ BOOK TO MKT represents the 
book to market ratio.  PREV RET 90 DAY represents the buy and hold abnormal return 
of the acquiring firm over the 90 days prior to merger announcement. BLOCKHOLDER 
HOLD represents the percentage holdings of five percent blockholders in the quarter of 
merger announcement. INSIDER HOLD represents the percentage holdings of corporate 
insiders in the quarter of merger announcement.55 
 In Table 3.4, we present the results for active institutions through six models. The 
primary difference between models 1, 3, 5 and 2, 4, 6 is whether or not we use additional 
control variables related to insider and block holdings. These variables control for percent 
of stock owned by individual and corporate five-percent blockholders with no obvious 
management affiliation and percent of outstanding stock beneficially owned by managers 
and/or directors. We focus our discussions on models 1, 3, and 5, as qualitatively the 
results remain unchanged whether or not we employ additional control variables.  
 In model 1, the coefficient of CAR is positive and significant at the one percent 
level (p-value of .007). This suggests that at the announcement quarter, active institutions 
increase holdings of acquirer stocks significantly for mergers with higher wealth 
implications. This implies that active institutions respond to the merger wealth effect 
created at the announcement, indicating that they are able to extract information from 
stock price reaction and trade based on the new information released upon merger 
announcement. Since institutions holding data is quarterly, it is possible that the reported 
changes in holdings in 13-f filings corresponds to the changes in holdings before the 
announcement of merger. In order to address this issue, we perform a sub-sample 
analysis with merger announcement in the first month of each quarter, considering that 
the reported quarterly changes in holdings by institutions would correspond to the 
                                                 
55 Additionally we control for number of days between merger announcement and quarter-end and the 
results remain similar. We also control for trading seasonality by including beginning of year and end of 
year effect and the results are consistent.   
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portfolio rebalancing activities in the later part of the quarter and hence after the merger 
announcement. CAR continues to have positive and significant effect (coefficient 0.098 
and p-value 0.0002) on changes in holdings by active institutions for this sub-sample test 
(results not reported in table). The effect is even stronger (coefficient 0.224 and p-value 
0.006) for the sub-sample analysis with the announcement date in the first week of each 
quarter. Hence, this emphasizes that at the announcement quarter active institutions 
respond to mergers with higher wealth implications by increasing holdings of acquirer 
stocks. In Table 3.4, the coefficient of PREV QTR HOLD CHNG is negative and 
significant. This suggests that the active institutions do not increase their holdings as 
much during the merger quarter in cases where they had already increased their holdings 
in the quarter prior to the merger.   
Literature on mergers suggests that the bidder firm return varies with the method 
of payment. Earlier research on announcement period return suggests that acquirer 
shareholders earn little or no abnormal return from cash tender offers and negative 
abnormal return for mergers with payment method as stocks.56 For our sample mergers, 
the mean return of the combined firm at the merger announcement (-1, +1) is -0.001 
(insignificant) for stock mergers and 0.034 (significant) for cash mergers. The mean 
return of the acquirer firm at the merger announcement is -0.033 (significant) for stock 
mergers and 0.003 (insignificant) for cash mergers. In model 3, we examine whether 
institutional investors engage in significantly different trading activity for cash versus 
stock mergers. The coefficient of CASH DUMMY is negative and significant at the five 
percent level. This suggests that active institutions increase holdings significantly more 
for stock acquirers as compared to cash acquirers, indicating their preference for stock 
proposals, despite the fact that cash proposals had higher wealth implications at the 
                                                 
56 Literature on long horizon return also document that cash mergers outperform stock mergers in the long 
run. Loughran and Vijh (1997) show that during a five-year period following the acquisition, on average, 
firms that complete stock mergers earn significantly negative excess returns of –25%, whereas firms that 
complete cash tender offers earn significantly positive excess returns of 61%. 
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announcement. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) report that glamour bidders pay more with 
stocks than value bidders. This suggests that active institutions prefer glamour stocks. 
This is also consistent with Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny’s (1994) finding that 
institutional investors tilt toward glamour stocks. Hence our results indicate that in terms 
of overall wealth implications, active institutions are able to differentiate value increasing 
mergers from value decreasing mergers at the announcement quarter. However, in 
analyzing the wealth effect with respect to method of payment, they are unable to process 
and incorporate the new information released upon merger announcement. Our analysis 
in the final resolution examines this behavior further and draws inferences from 
behavioral model.  
In model 5, we control for the eventual outcome of the merger at the 
announcement quarter. The coefficient of SUCCESS DUMMY is not statistically 
significant.  This suggests that portfolio adjustment by active institutions at the time of 
merger announcement is primarily driven by the wealth consequences of the merger 
announcement. The scenario analysis presented in the latter part of this section 
investigates the informational content of institutions with regard to the final outcome of 
the merger in detail. 
 We next test whether active institutions engage in informed trading ahead of 
merger announcement anticipating wealth implications of possible merger deals. To test 
whether active institutions are informed, we perform reverse regression and examine 
whether changes in holdings prior to announcement predict merger announcement period 
return (results not shown in table). The dependent variable in this analysis is CAR and 
independent variable is changes in percentage holdings of acquiring firm stock by active 
institutions one quarter prior to merger announcement. We find that CAR is not 
influenced by the changes in percentage holdings (coefficient 0.068 and p-value 0.36) by 
active institutions in the previous quarter of announcement. We further examine active 
institutions’ trading prior to merger announcement with a sub-sample of merger deals 
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with announcement dates in the first week of each quarter. Since institutions report 
changes in holdings in 13-f filings end of quarter, this sub-sample would allow us to 
investigate active institutions’ trading much closer to the announcement of a merger. The 
effect of PREV QTR HOLD CHNG on CAR is also positive and insignificant 
(coefficient 0.151 and p-value 0.55) in the sub-sample analysis. Hence, these results do 
not indicate that active institutions engage in informed trading with regard to wealth 
implication of merger just before announcement. 
The results for passive institutions are presented in Table 3.5. The format for this 
Table is identical to the one that we used for presenting the results for active institutions. 
It is interesting to note that in model 1, the coefficient of CAR is not statistically 
significant. The coefficient of CASH DUMMY is also insignificant in model 3. These 
results suggest that at the announcement quarter passive institutions do not actively 
rebalance their portfolios with respect to merger announcement period wealth effect or 
method of payment of the merger.57 The coefficient of SUCCESS DUMMY is also not 
statistically significant. This suggests that portfolio adjustment by passive institutions at 
the time of merger announcement is not influenced by the outcome of the merger. The 
negative significant coefficient of ACQ BOOK TO MKT implies that passive institutions 
decrease holdings of acquirer stocks at the announcement quarter which have high book-
to-market ratio. This indicates that passive institutions prefer low financially distressed 
firms. Hence, at merger announcement passive institutions’ trading behavior is not 
influenced by merger characteristics, but rather by acquiring firm characteristics. In 
section B we will see how passive institutions update their beliefs and change their 
trading strategies at the resolution quarter.  
                                                 
57 We also test whether passive institutions engage in informed trading ahead of merger announcement. To 
test whether passive institutions are informed, we perform reverse regression and examine whether past 
changes in holdings predict future merger performance. The effect of passive institutions’ PREV QTR 
HOLD CHNG on CAR is positive and insignificant (coefficient 0.123 and p-value 0.32). The similar result 
is obtained with a sub-sample of merger deals with announcement date in the first week of each quarter. 
Hence, the results do not indicate that passive institutions engage in informed trading with regard to 
possible merger wealth implication prior to merger announcement. 
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Table 3.5: Trading Behavior of Passive Institutions in the Announcement Quarter 
The table presents passive institutional investors’ trading behavior in the announcement quarter of 
merger proposals for the period 1992-2001. ANN QTR HOLD CHNG is the dependent variable, 
which is aggregate change in passive institutional holdings of acquirer stock in the announcement 
quarter. CAR is cumulative abnormal return (market adjusted) for the combined firm at the 
merger announcement for the event window (-1, +1). CASH DUMMY is a dummy variable, 
which is equal to 1 if the method of payment for the merger proposal is cash and is equal to 0 if 
the method of payment is stock or a combination of stock and cash. SUCCESS is a dummy 
variable, which is equal to 1 if the merger is successful and is equal to 0 if the merger is 
unsuccessful. PREV QTR HOLD represents the aggregate percentage holdings of acquirer stocks 
by passive institutional investors in the previous quarter before announcement. PREV QTR 
HOLD CHNG represents the aggregate change in passive institutional holdings of acquirer stock 
in the quarter prior to merger announcement. ACQ LOG ASSET is the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization of acquirer stocks at the announcement quarter. DEAL VALUE represents 
the log dollar value of the merger proposal. ACQ BOOK TO MKT represents the book to market 
ratio of acquiring firm at the announcement quarter. PREV RET 90 DAY represents the buy and 
hold abnormal return of the acquiring firm over 90 days prior to merger announcement. 
BLOCKHOLDER HOLD represents the percentage holdings of acquiring firm stock by five 
percent blockholder in the quarter of merger announcement. INSIDER HOLD represents the 
percentage holdings of acquiring firm stock by corporate insiders in the quarter of merger 
announcement. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
 















































































































































2R  0.012 0.014 0.013 0.016 0.013 0.015 
Number of Observations 1226 1058 1226 1058 1226 1058 
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Table 3.6: Trading Behavior of Active and Passive Institutions in the Announcement 
Quarter: Market Model CAR 
The table presents active and passive institutional investors’ trading behavior in the 
announcement quarter of merger proposals for the period 1992-2001. ANN QTR HOLD CHNG 
is the dependent variable, which is aggregate change in active (passive) institutional holdings of 
acquirer stock in the announcement quarter. CAR is cumulative abnormal return (market model) 
for the combined firm at the merger announcement for the event window (-1, +1). The ordinary 
least square coefficients of the market model regression are estimated over the period [-244, -6] 
with respect to the announcement date. CASH DUMMY is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 
if the method of payment for the merger proposal is cash and is equal to 0 if the method of 
payment is stock or a combination of cash and stock. SUCCESS is a dummy variable, which is 
equal to 1 if the merger is successful and is equal to 0 if the merger is unsuccessful. All other 
control variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of 
significance respectively. 
 
As part of our robustness check, we redo the analysis using the market model 
regression to measure the price reaction of the merger proposal at the announcement, 
instead of market-adjusted abnormal return. Table 3.6 reports trading behavior of both 
active and passive institutions at the announcement quarter, where CAR is computed 
 Active Institutions Passive Institutions 




















































































































































2R  0.022 0.025 0.025 0.014 0.015 0.016 
Number of Observations 1043 1043 1043 1051 1051 1051 
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using the market model regression. The implications of the results are the same as those 
presented earlier in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, where CAR is computed using the market-
adjusted abnormal return. 
 
Scenario Analysis  
Next we perform scenario analysis at the announcement quarter and one quarter 
prior to merger resolution on the basis of merger announcement period wealth effect, 
method of payment, and final outcome of the merger. This allows us to shed light on 
whether active and passive institutions have informational advantage with regard to the 
likelihood of merger success and failure and how they utilize the information in 
rebalancing their portfolio. In order to perform scenario analysis we introduce a dummy 
variable CAR DUMMY which takes the value 1 if the cumulative abnormal return for the 
combined firm at merger announcement is positive, and zero otherwise. We refer to the 
positive abnormal return merger proposals as value increasing proposals and denote them 
by V+, and the negative abnormal return proposals as value reducing proposals and 
denote them by V-. We construct interaction variables with CAR DUMMY, CASH 
DUMMY and SUCCESS DUMMY to perform the scenario analysis. This allows us to 
investigate the trading behavior of active and passive institutions under different 
combinations of merger characteristics comprised of announcement period wealth effect, 
method of payment, and final outcome of the merger.  
We present the results of the regression of the scenario analysis in Table 3.7. We 
also display the effects of the scenario analysis in a node-tree format. Figure 3.1 displays 
the changes in holdings of acquirer shares by active institutions at the announcement 
quarter and one quarter prior to merger resolution at different scenarios based on 
abnormal return of the combined firm at the announcement ( V+ vs. V-), method of 
payment of the  merger (CASH vs. STOCK) and eventual outcome of the merger 
(Success vs. Failure). Figure 3.2 displays changes in holdings of acquirer shares by  
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Table 3.7: Scenario Analysis of Trading Behavior of Active and Passive Institutions in the 
Announcement Quarter  
 The table presents active and passive institutional investors’ trading behavior for value 
increasing proposals vs. value reducing proposals and for cash vs. stock mergers and for 
successful vs. unsuccessful mergers at announcement quarter and one quarter prior to merger 
resolution. ANN QTR HOLD CHNG is the dependent variable for announcement quarter 
analysis, which is aggregate change in institutional holdings of acquirer stock in the 
announcement quarter. FINAL PREV QTR HOLD CHNG is the dependent variable for the 
analysis one quarter prior to merger resolution, which is aggregate change in institutional 
holdings of acquirer stock at the corresponding quarter. All other variables are defined in the 
Appendix. The second column of the table provides the description of the merger proposals the 
corresponding coefficient represents. +V represents value increasing merger proposals where 
CAR dummy variable takes the value 1 and −V  represents value reducing merger proposals where 
CAR dummy variable takes the value 0. Panel A provides the regression results and Panel B 
provides the results of the combined effect of the interaction variables.  
Panel A: Regression Results 
Independent Variable 
Captures the effect of 
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2R   0.022 0.026 0.018 0.033 
N  1216 1205 1226 1212 
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passive institutions at the announcement quarter and one quarter prior to merger 
resolution at different scenarios based on the above mentioned categories. For ease of 
explanation we refer to Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 for interpreting the results. Each node 
of the tree in Figure 3.1 and 3.2 represents a scenario, where the topmost node represents 
value increasing cash proposals that are successful mergers and the bottom most node 
represents value reducing stock proposals that are failed mergers. The remaining nodes 
are self explanatory. The scenario analysis gives us greater insight with respect to the 
merger characteristics, as we break down value increasing and value decreasing merger 
proposals into cash and stock proposals, and further into success and failed mergers.58 
Results for the announcement quarter in Figure 3.1 indicate that for value increasing 
stock mergers, active institutions increase their holdings of acquirer stock significantly, 
                                                 
58 One could argue that announcement period returns incorporate information on methods of payment - 
higher for cash deals. However, in our sample, a significant percentage (48%) of stock proposals are value 
increasing deals and also significant percentage (31%) of cash proposals are value reducing deals. Hence 
our analysis allows us to shed light on difference in trading between V+ and V- deals within a particular 
method of payment category.     
Panel B: Combined Effect of the Interaction Variables 
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for both the success and the failed cases. For value reducing stock proposals, we observe 
that active institutions increase holdings significantly only for mergers that failed. This 
suggests that for value increasing stock proposals, active institutions increase their 
holdings at announcement quarter without regard to the probable outcome of the merger. 











Figure 3.1: Changes in Holdings of Acquirer Shares by Active Institutions 
The figure displays the changes in holdings of acquirer shares by active institutions at the announcement 
quarter and one quarter prior to merger resolution at different scenarios based on abnormal return of the 
combined firm at the announcement ( V+ vs. V-), method of payment of the  merger (CASH vs. STOCK) 
and eventual outcome of the merger (SUCCESS vs. FAILURE).  The figure is presented in a form of a tree, 
where each node of the tree represents a scenario. The positive sign indicates that institutions increase 
holdings and negative sign indicates that institutions decrease holdings. The significance level at 10%, 5% 
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behavior is influenced by the possible outcome of the merger and they only increase their 
holdings when merger is likely to fail. Results on one quarter prior to resolution indicate 
that active institutions continue to engage in informed trading and they only increase their 
holdings significantly for value increasing stock mergers that are likely to succeed and 
for value reducing stock mergers that are likely to fail. Hence, these results suggest that 






Figure 3.2: Changes in Holdings of Acquirer Shares by Passive Institutions 
The figure displays the changes in holdings of acquirer shares by passive institutions at the announcement 
quarter and  one quarter prior to merger resolution at different scenarios based on abnormal return of the 
combined firm at the announcement ( V+ vs. V-), method of payment of the  merger (CASH vs. STOCK) 
and eventual outcome of the merger (SUCCESS vs. FAILURE).  The figure is presented in a form of a tree, 
where each node of the tree represents a scenario. The positive sign indicates that institutions increase 
holdings and negative sign indicates that institutions decrease holdings. The significance level at 10%, 5% 







































the merger prior to merger resolution and that they utilize their superior information 
vigilantly in trading acquiring firm stocks in case of stock mergers. The nodes 
representing the cash proposals do not indicate any differential trading behavior, which 
emphasizes that at the announcement quarter active institutions monitor stock merger 
proposals more carefully than cash proposals.  The behavior of passive institutional 
investors in different scenarios (presented in Figure 3.2) does not suggest that they 
possess any superior knowledge about the probable outcome of the merger prior to 
merger resolution. 
 
B. Trading Behavior of Active and Passive Institutions between Announcement and 
Resolution and at the Final Resolution Quarter 
In this section we investigate the trading behavior of active and passive 
institutions in the quarters between merger announcement and its final resolution and also 
at the final resolution quarter. We consider only the successful mergers in our sample for 
the analysis performed in the final resolution quarter.59 By investigating the trading 
behavior between merger announcement and resolution and at the final resolution quarter 
we shed light on the issue of whether institutions update their information and beliefs and 
change their strategies between merger announcement and the final outcome of the 
merger. First we discuss results that correspond to trading in the quarters between 
announcement and resolution. Next, we analyze trading of institutions at the final 
resolution quarter.  
To shed light on institutions’ information environment between merger 
announcement and its outcome, we observe their trading in the quarters between merger 
announcement and final resolution and the results are reported in Table 3.8. Column 1 
reports regression results for active institutions and column 2 reports regression results 
                                                 
59 Regression analysis on full sample mergers (considering both completed and cancelled deals) at the 
resolution quarter give similar results.  
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for passive institutions. The dependent variable is BET ANN TO FINAL HOLD CHNG, 
which is aggregate change in active (passive) institutional holdings of acquirer stock in 
the quarters between merger announcement and its completion or cancellation. 
 
Table 3.8: Trading Behavior of Active and Passive Institutions between Announcement and 
Resolution of Merger 
The table presents active and passive institutional investors’ trading behavior in the quarters 
between announcement and resolution of merger proposals for the period 1992-2001. BET ANN 
TO FINAL HOLD CHNG is the dependent variable, which is the aggregate change in active 
(passive) institutional holdings of acquirer stock in the quarter between merger announcement 
and its resolution. CAR is cumulative abnormal return (market adjusted) for the combined firm at 
the merger announcement for the event window (-1, +1). CASH DUMMY is a dummy variable, 
which is equal to 1 if the method of payment for the merger proposal is cash and is equal to 0 if 
the method of payment is stock or a combination of stock and cash. SUCCESS is a dummy 
variable, which is equal to 1 if the merger is successful and is equal to 0 if the merger is 
unsuccessful. PREV QTR HOLD represents the aggregate percentage holdings of acquirer stocks 
by active (passive) institutional investors in the previous quarter before announcement. PREV 
QTR HOLD CHNG represents the aggregate change in active (passive) institutional holdings of 
acquirer stock in the quarter prior to merger announcement. ACQ LOG ASSET is the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization of acquirer stocks at the announcement quarter. DEAL 
VALUE represents the log dollar value of the merger proposal. ACQ BOOK TO MKT represents 
the book to market ratio of acquiring firm stock at the announcement quarter. PREV RET 90 
DAY represents the buy and hold abnormal return of the acquiring firm over 90 days prior to 
merger announcement. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable: BET ANN TO FINAL HOLD CHNG 




















































2R  0.02 0.03 
N 580 584 
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Hence, this reflects changes in holdings between one quarter after announcement and one 
quarter before resolution. The results indicate that changes in holdings of acquirer stock 
by active and passive institutions in the quarters between announcement and resolution 
are not influenced by the announcement period abnormal return CAR. Moreover, CASH 
DUMMY has insignificant effect on active institutions’ trading during the period 
between announcement and outcome of the merger. Passive institutions display 
preference for stock mergers as compared to cash mergers during this intermediate 
period.60   
We now discuss results at the resolution quarter. Our analysis at the resolution 
quarter shed light on whether institutions update their beliefs and change their trading 
strategies as merger approaches its completion. Table 3.9 reports the regression analysis 
for active institutions at the resolution quarter. The structure of the table is similar to that 
of Table 3.4. The dependent variable is FINAL QTR HOLD CHNG, which is aggregate 
change in active institutional holdings of acquirer stock in the resolution quarter of 
mergers. We observe that CAR continues to have a positive significant effect on the 
changes of holdings of acquirer stocks by active institutions at the resolution quarter. This 
suggests that active institutions update their information with regard to the wealth 
implications of the merger as more information comes into the market and that they 
resume to trade on the basis of the announcement period wealth effect at the resolution 
quarter. In model 3, we observe that CASH DUMMY is positive and significant, which 
implies that at the final resolution quarter active institutions increase holdings of acquirer 
stocks for cash mergers more as compared to stock mergers. The reversal of sign for 
CASH DUMMY from negative and significant at the announcement quarter (Table 3.4) 
to positive and significant at the resolution quarter (Table 3.9) is interesting and warrants 
a discussion. This reversal can be explained by overreaction and underreaction 
                                                 
60  For the analysis performed in the quarters between announcement and outcome of merger, we report the 
results without the control variables blockholder and insider ownership, as inclusion of these variables 
reduce the sample size significantly; however they give similar results. 
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phenomena. We argue that active institutions evaluate stock vs. cash mergers on the basis 
of their prior beliefs about the firm at the merger announcement. Since stock mergers are 
mostly overvalued glamour stocks and institutions tilt towards glamour stocks 
(Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994)), the informed institutions overestimate their 
prior information about the firm and trade on the basis of that at the merger 
announcement. 
For our sample stock mergers, the mean return of the acquirer firm 90 days before 
the merger announcement is 0.097 (significant), which is higher than the mean return of 
0.004 (insignificant) for cash mergers. Moreover, the abnormal return of the combined 
firm at the merger announcement (-1, +1) is -0.001 (insignificant) for stock mergers and 
0.034 (significant) for cash mergers. The abnormal return of the acquirer firm at the 
merger announcement is -0.033 (significant) for stock mergers and 0.003 (insignificant) 
for cash mergers. This shows that before merger announcement stock acquirers had a 
price run up and active institutions overestimate this trend, thereby displaying their 
preference for stock mergers, ignoring the price reaction at the merger announcement 
with regard to method of payment of mergers. Active institutions gradually update their 
beliefs as more public information arrives at the market, and at the final resolution 
quarter display their preference for cash mergers as compared to stock mergers.61 The 
trading behavior of active institutions is consistent with the behavior of “momentum-
traders” as presented in Hong and Stein (1999), where momentum traders make 
transaction based on recent price trends, and since they are unable to assess their position 
in the momentum cycle, their trading eventually leads to over-reaction. 
 
                                                 
61 For our sample mergers, the mean return of the acquirer 90 days after announcement, 90 days before 
final resolution, 90 days after final resolution and 180 days after final resolution is higher for cash mergers 
than stock mergers. This suggests that for our sample the cash mergers outperform stock mergers at the 
announcement as well as between merger announcement and final resolution, as well as after the final 
resolution. 
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Table 3.9: Trading Behavior of Active Institutions in the Resolution Quarter: Successful 
Mergers 
The table presents active institutional investors’ trading behavior in the resolution quarter for 
successful mergers for the period 1992-2001. FINAL QTR HOLD CHNG is the dependent 
variable, which is aggregate change in active institutional holdings of acquirer stock in the 
resolution quarter of mergers. CAR is cumulative abnormal return (market adjusted) for the 
combined firm at the merger announcement for the event window (-1, +1). CASH DUMMY is a 
dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the method of payment for the merger proposal is cash and 
is equal to 0 if the method of payment is stock or a combination of stock and cash. PREV QTR 
HOLD represents the aggregate percentage holdings of acquirer stocks by active institutional 
investors in the previous quarter before resolution. PREV QTR HOLD CHNG represents the 
aggregate change in active institutional holdings of acquirer stock in the quarter prior to merger 
resolution. ACQ LOG ASSET is the natural logarithm of market capitalization of acquirer stocks 
at the resolution quarter. DEAL VALUE represents the log dollar value of the merger proposal. 
ACQ BOOK TO MKT represents the book to market ratio of acquiring firm stock at the 
resolution quarter. PREV 30 DAY FINAL RETURN represents the buy and hold abnormal return 
of the acquiring firm over 30 days prior to merger resolution. BLOCKHOLDER HOLD 
represents the percentage holdings of acquiring firm stock by five percent blockholder in the 
quarter of merger resolution. INSIDER HOLD represents the percentage holdings of acquiring 
firm stock by corporate insiders in the quarter of merger resolution. Statistical significance at the 



































































































2R  0.11 0.10 0.12 0.12 
Number of 
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1086 934 1086 934 
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We also observe that the coefficients of PREV QTR HOLD and PREV QTR 
HOLD CHNG are both negative and significant. The negative coefficient of PREV QTR 
HOLD implies that active institutions do not increase their holdings at the final quarter, if 
they already have a high percentage ownership at the previous quarter. The negative 
coefficient of PREV QTR HOLD CHNG suggests that if active institutions have already 
increased the holdings of the acquirer firm in the previous quarter, they are unlikely to do 
the same in the final quarter. These two results are intuitive, as they suggest that 
institutions that have high ownership concentration in the acquiring firm are more 
cautious about increasing their holdings. The effect of PREV 30 DAY FINAL RETURN, 
which represents buy and hold abnormal return of the acquiring firm over 30 days prior 
to merger resolution, is insignificant. Additionally, we run regression using the buy and 
hold abnormal return between announcement and final resolution dates and the result 
remain same.   
We now discuss results for passive institutions at the final resolution quarter. 
These results are presented in Table 3.10. We observe that CAR has positive significant 
effect on the changes of holdings of acquirer firms at the resolution quarter for passive 
institutions. This implies that at the resolution quarter, passive institutions increase 
holdings of acquirer shares significantly as the cumulative abnormal return of the 
combined firm at the announcement increases. We have observed in Table 3.5 that the 
effect of CAR is insignificant on the changes of holdings of acquirer shares by passive 
institutions at the announcement quarter. The results in Table 3.8, reflecting trading in the 
quarters between merger announcement and its outcome also highlights the fact that 
passive institutions do not respond to merger announcement period wealth effect. This 
suggests that passive institutions are indifferent to the merger wealth effect and do not 
actively engage in portfolio rebalancing activities with respect to the merger wealth 
implication at the announcement quarter and even in the quarters between merger 
announcement and its completion. Whereas, at the final resolution quarter their trading  
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Table 3.10: Trading Behavior of Passive Institutions in the Resolution Quarter: Successful 
Mergers 
The table presents passive institutional investors’ trading behavior in the resolution quarter for 
successful mergers for the period 1992-2001. FINAL QTR HOLD CHNG is the dependent 
variable, which is aggregate change in passive institutional holdings of acquirer stock in the 
resolution quarter of mergers. CAR is cumulative abnormal return (market adjusted) for the 
combined firm at the merger announcement for the event window (-1, +1). CASH DUMMY is a 
dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the method of payment for the merger proposal is cash and 
is equal to 0 if the method of payment is stock or a combination of stock and cash.  PREV QTR 
HOLD represents the aggregate percentage holdings of acquirer stocks by passive institutional 
investors in the previous quarter before resolution. PREV QTR HOLD CHNG represents the 
aggregate change in passive institutional holdings of acquirer stock in the quarter prior to merger 
resolution. ACQ LOG ASSET is the natural logarithm of market capitalization of acquirer stocks 
at the resolution quarter. DEAL VALUE represents the log dollar value of the merger proposal. 
ACQ BOOK TO MKT represents the book to market ratio of acquiring firm stock at the 
resolution quarter. PREV 30 DAY FINAL RETURN represents the buy and hold abnormal return 
of the acquiring firm over 30 days prior to merger resolution. BLOCKHOLDER HOLD 
represents the percentage holdings of acquiring firm stock by five percent blockholder in the 
quarter of merger resolution. INSIDER HOLD represents the percentage holdings of acquiring 
firm stock by corporate insiders in the quarter of merger resolution. Statistical significance at the 



































































































2R  0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 
Number of 
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1103 948 1103 948 
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behavior is largely influenced by the wealth implications created at the announcement. 
This suggests a strong under-reaction by passive institutions in identifying the wealth 
created or destroyed by the merger announcement.  
The effect of CASH DUMMY is insignificant after controlling for insider and 
blockholder ownership, which implies that passive institutions trading behavior is not 
influenced by the method of payment of the merger proposals. We observe that the 
coefficients of PREV QTR HOLD and PREV QTR HOLD CHNG are both negative and 
significant for passive institutions. This behavior is similar to that of active institutions 
and supports the notion that institutions are more cautious in increasing their holdings 
when they have a higher ownership stake in the company. 
We perform additional analysis at the resolution quarter using the market model 
regression to measure the price reaction of the merger proposal at the announcement, 
instead of market-adjusted abnormal return. Table 3.11 reports trading behavior of both 
active and passive institutions at the resolution quarter, where CAR is computed using the 
market model regression. The implications of the results are the same as those presented 
earlier in Tables 3.9 and 3.10, where CAR is computed using the market-adjusted 
abnormal return. Thus our results are robust to the model used to compute the abnormal 
returns.  
In summary, our results indicate that active institutions trade on the basis of recent 
price trends displaying their support to stock proposals at the announcement quarter. 
They trade on momentum and since they are unable to assess their position in the 
momentum cycle, the excessive momentum eventually lead to overreaction. Finally at the 
resolution quarter active institutions display their aversion for stock proposals. Passive 
institutions display strong under-reaction at the announcement quarter to the merger 
announcement period wealth effect. At the final resolution quarter both active and 
passive institutions utilize their updated information and trade accordingly. These results 
are consistent with behavioral model for under-reaction and over-reaction presented by  
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Table 3.11: Trading Behavior of Active and Passive Institutions in the Resolution Quarter 
for Successful Mergers: Market Model CAR 
The table presents active and passive institutional investors’ trading behavior in the resolution 
quarter for successful mergers for the period 1992-2001. FINAL QTR HOLD CHNG is the 
dependent variable, which is aggregate change in active (passive) institutional holdings of 
acquirer stock in the resolution quarter of mergers. CAR is cumulative abnormal return (market 
model) for the combined firm at the merger announcement for the event window (-1, +1). The 
ordinary least square coefficients of the market model regression are estimated over the period [-
244, -6] with respect to the announcement date. CASH DUMMY is a dummy variable, which is 
equal to 1 if the method of payment for the merger proposal is cash and is equal to 0 if the 
method of payment is stock or a combination of stock and cash. PREV QTR HOLD represents 
the aggregate percentage holdings of acquirer stocks by active (passive) institutional investors in 
the previous quarter before resolution. PREV QTR HOLD CHNG represents the aggregate 
change in active (passive) institutional holdings of acquirer stock in the quarter prior to merger 
resolution. ACQ LOG ASSET is the natural logarithm of market capitalization of acquirer stocks 
at the resolution quarter. DEAL VALUE represents the log dollar value of the merger proposal. 
ACQ BOOK TO MKT represents the book to market ratio of acquiring firm stock at the 
resolution quarter. PREV 30 DAY FINAL RETURN represents the buy and hold abnormal return 
of the acquiring firm over 30 days prior to merger resolution. BLOCKHOLDER HOLD 
represents the percentage holdings of acquiring firm stock by five percent blockholder in the 
quarter of merger resolution. INSIDER HOLD represents the percentage holdings of acquiring 
firm stock by corporate insiders in the quarter of merger resolution. Statistical significance at the 
one, five and ten percent level is indicated by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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2R  0.11 0.12 0.09 0.09 
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Hong and Stein (1999), which is based on gradual diffusion of information. The model 
presents two types of agents: “news-watchers” and “momentum-traders.” Both types of 
agents possess bounded rationality, indicating that they are only able to process some 
subset of available information. News-watchers are unable to draw inference form current 
or past price and trade based on fundamentals, causing under-reaction. Momentum 
traders make transaction based on recent price trends, causing over-reaction. The trading 
behavior of institutions therefore suggest that in the context of mergers, passive 
institutions behave more like “news-watchers’ and active institutions reflect upon 
“momentum-traders.”  
 
C. Additional Tests  
In order to differentiate the trading of institutions before and after the final 
effective date, we construct one sub-sample with resolution date in the first week of each 
quarter and another sub-sample with the resolution date in the last week of each quarter. 
62  We argue that for the first week of quarter sub-sample, the reported change in holdings 
by institutions is likely to correspond to the portfolio adjustment in the later part of the 
quarter and hence after the effective date. Similarly, for the last week of the quarter sub-
sample, the reported change in holdings by institutions is likely to correspond to the 
portfolio adjustment before the effective date. The effect of CAR on changes of holdings 
of active and passive institutions at the final resolution quarter with regard to these sub-
sample data is reported in Panel A of Table 3.12. Our results on sub-sample with the first 
week of each quarter show that CAR has positive and insignificant effect (coefficient 
0.004 and p-value 0.94) on changes of holdings of acquirer stocks by active institutions. 
Moreover, the results on sub-sample with last week of each quarter show that CAR has 
positive significant effect (coefficient 0.172 and p-value 0.02) on changes of holdings by 
active institutions. Thus, these results suggest that active institutions continue to trade on 
                                                 
62 Sub-sample analysis with resolution dates within first three days of each quarter and last three days of 
each quarter also give similar results. 
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the basis of announcement period abnormal return up until the final resolution date. 
However, they do not change holdings of acquiring stocks on the basis of merger wealth 
implications after the final resolution date.  
 
Table 3.12: Sub-sample Analysis: Changes of Holdings of Acquiring Stocks by Active and 
Passive Institutions in Resolution Quarter 
This table reports effect of CAR and CASH DUMMY variable on changes of holdings of 
acquiring stocks by active and passive institutions in resolution quarter in two sub-samples with 
respect to resolution dates. Panel A, reports effect of CAR on changes of holdings of active and 
passive institutions at the final resolution quarter for one sub-sample with resolution date in the 
first week of each quarter and another sub-sample with the resolution date in the last week of 
each quarter. Panel B, reports effect of CASH DUMMY on changes of holdings of active and 
passive institutions at the final resolution quarter for one sub-sample with resolution date in the 
first week of each quarter and another sub-sample with the resolution date in the last week of 
each quarter. CAR is cumulative abnormal return (market adjusted) for the combined firm at the 
merger announcement for the event window (-1, +1).  CASH DUMMY is a dummy variable, 
which is equal to 1 if the method of payment for the merger proposal is cash and is equal to 0 if 
the method of payment is stock or a combination of stock and cash. FINAL QTR HOLD CHNG 
is the dependent variable, which is aggregate change in institutional holdings of acquirer stock in 
the resolution quarter of mergers. 
 
Panel A: Effect of CAR on changes of holdings of institutions at the final quarter 
 Dependent Variable: FINAL QTR HOLD CHNG 
 
Sub-sample with Resolution 
Date in First Week of Each 
Quarter 
Sub-sample with Resolution 














Panel B: Effect of CASH DUMMY on changes of holdings of institutions at the final 
quarter 
 Dependent Variable: FINAL QTR HOLD CHNG 
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Quarter 
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We have observed in Table 3.8 that active institutions’ trading in the quarters 
between merger announcement and final resolution is not influenced by merger 
announcement period abnormal return. The results show that CAR has negative 
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insignificant effect (coefficient (-0.027) and p-value 0.16) on changes of holdings by 
active institutions in the quarters between merger announcement and final resolution. 
Hence, these results suggest that between the quarters of merger announcement to its 
completion, active institutions’ trading is not influenced by the announcement period 
abnormal return. However, at the resolution quarter right before the completion of 
merger, active institutions resume to trade on the basis of merger wealth effect captured 
by CAR.      
Similar to active institutions, we attempt to disentangle the trading of passive 
institutions before and after the final effective date by performing sub-sample analysis 
and these results are also reported in Table 3.12. Our results on sub-sample with the first 
week of each quarter show that CAR has positive and insignificant effect (coefficient 
0.011 and p-value 0.76) on changes of holdings of acquirer stocks by passive institutions. 
Moreover, the results on sub-sample with last week of each quarter show that CAR has 
negative insignificant effect (coefficient (-0.015) and p-value 0.46). The full sample 
results, discussed in section B (Table 3.10) show that trading by passive institutions in the 
resolution quarter is influenced by the merger announcement period wealth effect 
captured by CAR. Hence, in the resolution quarter, trading by passive institutions on the 
basis of merger wealth effect seems to be occurring both before and after the resolution 
date. To shed light on passive institutions’ information environment between 
announcement and final resolution, we observed passive institutions’ trading in the 
quarters between merger announcement and final resolution in Table 3.8. The results 
show that changes in holdings of acquiring stock by passive institutions in the quarters 
between merger announcement and final resolution has negative and insignificant relation 
with CAR (coefficient (-0.014) and p-value 0.12). Hence, relating these results with that 
of the results obtained at the resolution quarter, we can argue that passive institutions’ 
response to merger announcement period wealth effect seem to be occurring near the 
completion of merger.  
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The effect of CASH DUMMY on changes of holdings of acquiring firm stocks by 
active and passive institutions before and after the final effective date is observed also by 
performing sub-sample analysis and these results are reported in Panel B of Table 3.12. 
For the sub-sample with resolution date in first week of quarter, the effect of CASH 
DUMMY on changes of holdings by active institutions is positive and significant 
(coefficient 0.018 and p-value 0.01). Moreover, for the sub-sample with resolution date in 
the last week of quarter, the effect of CASH DUMMY is positive and insignificant. For 
the first week of quarter sub-sample, the reported change in holdings by institutions is 
likely to correspond to the portfolio adjustment in the later part of the quarter and hence 
after the effective date. Similarly, for the last week of the quarter sub-sample, the 
reported change in holdings by institutions is likely to correspond to the portfolio 
adjustment before the effective date. Hence, we can argue from the results in Panel B of 
Table 3.12 that active institutions show their preference for cash acquirers only after the 
merger effective date. The results for passive institutions do not indicate any preference 
for cash over stock acquirers for the sub-sample tests. 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) document that acquiring firms had 
massive shareholder wealth losses during 1998-2001. We introduce a year dummy for the 
period 1998-2001 in our regression analysis, to investigate the effect of the years with 
huge negative shareholders’ wealth implications. The effect of the year dummy (1998-
2001) at the announcement quarter is negative and significant (p-value 0.03) for active 
institutions and positive and insignificant for passive institutions. All other effects remain 
unchanged. This emphasizes that active institutions are more vigilant at the 
announcement quarter in their response to the wealth implications created by mergers as 
compared to passive institutions. At the resolution quarter the effect of the year dummy is 
negative and significant for both active and passive institutions. This change in sign of 
the year dummy for passive institutions from announcement to resolution quarter again 
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emphasizes passive institutions’ undereaction phenomenon. These results are not 
presented in table and are available upon request. 
We also run regressions using the final event (-1, +1) return of the acquiring firm 
instead of the announcement period abnormal return CAR. The results show that the 
effect of resolution date return on changes in holdings at the resolution quarter is positive 
and insignificant for both active and passive institutions. This is not surprising as most of 
the value implications of the merger announcement are captured by the market at the time 
of the announcement.63  
 
C.  Robustness Checks 
In this section, we present and discuss the robustness of our results to alternative 
specifications and interpretations. As part of our robustness checks we perform a sub-
sample analysis for the years 1991-1997. The selection of the sub-sample period is due to 
the fact that the identification of the institutions for the year 1998 and beyond is not 
properly done in CDA-Spectrum 13f filings institutional holdings data. Our results (not 
reported in table) for both active and passive institutions remain unchanged for the 
announcement quarter as well as for the resolution quarter for the sub-sample period 
1991-1997.  
We perform regression analysis using only the acquirer announcement period 
abnormal return as a measure of wealth implication of the acquiring firm instead of the 
combined announcement period abnormal return. The results support active institutions’ 
immediate response to acquiring firms’ wealth effect at the announcement.  The 
underreaction phenomenon with regard to announcement period wealth effect holds for 
passive institutions when acquiring firm abnormal return is used. Active institutions’ 
overreaction to stock proposals at the announcement quarter also holds, although the 
effect weakens after controlling for blockholder and insider holdings. The results at the 
                                                 
63 These results are available on request 
 101 
resolution quarter using acquiring firms’ abnormal returns are similar to that of the results 
presented earlier using abnormal return of the combined firms. The results at the 
resolution quarter therefore indicate that both active and passive institutions continue to 
trade on the basis of wealth implications of the merger at the announcement. Moreover, 
both the institutions display their preference for cash mergers at the resolution quarter, 
thereby indicating delayed reaction to the cash proposals.  
We perform additional tests by including “Other Institutions” which are type 5 in 
the CDA Spectrum 13-f filings. In our main analysis we exclude type 5, as this category 
is not distinct and it is a mixture of both active and passive institutions. As part of our 
robustness checks we include type 5 in both active and passive institutions category and 
observe how it affects our main results. The results suggest that for active institutions the 
overreaction phenomenon holds, with regard to stock vs. cash proposals, even when 
“Other Institutions” are included in this category. Also the results support active 
institutions’ immediate response to merger wealth effects with the new defined category. 
When type 5 is included with Passive institutions, they do not respond to the wealth 
effect of merger proposals at the announcement and at the resolution quarter. Also, they 
show similar response to cash and stock proposals as that of active institutions’ at both 
announcement and resolution quarter. Thus in response to merger proposals the “Other” 




We investigate institutional investors’ holdings and trading behavior of acquiring 
firm stocks in response to merger announcements. We categorize institutions into two 
groups. The first group of institutions consists of investment companies and independent 
investment advisors and we term these active institutions. The second group of 
institutions consists of banks and insurance companies and we term these passive 
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institutions. We analyze the trading behavior of active and passive institutions 
surrounding merger announcements and their eventual resolutions.  
We observe significant differences in trading strategies between active and 
passive institutions. Our results reveal that, at the announcement quarter, trading behavior 
of active institutions is largely influenced by merger characteristics and market response 
to the merger announcement. Active institutions significantly increase their holdings of 
acquiring firm stocks for mergers that have higher wealth effect at the announcement. 
This emphasizes that active institutions have superior skill to identify mergers with 
higher wealth implications. The results also indicate that active institutions prefer stock 
proposals at the merger announcement on the basis of its recent price trend and disregard 
the negative wealth implications of stock proposals at the announcement. This behavior is 
explained by the overreaction phenomenon that investors are overconfident in their 
abilities to select stocks and that they overestimate their private signals of the stocks, 
thereby displaying overreaction. Our results further suggest that active institutions update 
their information between announcement and final resolution as more information arrives 
into the market. Finally active institutions make corrections for their overreaction 
behavior at the resolution quarter by displaying their aversion to stock proposals. The 
trading behavior of active institutions is consistent with “momentum-traders” as 
presented in Hong and Stein (1999). Momentum traders make transaction based on recent 
price trends, and since they are unable to asses their entry point into the momentum 
cycle, excessive momentum eventually lead to over-reaction. The scenario analysis at the 
announcement with respect to merger wealth effect, method of payment, and probable 
final outcome of the merger reveals that active institutions are better informed with 
regard to the likelihood of the merger success.  
We find that, at the announcement quarter, passive institutions are indifferent to 
the market response of the merger announcement.  However, at the final resolution, they 
update their beliefs and increase holdings of acquiring firm stocks for merger proposals 
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that had a positive market response at the announcement. This suggests a strong under-
reaction in passive institutions’ trading strategy. In the light of behavioral model 
presented by Hong and Stein (1999), passive institutions behave more like “news-
watchers,” who are unable to draw inference from stock price and display under-reaction 
due to gradual diffusion of information. The results also do not indicate that passive 
institutions have informational advantage in assessing the probable outcome of the 
merger. 
In summary, our results suggest distinct trading behavior between active and 
passive institutions surrounding merger activities. Active institutions’ response to the 
merger wealth implications is immediate, whereas passive institutions respond to the 
wealth effect with a delay. This difference in their response could be explained by the 
notion that there are differences in employee expertise between these two types of 
institutions. The evidence also indicates that there are behavioral aspects in both active 
and passive institutions’ trading. Active institutions display behavior consistent with 
investor overreaction, which they seem to correct as more information is released into the 
market. Passive institutions display under-reaction in responding to the merger wealth 
effect. Furthermore, active institutions seem to have informational advantage with regard 
to the likelihood of the merger outcome. 
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CHAPTER 4 




Market for corporate control is considered to be an external monitoring mechanism to 
discipline managers and reduce the agency problem. Various studies have examined the 
effectiveness of this monitoring mechanism with regard to different corporate decisions 
and its interaction with other forms of governance mechanisms.64 In this paper, we 
examine the extent to which the market for corporate control influence one of the most 
important and debatable corporate decisions – executive compensation.65 We investigate 
two primary questions: First whether executive compensation structure depends on the 
level of external monitoring mechanism represented by existing anti-takeover provisions 
of the firm. In particular, we examine whether managerial power in firms with high level 
of anti-takeover provisions (ATP) contribute in establishing higher compensation for 
executives. Second, we examine whether changes in takeover vulnerability cause any 
subsequent changes in executive compensation structure. That is, whether executive 
                                                 
64 Mikkelson and Partch (1997) show that CEOs are more likely to be replaced when hostile takeover 
activity is high, supporting managerial entrenchment argument. Hadlock and Lumer (1997) show that 
relation between firm performance and executive turnover is weaker when threat of takeover is low. Huson, 
Parrino, and Starks (2001) find that changes in intensity in takeover market do not influence relation 
between CEO turnover and firm performance. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2006) show that managers in firms 
with higher ATPs are more likely to engage in acquisitions for empire building, as they are less likely to be 
disciplined by the takeover market. Cremers and Nair (2005) show that market for corporate control and 
shareholder activism are complementary to each other and results in long-term abnormal returns and 
profitability of firms. Supporting the view of enhanced bargaining effect of takeover defense mechanisms, 
Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) show that independent boards use anti-takeover provisions to the 
advantage of target shareholders than other boards. Comment and Schwert (1995) also find that anti-
takeover measures increase bid premia. Ashraf, Chakrabarti, Fu, and Jayaraman (2007) find directors in 
firms with weak external monitoring mechanisms are more likely to lose board positions and also directors 
approving increase in anti-takeover provisions are more likely to lose their seats  
65 Surveys on executive compensation include, Bebchuk, Fired, and Walker (2002), Perry and Zenner 
(2000), Abowd and Kaplan (1999), and Murphy (1999).  
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compensation structure gets adjusted with changes in managerial power resulting from 
changes in anti-takeover provisions of the firm. 
Two competing views exist that relate executive compensation to agency problem. 
Under the “Efficient Compensation Contracting,” board of directors aligns managers and 
shareholders’ interests by incentive driven optimal executive compensation structure. 
According to this approach executive compensation scheme resolve agency problems, at 
least partially. The “Managerial Entrenchment” on the other hand considers executive 
compensation as part of the agency problem itself. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) 
argue that higher managerial power from management entrenchment play a role in 
resulting executive compensation structure deviate from optimal contracting and 
generating higher rents for executives.66 The authors further argue that in order to 
camouflage the extraction of rents, managerial power results in establishing inefficient 
pay structure which lead to destruction of shareholders’ wealth.67 The authors state that 
higher managerial power would lead to higher pay and less pay-for-performance 
sensitivity of executive compensation schemes.68 Considering external disciplining 
mechanism – market for corporate control, managers in a firm with higher level of anti-
takeover provisions are likely to be less vulnerable to hostile takeover and more likely to 
be entrenched; therefore higher managerial power would play a significant role in the 
design of compensation schemes of executives in those firms.69   
Contrary to the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, Knoeber (1986) provides a 
theory arguing that anti-takeover provisions reduce the likelihood of executives losing 
                                                 
66 Other studies providing similar argument are: Yermack (1997), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) 
67 The authors acknowledge that managerial power approach is not a substitute for the optimal contracting 
approach. Rather, the compensation practices are likely to be influenced by both phenomenons, which 
eventually results in deviation from the optimal outcome causing by the managerial power approach.    
68 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) examine the effect of corporate governance on CEO pay and compare 
efficient contracting hypothesis with managerial entrenchment hypothesis. They argue that managerial 
power influence CEO pay structure in poor governed firms; whereas, efficient contract seem to fit better in 
well governed firms.   
69 We use the phrases “managerial power” and “management entrenchment” interchangeably through out 
the paper.   
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their jobs, and therefore an efficient contracting can be achieved by allowing the 
compensation to be deferred until performance of the manager can be better evaluated.70 
According to this “Efficient Compensation Contracting Hypothesis” manager at firms 
with high ATP will receive lower current compensation as compared to managers in 
firms with low ATP, since managers in firms with high ATP face low risk of not 
receiving the deferred compensation due to low probability of takeover.71 Contradicting 
this argument, Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Parrino (1997) show that firms adopting anti-
takeover provisions such as fair price and supermajority charter amendments pay higher 
executive compensation before the adoption of the provisions and also experience an 
increase in compensation after the adoption. Their results support the “Entrenchment 
Hypothesis,” which suggests that managerial power in high ATP firms may result in 
generating higher compensation for executives deviating from efficient contract. They 
examine proposed amendments of 129 firms over the sample period of 1979-1987, 
assuming that all of the proposed amendments have been implemented. Their study 
considers only two ATP provisions (fair price and supermajority charter amendments) 
that are proposed for implementation and also the study does not incorporate the existing 
ATP which will have an influence over the executive compensation structure Moreover, 
the study is unable to address whether executive compensation contract differs between 
firms that increase anti-takeover provisions as compared to firms that eliminate such 
provisions.  
                                                 
70 This line of research relates to the long-term contracting theory described by DeAngelo and Rice (1983), 
where authors argue that ATP reduce the risk of managers to undertake long-term profitable investments 
that may appear to be unprofitable to investors initially. Hence, ATP protects managers from risk of losing 
firm specific human capital due to takeover before the true value of such long-term profitable investments 
is revealed. Stein (1988) argues that ATP provisions increase the likelihood of long-term investment 
projects to be implemented and shareholders are likely to observe the true value of these projects due to 
low probability of takeover.   
71 Agarwal and Knoeber (1996) show that an increase in the threat of takeover (measured by the relative 
frequency of acquisitions in the same industry of the firm) has a positive effect on managerial 
compensation. 
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Our study extends this line of research by examining the relation of compensation 
structure with regard to variation of the existing anti-takeover provisions of firms. In 
particular, we examine whether management power plays a role in generating higher 
rents for executives in firms with higher level of existing ATP, or whether higher ATP 
results in efficient contracting by deferring executives pay in future. We also address 
whether changes in takeover vulnerability cause any subsequent changes in executive 
compensation structure. If a firm increases its takeover vulnerability by eliminating 
existing anti-takeover provisions, whether that cause any subsequent changes of 
compensation structure. Conversely, we test whether implementing additional anti-
takeover provisions effect future pay structure of executives. While considering the 
changes in takeover vulnerability, we take into account the existing anti-takeover 
provisions of the firms. In particular, we examine whether the effect of changes in 
takeover vulnerability on executive pay structure differs between firms with varying 
management power. By separating out increase and decrease in takeover vulnerability 
with respect to existing anti-takeover provisions of the firms, we are able to understand 
the extend to which management power play a role in determining pay structure of 
executives and how it interacts with the efficient contracting phenomenon.   
We use the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance score (GIM Index) of 
the firm in the year of the proposal as a measure of anti-takeover provisions of firms. The 
construction of the score predominantly considers anti-takeover provisions and hence the 
measure is accepted as an anti-takeover provision (ATP) rather than a representation of 
the overall governance of the firm. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) document that the 
index is negatively related to firm value and stock return.72 The GIM index is constructed 
by 24 anti-takeover provisions published by the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
                                                 
72 A debate surrounds around the causal link between GIM index and equity price. However, there is 
growing empirical evidence that corporate governance can substantially increase shareholder value. See 
Becht, Bolton, and Roell (2002) for an overview of corporate governance.  
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(IRRC), giving each provision equal weight. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) provide 
an entrenchment index (BCF Index) based on six provisions among the 24 that have 
negative valuation consequences in firms, both individually and at the aggregate level. 
These six provisions are: classified boards, poison pills, golden parachutes, limit to 
amend by-laws, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. 
We use both GIM and BCF indices as a proxy for anti-takeover measures, where higher 
value of both the indices indicate higher existing anti-takeover provisions and hence low 
takeover vulnerability of the firm. We also identify changes of GIM and BCF index and 
how they influence level of executive compensation.  
Our results can be summarized as follows. We find firms with high ATP provide 
higher level of compensation to executives as compared to firms with low ATP. 
Moreover, the pay-for-performance sensitivity is lower in firms with high ATP, although 
the effect is weak. Hence, with regard to existing anti-takeover provisions, firms which 
are likely to be less disciplined by the takeover market have higher pay structure for the 
executives. Therefore, the results are consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis, which 
argue that higher managerial power would lead to higher pay for executives. This 
emphasizes that market for corporate control act as a disciplining mechanism in reducing 
conflict of interests between management and shareholders with regard to executive 
compensation issues.  
We next examine the effect of changes in takeover vulnerability on level and 
subsequent changes on executive pay structure. The results on effect of changes of ATP 
on executive compensation contradict the results presented by Borokhovich, Brunarski, 
and Parrino (1997). We find that increase in anti-takeover provisions of a firm leads to 
decrease in cash and total compensation of executives, but has no effect on pay-for-
performance sensitivity. A firm that undergoes eliminating some existing anti-takeover 
provisions provides higher total compensation to executives following the changes in 
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ATP. Moreover, decrease in ATP has a positive significant effect on percentage change 
in cash and total compensation.  
With regard to changes in takeover vulnerability, our results are consistent with 
the “Efficient Compensation Contracting Hypothesis” suggested by Knoeber (1986). An 
increase in the level of takeover vulnerability of a firm would result in higher likelihood 
of losing deferred compensation by managers due to higher risk of hostile takeover, and 
thereby causing an increase in current compensation. With an increase in ATP, managers 
are less likely to lose their firm specific human capital due to hostile takeover and more 
likely to receive the deferred compensation and therefore accept lower current 
compensation. However, these results seem not to be driven by firms strong in 
shareholder rights. Low ATP firms display entrenchment phenomenon by decrease in 
both cash and total compensation when firm eliminate some existing ATP and increase in 
cash compensation when firm incorporate additional ATP. We argue that when changes 
in ATP occur in firms with lower shareholder rights (high ATP firms), management 
power play a role in settling up a compensation contract which protects them from the 
risk of not receiving deferred compensation. According to Knoeber (1986), ATP itself 
acts as a disciplinary mechanism in achieving efficient compensation contract by having 
lower compensation in high ATP firms. Contradicting this view, our results indicate that 
management entrenchment contribute in obtaining such a contract as a means of securing 
them from losing deferred compensation.  
The results further indicate that the pay-for-performance sensitivity is higher for 
firms that experience increases in takeover vulnerability. However, firms that undergo 
decreases in takeover vulnerability do not display any significant effect over pay-for-
performance sensitivity. This implies that when a firm moves from lower shareholder 
rights to higher shareholder rights regime, it establishes executive compensation schemes 
that are aligned with performance more. This relation is mainly driven by the firms which 
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already have higher shareholder rights to begin with, although this is not consistent across 
different specifications of managerial power.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe the data. 
In Section 4.3, we analyze the effect of existing level of anti-takeover provisions on 
executive compensation structure. In Section 4.4, we examine the effect of changes in 
takeover vulnerability of a firm over executive compensation schemes. Finally, Section 
4.5 provides the conclusion.   
 
4.2. Data 
4.2.1. Executive Compensation Data 
Executive compensation data is obtained from ExecuComp database for the 
sample year 1992-2005. We construct the following variable for each executive: CASH 
COMPENSATION t  represents salary plus bonus of executive for the year t. % ∆ CASH 
COMPENSATION t is the percentage change in cash compensation in year t compared to 
previous year (t-1). TOTAL COMPENSATION t represents total compensation of 
executive comprising of salary, bonus, option grants, and other compensation. 
% ∆ TOTAL COMPENSATION t is the percentage change in total compensation in year t 
compared to previous year (t-1). PAY FOR PERFORMANCE t is computed by dividing 
the value of options granted to the executive by the shareholder wealth at the year t. 
Following Yermack (1995) we represent pay-for-performance sensitivity as sensitivity of 
option grant per dollar change in share value. This is calculated by first computing the 
“delta” of option grant (which is the partial derivative of the Black Scholes formula with 
respect to stock price, PesValueBlackSchol ∂∂ /)( ). Pay-for-performance sensitivity is 
computed by multiplying delta by the fraction of the equity represented by the option 
award, which is number of options granted divided by number of shares outstanding at 
the beginning of the year. This provides the change in value of executive option grant for 
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every dollar change in share value. Hartzell and Starks (2003) also use similar measures 
to examine institutional investor monitoring role with regard to executive compensation. 
The authors note that none of these measures take into consideration the changes in 
wealth of executives in association with changes in portfolio holdings of existing stocks 
and options. The authors further mention that current compensation is a good 
representation of compensation structure which board controls. Other studies using 
similar measure include: Core and Guay (1999), Guay (1999), Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 
(2003).73  
 
4.2.2. Construction of Proxy for Takeover Vulnerability 
As a proxy for takeover vulnerability we use the anti-takeover provisions (ATP) 
incorporated by the firms.74 Higher anti-takeover provisions (ATP) imply higher 
resistance for market for corporate control. Hence, these firms are more likely to have 
entrenched management, as they are less likely to be disciplined by the takeover 
market.75 We use the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance score of the firm in 
the year of the proposal as a measure of anti-takeover provisions of firms. Although 
being widely used in the recent literature, the Gompers-Ishii-Metrick (GIM) governance 
score is receiving a lot of criticism among the finance academics. The debate centers on 
whether this score truly measures the governance structure of a firm. The construction of 
the score predominantly considers anti-takeover provisions and hence the measure is 
accepted as an anti-takeover provision (ATP). According to the measure, firms with a 
higher GIM score have higher “management control” and lower “shareholder rights.” The 
GIM index is constructed by 24 anti-takeover provisions published by Investor 
                                                 
73 We thank Lalitha Naveen for providing us the data for delta.  
74 Coates (2000) and Bhagat and Romano (2001) provide a survey of the literature regarding takeover 
defenses.  
75 Another competing argument is that higher ATP increase bargaining power of target board. However, the 
literature suggests that managerial entrenchment dominates the enhanced bargaining effect (Becht, Bolton, 
and Roell (2002)).  
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Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), giving each provision equal weight. GIM index 
can take values from 0 to 24, adding one for each of the 24 anti-takeover provisions a 
firm incorporates. Therefore, a higher value of GIM index implies firms with higher 
ATPs and therefore higher resistance for market for corporate control and high in 
managerial power. The study documents that the GIM index is negatively related to firm 
value and stock return. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) argue that not all 24 IRRC 
provisions contribute equally to the negative correlation between GIM index and firm 
value. They identify six provisions among the 24 that reduce shareholders’ protection: 
classified boards, poison pills, golden parachutes, limit to amend by-laws, and 
supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. The authors provide an 
entrenchment index (BCF) based on theses six provisions and show that they have 
negative valuation consequences in firms, both individually and at the aggregate level. 
The authors further state that the other 18 provisions are not significantly negatively 
correlated with firm value. The BCF index can take values from 0 to 6, adding one for 
each of the six anti-takeover provisions a firm incorporates. Similar to GIM index, a 
higher value of BCF index implies firms with higher ATPs and therefore high in 
managerial power. Both GIM and BCF index values are available for the years 1990, 
1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 (IRRC published years). 
A new body of research has emerged on the basis of GIM and BCF indices. Using 
the GIM index, Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2006) show that the conflict of interest between 
managers and shareholders is more severe at firms with higher ATPs. They argue that 
managers in firms with higher ATPs are more likely to engage in acquisitions for empire 
building, as they are less likely to be disciplined by the market for corporate control. 
Cremers and Nair (2005) investigate how the market for corporate control, which is the 
external governance mechanism, interacts with shareholder activism, which is the internal 
governance mechanism. They show that external and internal governance mechanisms 
complement to each other, which results in long-term abnormal returns and profitability 
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of firms. They use percentage of share ownership by public pension funds and by the 
largest blockholders as the proxy for the internal governance mechanism. As a proxy for 
the external governance mechanism they use the anti-takeover provisions (ATP) 
incorporated by the firms, represented by GIM index. Using GIM index as a measure of 
managerial entrenchment, Fisman, Khurana, and Rhodes-Kropf (2005) find that 
entrenchment is negatively correlated with likelihood of firing and positively correlated 
with the market response to announcement of firing. Moreover, they find that firing of 
entrenched CEO lead to improved operating performance. Knyazeva (2006) use firms’ 
GIM index to represent poorly governed managers and find that poorly governed 
managers show fewer dividend cuts and engage in dividend smoothing.  
 
4.2.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample firm for the period 1992 to 
2005. GIM Index is the Gompers-Ishii-Metirck governance measure of the firm. BCF 
index is the Bebchuk-Cohen-Ferrell governance measure of the firm. CASH 
COMPENSATION represents salary plus bonus of executives in thousands of dollars. 
TOTAL COMPENSATION represents total compensation of executives comprising of 
salary, bonus, option grants, and other compensation in thousands of dollars. OPTION 
GRANTS is the total options granted to executives in thousands of dollars. Aggregate 
firm level compensations are reported. AGGREG ALL INST HOLD represents the 
aggregate holdings of sample firms by all institutional investors. AGGERG 5-PERC 
INST represents aggregate holdings of institutions with 5-percent or more holdings. LAG 
ONE YEAR ABN RETURN is the one-year lag buy-and-hold abnormal return of the 
sample firms. SIZE is the total market capitalization of company’s stocks. We observe 
that the mean of GIM index is 9.07 with median value equal to 9.0. The mean of BCF 
index is 2.36 with median value equal to 2.0. The mean of aggregate cash compensation 
of executives is $4.3 million and mean of aggregate total compensation is $14.08 million. 
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The mean of total institutional hold of the sample firm is 62.4%. The mean of size of the 
firm is $5.4 billion with median value $1.1 billion.  
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Sample Firms 
The table provides the descriptive statistics of the sample firms for the sample years 1992-2005. 
GIM Index is the Gompers-Ishii-Metirck governance measure of the firm. BCF index is the 
Bebchuk-Cohen-Ferrell governance measure of the firm. CASH COMPENSATION represents 
salary plus bonus of executives in thousands of dollars. TOTAL COMPENSATION represents 
total compensation of executives comprising of salary, bonus, option grants, and other 
compensation in thousands of dollars. OPTION GRANTS is the total options granted to 
executives in thousands of dollars. AGGREG ALL INST HOLD represents the aggregate 
holdings of sample firms by all institutional investors. AGGERG 5-PERC INST represents 
aggregate holdings of institutions with 5-percent or more holdings. LAG ONE YEAR ABN 
RETURN is the one-year lag buy-and-hold abnormal return of the sample firms.  
 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev 10 Percentile 90 Percentile 
GIM Index 23473 9.07 9.0 2.78 5 13 








15384 14087 7464 23772 2387 30015 
OPTION GRANTS 
($K) 
15384 8822 3364 20417 331 20457 
AGGREG ALL 
INST HOLD 
20012 0.624 0.645 0.216 0.313 0.89 
AGGERG 5-PERC 
INST 
15400 0.175 0.148 0.113 0.06 0.325 
LAG ONE YEAR 
ABN RETURN 
19941 0.075 -0.017 0.623 -0.541 0.739 
SIZE ($MM) 21453 5457.85 1161.41 19402 159.29 10127.5 
  
The changes in anti-takeover provisions of a firm are measured by the changes in 
GIM and BCF indices. The mean of changes in GIM index is 0.13 with standard 
deviation of 0.69. The maximum increase in GIM index is 10 and maximum decrease in 
GIM index is 9. The mean of changes in BCF index is 0.06 with standard deviation of 
0.37. Both the maximum increase and decrease in BCF index are 4. The changes in GIM 
and BCF indices are highly correlated and the correlation coefficient is 0.63.76 Table 4.2 
provides number of firms GIM Index is available for the sample years and percentage of 
                                                 
76 These numbers are not reported in any tables. 
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stocks that undergo decrease, remains same, and increase in GIM Index. The table also 
provides number of firms BCF Index is available for the sample years and percentage of 
stocks that undergo decrease, remains same, and increase in BCF index. For each sample 
year the percentage of stocks that undergo increase in anti-takeover provisions is higher 
than percentage stocks that experience a decrease for both GIM and BCF index.  
 
Table 4.2: Change in GIM and BCF Indices: 
This table provides number of firms GIM Index is available for the sample years and percentage 
of stocks that undergo decrease, remains same, and increase in GIM Index. The table also 
provides number of firms BCF Index is available for the sample years and percentage of stocks 
that undergo decrease, remains same, and increase in BCF index.   
 
 
 GIM BCF 
YEAR N DECREASE MAINTAIN INCREASE N DECREASE MAINTAIN INCREASE 
1993-2004 8622 9.7 60.9 29.4 8179 5.8 77.3 16.8 
1993 1265 12.9 49.3 37.8 1229 6.0 78.4 15.6 
1995 1348 10.2 62.3 27.4 1308 5.9 83.6 10.6 
1998 1233 9.9 62.2 27.9 1176 7.1 73.4 19.5 
2000 1633 8.2 60.0 31.8 1486 5.4 72.7 21.9 
2002 1447 9.4 55.1 35.5 1372 4.8 73.9 21.3 
2004 1696 8.3 73.2 18.5 1608 6.0 81.5 12.4 
 
4.3. Effect of Existing Level of Takeover Vulnerability on Executive Compensation 
Structure 
In this section, we examine the relation between existing anti-takeover provisions 
of firms and executive compensation structure. Firms with a larger number of anti-
takeover provisions are less likely to be disciplined by the takeover market and therefore, 
more likely to have entrenched management. On the other hand, since managers in high 
ATP firms face low risk of losing their firm specific human capital due to hostile 
takeover, efficient contracting is possible in these firms by setting up executive 
compensation scheme that is deferred until the true performance of executives is 
revealed. Hence, this provides a testable hypothesis with regard to existing anti-takeover 
provisions, whether it acts as a disciplinary mechanism in achieving efficient 
compensation contract for executives or whether it contributes to managerial power in 
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obtaining higher compensation for them. We examine whether management power plays 
a role in generating higher rents for executives in firms with higher level of existing ATP, 
or whether higher ATP results in efficient contracting by deferring executives pay in 
future. 
  
4.3.1. Executive Compensation Structure for Low ATP and High ATP Portfolios 
In this section, we examine executive compensation structure in extreme 
portfolios based on anti-takeover provisions of the firms. Figure 4.1 displays mean of 
aggregate cash and total compensation for high ATP and low ATP portfolios based on 
GIM index for the sample 1992 to 2004. High ATP portfolio is formed by stocks with 
GIM greater or equal to 14 in year t and Low ATP portfolio is formed by stocks with 
GIM smaller or equal to 5.77 In figure 1A, we observe that average of CASH 
COMPENSATION for high ATP portfolio is consistently higher than that of for the low 
ATP portfolios for all the sample years. In the case of the total compensation in figure 
1B, high ATP portfolio in some sample years display lower total compensation as 
compared to low ATP portfolio.  
In Table 4.3, we examine the difference in compensation structure between high 
ATP and low ATP portfolios based on both GIM and BCF indices. In panel A, we 
construct high ATP and low ATP portfolios based on GIM index similar to Figure 1. In 
Panel B, we construct high and low ATP portfolios on the basis of BCF index, with a 
BCF index equal to or smaller than two (median value) as “Low ATP” portfolio and a 
BCF index greater than two as “High ATP” portfolio. The table presents mean and 
median of CASH COMPENSATION, TOTAL COMPENSATION, and PAY FOR 
PERFORMANCE of High ATP and Low ATP portfolios and also the statistical 
                                                 
77 Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) form dictatorship portfolio with stocks with GIM index higher than 
14 and democratic portfolio with stocks with GIM index less than 5. Dictatorship portfolio represents 
stocks with low shareholder rights and high managerial power and democratic portfolio represents stocks 
with high shareholder rights and low managerial power. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2006) also use similar 
cutoff samples to study acquirer returns.  
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significance of the differences in mean and median of these variables between the two 
portfolios. The description of these variables is provided in Section 4.2.1. 
 
Figure 1A: Cash Compensation for High ATP and Low ATP Portfolios:






































Figure 1B: Total Compensation for High ATP and Low ATP Portfolios: 




































Figure 4.1: Executive Compensation for High ATP and Low ATP Portfolios 
This figure displays level of executive compensation for High ATP and Low ATP portfolios 
based on GIM index.  High ATP portfolio is formed by stocks with GIM>=14 in year t and Low 
ATP portfolio is formed by stocks with GIM<=5. Figure 1A displays the mean of aggregate cash 
compensation for High ATP and Low ATP portfolio of stocks for the sample years 1992-2004. 
CASH COMPENSATION t  represents salary plus bonus of executive for the year t. Figure 1B 
displays the mean of aggregate total compensation for High ATP and Low ATP portfolio of 
stocks for the sample years 1992-2004. TOTAL COMPENSATION t represents total compensation 
of executive comprising of salary, bonus, option grants, and other compensation. 
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Table 4.3: Executive Compensation for Low ATP and High ATP Portfolios: 1992-2005 
This table presents executive compensation structure for low ATP and High ATP portfolio. CASH 
COMPENSATION t  represents salary plus bonus of executive for the year t. TOTAL 
COMPENSATION t represents total compensation of executive comprising of salary, bonus, 
option grants, and other compensation. PAY FOR PERFORMANCE t represents the change in 
the value of options granted to executive per dollar change in shareholder value. In panel A, Low 
ATP and High ATP portfolios are formed by GIM index in year (t-1), which is the Gompers-Ishii-
Metirck governance measure. For GIM index High ATP Portfolio is formed by stocks with 
GIM>=14 and Low ATP Portfolio is formed by stocks with GIM<=5.  In panel B, BCF index in 
year (t-1), which is the Bebchuk-Cohen-Ferrell governance measure, is used to form the 
portfolios. For BCF index High ATP Portfolio is formed by stocks with BCF>=3 and Low ATP 
Portfolio is formed by stocks with BCF<=2.   
 
 Panel A Panel B 
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difference) 





















































In panel A, we observe that both mean and median values for CASH 
COMPENSATION and TOTAL COMPENSATION are higher for High ATP portfolios 
as compared to Low ATP portfolios and the difference in mean is statistically significant 
for cash compensation. This implies that firms with high anti-takeover provisions have a 
higher pay structure for executives.78 We also observe that mean of PAY FOR 
PERFORMANCE t is higher for Low ATP portfolios as compared to High ATP 
portfolios. This implies that managerial compensation is better aligned with shareholders’ 
interests in firms which are likely to be more disciplined by the takeover market. Hence, 
                                                 
78 We also consider the median value of GIM index as another cutoff point to construct High ATP and Low 
ATP portfolios and observe similar differences with regard to executive compensation between High ATP 
and Low ATP portfolios. 
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managerial power plays a role in obtaining higher cash and total compensation and lower 
pay-for-performance sensitivity for executives in high ATP firms. However, in Panel B, 
we observe that using BCF index results in higher mean cash and total compensation for 
low ATP portfolios as compared to high ATP portfolios. The regression analysis in Table 
6, allow us to investigate whether this relation holds after controlling for firm 
characteristics, performance, and ownership variables. The pay-for-performance show 
higher mean values for low ATP firms as compared to high ATP firms using BCF index, 
which is consistent with the results using GIM index.   
 
4.3.2. Effect of Takeover Vulnerability on Compensation of Executives 
In this section, we examine whether the level of executive compensation varies 
with the level of takeover vulnerability of firms. Table 4.4 presents the effect of existing 
ATP on executive cash compensation using GIM index. The dependent variable CASH 
COMPENSATION t  represents salary plus bonus of executive for the year t. In models 1, 
2, and 3, the regression is performed on executive-firm-year level data, considering an 
observation for each executive for each firm in a given year. In order to prevent potential 
problem due to correlation across executives within a firm, we conduct firm level 
analysis in models 4, 5, and 6, where cash compensation is measured by aggregating over 
all executives in a firm. This ensures that small standard errors are not driving the results. 
The dependent variable GIM in model 1 and 4 is the Gompers-Ishii-Metirck governance 
measure. In models 2 and 5, the dependent variable GIM HIGH ATP is an indicator 
variable, which takes the value one if GIM index of the firm exceeds 14 and zero 
otherwise. Similarly, in models 3 and 6, GIM LOW ATP is an indicator variable which 
takes the value equal to one if GIM index of the firm is below 5 and zero otherwise.   
We control for various firm characteristics, performance and institutional 
ownership variables. The control variables used in the regression analysis are defined 
below. AGGREG ALL INST HOLD is the aggregate percentage of outstanding shares 
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held by all institutions. AGGREG 5-PERC INST is aggregate percentage of outstanding 
shares held by institutions with holdings greater than 5% of firm’s outstanding shares. 
Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that institutional investors undertake monitoring role with 
regard to executive compensation. They show that institutional ownership concentration 
is positively related to the pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation and 
negatively related to the level of compensation. Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) show 
that larger firms have higher executive compensation structure. Smith and Watts (1992) 
argue that firm size, performance, and growth opportunities influence executive 
compensation schemes. The results show that firms with investment opportunities have 
higher incentive based compensation.79 To control for past stock performance we include 
ONE YEAR ABN RETURN, which is one-year buy and hold abnormal return of the 
stock. Following Hartzell and Starks (2003), we include Tobin’s q to control for the 
growth opportunities of the firm and expected performance of the firm. Other firm 
specific control variables included in the regressions are SIZE, TOTAL ASSETS and 
BKMK. SIZE is defined as the total market value of the firm, obtained by multiplying 
number of outstanding shares by share price. To account for the difference in pay 
structure of CEO as compared to other top executives, we include indicator variable CEO 
DUMMY, which takes the value one if the executive is current CEO and zero otherwise. 
We define another indicator variable CEO CHAIR DUMMY, which takes the value one 
if the current CEO is also the chairman of the board and zero otherwise. This accounts for 
any power CEO might exert over compensation structure if CEO is also the chairman of 
the board.   
In model 1, we observe the effect of GIM index over CASH COMPENSATION. 
We observe that after controlling for firm characteristics, performance and institutional 
investors influence, GIM index has a positive significant (coefficient 5.45 with p-value 
                                                 
79 Other studies relating growth opportunities to executive compensation include, Mehran (1995), Gaver 
and Gaver (1995), and Sloan (1993).   
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0.06) effect over CASH COMPENSATION. This implies that firms which are less likely 
to be disciplined by the takeover market will have higher level of cash compensation for 
executives.  
 
Table 4.4: Effect of Existing Level of ATP on Executive Cash Compensation: Analysis with 
GIM Index 
This table presents the effect of anti-takeover provisions represented by GIM index on executive 
compensation. The dependent variable is CASH COMPENSATION t , which represents salary plus 
bonus of executive in thousands of dollars for the year t. GIM HIGH ATP 1−t portfolio is formed 
by stocks with GIM>=14 in year (t-1) and GIM LOW ATP 1−t  portfolio is formed by stocks with 
GIM<=5.  All other control variables are defined in the Appendix.  
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Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 24212 24212 24212 4548 4548 4548 
2R  0.30 0.30 0.30 0.55 0.55 0.55 
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In model 1, the effect of GIM index over cash compensation implies that a one-
standard deviation increase in the GIM index is associated with an increase in cash 
compensation of $151 (=5.45*0.0278*1000).80 In model 2, we observe GIM HIGH ATP 
has negative insignificant effect on CASH COMPENSATION. In model 3, the effect of 
GIM LOW ATP is negative and significant over level of cash compensation paid to top 
executives. Hence, the results suggest that firms with higher level of existing anti-
takeover provisions provide higher cash compensation to executives. Moreover, low ATP 
firms’ executives earn lower cash compensation implying that higher shareholder rights 
and lower managerial power contribute in reducing cash compensation to executives of 
such firms.81 The results obtained in aggregate level analysis in models 4, 5, and 6 are 
similar to that of individual level analysis in  models 1, 2, and 3 respectively, suggesting 
that the effects are not driven by small standard error of the regression. In model 4, the 
effect of GIM index implies that a one standard deviation increase in the GIM index is 
associated with an increase in the aggregate cash compensation of firms’ executive of 
$1500 (=53.97*0.0278*1000) or a 0.03% (0.05%) increase over the mean (median) 
aggregate cash compensation.  
 In Table 4.5, we observe the effect of takeover vulnerability on executive total 
compensation using GIM index as a measure of existing anti-takeover provisions of the 
firm. The structure of the table is similar to that of Table 4.4. The independent variable 
TOTAL COMPENSATION represents total compensation of executive comprising of 
salary, bonus, options grants, and other compensation in thousands of dollars. All other 
independent variables are as defined in Table 4.4. In model 1 and 4, GIM index have 
positive significant effect on TOTAL COMPENSATION, suggesting that firms with 
higher level of takeover defense mechanism will have higher total compensation for 
                                                 
80 Table 1 reports the standard deviation of GIM index.  
81 Considering only current salary of executives as cash compensation (excluding the bonus) give similar 
results. 
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executives. Hence, higher level of managerial power contributes in higher total 
compensation structure for executives.  
 
Table 4.5: Effect of Existing Level of ATP on Executive Total Compensation: Analysis with 
GIM Index 
This table presents the effect of anti-takeover provisions represented by GIM index on executive 
compensation. The dependent variable is TOTAL COMPENSATION t , which represents total 
compensation of executive comprising of salary, bonus, option grants, and other compensation in 
thousands of dollars. GIM 1−t index is the Gompers-Ishii-Metirck governance measure for year (t-
1). GIM HIGH ATP 1−t portfolio is formed by stocks with GIM>=14 in year (t-1) and GIM LOW 
ATP 1−t  portfolio is formed by stocks with GIM<=5.  All other control variables are defined in the 
Appendix.  
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Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 22443 22443 22443 4532 4532 4532 
2R  0.30 0.30 0.30 0.49 0.49 0.49 
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In model 1, the effect of GIM index over total compensation implies that a one-
standard deviation increase in the GIM index is associated with an increase in total 
compensation of $666 (=23.96*0.0278*1000). In model 4, the effect of GIM index 
implies that a one standard deviation increase in the GIM index is associated with an 
increase in the aggregate total compensation of firms’ executive of $4804 
(=172.79*0.0278*1000), or a 0.03% (0.06%) increase over the mean (median) aggregate 
total compensation. The indicator variable GIM HIGH ATP has insignificant effect 
(models 2 and 5). The effect of GIM LOW ATP over total compensation of executives is 
negative and significant, in both models 3 and 6. Overall, the results in this table imply 
that firms with high ATP pay higher total compensation to its executives as compared to 
firms with low ATP, supporting managerial entrenchment hypothesis.  
 In Table 4.6, we perform the analysis using BCF index as our proxy for firm’s 
existing anti-takeover provisions. BCF index is the Bebchuk-Cohen-Ferrell governance 
measure. We define an indicator variable BCF LOW ATP which takes the value one if 
BCF index of the firm is below 3 and zero otherwise. All other variables are as defined in 
Table 4.  In models 1 and 2, we observe the effect on CASH COMPENSATION and in 
models 3 and 4 we observe the effect on TOTAL COMPENSATION. We observe that 
BCF index has a positive significant effect on both cash and total compensation (model 1 
and 3). Moreover, the effect of the indicator variable BCF LOW ATP is also significant 
in both models 2 and 4. The results using BCF index therefore also imply that higher 
level of existing anti-takeover would lead to higher cash and total compensation for 
executives. Overall, both GIM and BCF indices imply that higher managerial power 
contributes in obtaining higher cash and total compensation for executives. The results do 
not seem to support efficient contracting hypothesis, which suggest that due to low 
likelihood of hostile takeover in firms with high level of existing anti-takeover 
provisions, lower current compensation for executives can be established by allowing 
compensation to be deferred. 
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Table 4.6: Effect of Existing Level of ATP on Executive Compensation: Analysis with BCF 
Index 
This table presents the effect of anti-takeover provisions represented by BCF index on executive 
compensation. The dependent variables in models 1 and 2 are CASH COMPENSATION t , which 
represents salary plus bonus of executive for the year t. The dependent variables in model 3 and 4 
are TOTAL COMPENSATION t , which represents total compensation of executive comprising of 
salary, bonus, option grants, and other compensation. BCF 1−t index is the Bebchuk-Cohen-Ferrell 
governance measure for year (t-1). BCF LOW ATP 1−t  portfolio is formed by stocks with 





COMPENSATION t  
TOTAL 
COMPENSATION t  
























AGGREG ALL INST 



















ONE YEAR ABN 
































































Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Number of 
Observations 
24032 24032 22272 22272 
Adjusted 
2R  0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
   
Next, we examine whether the level of takeover vulnerability influence pay-for-
performance sensitivity of executives. The pay-for-performance sensitivity is computed 
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as the change in value of executives’ stocks option award for every dollar change in the 
value of firm’s common equity. The computation of pay-for-performance sensitivity is 
explained in Section 4.2.1. The results suggest (not reported in a table) that firms with 
higher anti-takeover provisions have lower pay-for-performance sensitivity. However, 
after controlling for industry level fixed effects, the influence of level of ATP over pay-
for-performance sensitivity becomes insignificant. We obtain similar results for both 
GIM and BCF index. Hence, the results suggest that the existing level of ATP does not 
influence the pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
 
4.4. Effect of Changes in Takeover Vulnerability on Executive Compensation 
Structure 
In this section, we examine whether changes in anti-takeover provisions 
contribute to any subsequent change in pay structure of executives. We test whether 
managerial entrenchment hypothesis or efficient contracting hypothesis hold with regard 
to effect of changes in ATP on executive compensation structure. While considering the 
changes in takeover vulnerability, we take into account the existing anti-takeover 
provisions of the firms. In particular, we examine whether the effect of changes in 
takeover vulnerability on executive pay structure differs between firms with varying 
management power.  
In section 4.4.1, we examine executive compensation structure for portfolio of 
stocks that experience a change in anti-takeover provisions. In section 4.4.2, we examine 
the effect of changes in ATP on cash and total compensation and the percentage change 
in cash and total compensation. In section 4.4.3, we examine effect of changes in ATP on 
pay-for-performance sensitivity.   
 
4.4.1. Changes in Anti-takeover Provisions and Executive Compensation Structure 
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In this section, we compare executive compensation structure between portfolio 
stocks that undergo increase in ATP versus portfolio of stocks that undergo decrease in 
ATP.  
Before looking into the effect of changes in ATP on executive compensation, we 
discuss briefly the characteristics of the firms that undergo changes in ATP. In Table 4.7, 
we present the difference in firm characteristics, performance, and governance related 
measures between stocks that undergo decrease in ATP vs. stocks that undergo increase 
in ATP. GIM Decrease represents portfolio of stocks with a decrease in GIM index in 
year t compared to the previous year (t-1). GIM Increase represents portfolio of stocks 
with an increase in GIM index in year t compared to the previous year (t-1). BCF 
Decrease represents portfolio of stocks with a decrease in BCF index in year t compared 
to the previous year (t-1). BCF Increase represents portfolio of stocks with an increase in 
BCF index in year t compared to the previous year (t-1).82 We observe that aggregate 
institutional holdings, top 5-percent institutional holdings and also pension fund holdings 
in portfolio of stocks that undergo decrease in ATP is higher as compared to portfolio of 
stocks that undergo increase in ATP. This suggests that overall institutional investors 
undertake monitoring role in improving the disciplinary role of the market for corporate 
control. Firms that experience decrease in ATP also have higher percentage of 
independent board and bigger board size. We also observe that firms that undergo 
increase in ATP have higher stock performance (ONE YEAR ABN RETURN and FIVE 
YEAR ABN RETURN) as compared to firms that undergo decrease in ATP; however the 
differences are not statistically significant. Moreover, firms that experience decrease in 
ATP have lower Tobin-q, higher total assets and are bigger in size.83 
 
                                                 
82 In computing the changes in GIM and BCF indices, we cannot identify which provisions among the 24 
(for GIM index) and 6 (for BCF index) cause the changes in GIM and BCF indices respectively. Hence, we 
cannot test whether certain takeover provisions have higher implications over executive compensation.  
83 We do not elaborate on this issue, as the main objective of the paper is to understand the effect of ATP 
over executive compensation. 
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Table 4.7: Firm Governance, Performance and Characteristics for Changes in ATP 
GIM Decrease is portfolio of stocks with decrease in GIM index from the previous year. GIM 
Increase is portfolio of stocks with increase in GIM index from the previous year. BCF Decrease 
is portfolio of stocks with decrease in BCF index from the previous year. BCF Increase is 
portfolio of stocks with increase in BCF index from the previous year.   
 





























































































































































































































Figure 2A: Cash Compensation for 







































Figure 2B: Total Compensation for 







































Figure 4.2: Executive Compensation for Stocks with Increase and Decrease in ATP 
This figure displays level of executive compensation for portfolio of stocks with an increase and 
decrease in GIM index.  GIM DECREASE represents portfolio of stocks with a decrease in GIM 
index in year t compared to the previous year (t-1). GIM INCREASE represents portfolio of stocks 
with an increase in GIM index in year t compared to the previous year (t-1). Figure 2A displays 
the mean of aggregate cash compensation for GIM DECREASE and GIM INCREASE portfolio of 
stocks. CASH COMPENSATION t  represents salary plus bonus of executive for the year t. Figure 
2B displays the mean of aggregate total compensation for GIM DECREASE and GIM INCREASE 
portfolio of stocks. TOTAL COMPENSATION t represents total compensation of executive 
comprising of salary, bonus, option grants, and other compensation. 
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Now, we examine the effect of changes in ATP on executive compensation 
structure. Figure 4.2 displays the level of executive compensation for portfolio of stocks 
with decrease and increase in GIM index for the years 1993-2004 (for the sample years 
on which changes in GIM index is available). Figure 2.A displays cash compensation for 
GIM Increase and GIM Decrease portfolios. We observe that cash compensation is 
higher in all sample years for GIM Decrease portfolio as compared to GIM Increase 
portfolio. Figure 2.B displays the level of total compensation for GIM Increase and GIM 
Decrease portfolios. Here also we observe that total compensation is higher for GIM 
Decrease portfolios in all sample years as compared to GIM Increase portfolios. Hence, 
we observe that firms which undergo increase in takeover vulnerability by eliminating 
some anti-takeover provisions pay their executives higher cash and total compensation 
for all the sample years.  
Table 4.8 presents executive compensation structure for portfolio of stocks with 
increase and decrease in anti-takeover provisions. CASH COMPENSATION t  represents 
salary plus bonus of executive for the year t. % ∆ CASH COMPENSATION t is the 
percentage change in cash compensation in year t compared to previous year (t-1). 
TOTAL COMPENSATION t represents total compensation of executive comprising of 
salary, bonus, option grants, and other compensation. % ∆ TOTAL COMPENSATION t is 
the percentage change in total compensation in year t compared to previous year (t-1). 
PAY FOR PERFORMANCE t represents the change in the value of options granted to 
executive per dollar change in shareholder value. 
In Panel A, of Table 4.8 we compare compensation between stocks that 
experience changes in GIM Index with stocks that experience no such change. At the 
beginning of this section, we have defined GIM Increase and GIM Decrease portfolio of 
stocks. GIM Maintain represents portfolio of stocks with no changes in GIM index in 
year (t-1) compared to the previous year. Panel A, compares compensation of GIM 
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Increase portfolio with a control sample of GIM Maintain matched by 4-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) and size. Panel A, also compares compensation of GIM 
Decrease portfolio with a control sample of GIM Maintain matched by 4-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) and size. We provide mean and median compensation of 
the portfolios and also statistical significance of the difference in mean and median. 
 In Panel A, we observe that both cash and total compensation for portfolio of 
stocks that experience any changes (increase or decrease) in GIM Index are higher as 
compared to portfolio of stocks that experience no such changes. Moreover, percent 
increase in cash compensation is also higher for stocks that undergo any changes in GIM 
Index. This suggests that, changes in takeover vulnerability lead to higher compensation, 
irrespective of increase or decrease in ATP. Hence, with regard to effect of changes in 
ATP over compensation, we are unable disentangle “management entrenchment” 
hypothesis with “efficient contracting” hypothesis, when comparison is done with firms 
with no change in takeover defense mechanisms.  
In Panel B, we compare compensation of executives between GIM Increase and 
GIM decrease portfolios. Panel B, also reports comparison of compensation between 
portfolios based on BCF index. For both GIM and BCF indices, we observe that CASH 
COMPENSATION is higher for portfolio of stocks that experience decrease in index as 
compared to portfolio of stocks that experience an increase in the index. Moreover, 
% ∆ CASH COMPENSATION t is also higher for portfolio of stocks that experience 
decrease in GIM or BCF index as compared to portfolio of stocks that experience 
increase in the index. The differences in mean for both the variables are significant. We 
further observe that both TOTAL COMPENSATION t and % ∆ TOTAL 
COMPENSATION t is higher for firms that eliminate anti-takeover provisions as 
compared to firms that implement more such provisions. The results therefore suggest 
that eliminating existing anti-takeover provisions would lead to higher cash and total 
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compensation as compared to firms which incorporate more of such provisions. This is 
consistent with the efficient contracting hypothesis, which predicts that increase in ATP 
would facilitate in achieving lower current compensation for executives.   
 
Table 4.8: Changes in Takeover Vulnerability and Executive Compensation  
This table presents executive compensation structure for portfolio of stocks with changes in 
takeover vulnerability. CASH COMPENSATION t  represents salary plus bonus of executive for 
the year t. % ∆ CASH CPMPENSATION t is the percentage change in cash compensation in year t 
compared to previous year (t-1). TOTAL COMPENSATION t represents total compensation of 
executive comprising of salary, bonus, option grants, and other compensation. % ∆ TOTAL 
COMPENSATION t is the percentage change in total compensation in year t compared to previous 
year (t-1). PAY FOR PERFORMANCE t represents the change in the value of options granted to 
executive per dollar change in shareholder value. GIM index is the Gompers-Ishii-Metirck 
governance measure. GIM Decrease represents portfolio of stocks with a decrease in GIM index 
in year (t-1) compared to its previous year. GIM Increase represents portfolio of stocks with an 
increase in GIM index in year (t-1) compared to the previous year. GIM Maintain represents 
portfolio of stocks with no changes in GIM index in year (t-1) compared to the previous year. 
Panel A, compares compensation of GIM Increase portfolio with a control sample of GIM 
Maintain matched by 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and size. Panel A, also 
compares compensation of GIM Decrease portfolio with a control sample of GIM Maintain 
matched by 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and size. Panel B compares 
compensation of executives between GIM Increase and GIM decrease portfolios. Panel B also 
reports comparison of compensation between portfolios based on BCF index. BCF index is the 
Bebchuk-Cohen-Ferrell governance measure. BCF Decrease represents portfolio of stocks with a 
decrease in BCF index in year (t-1) compared to the previous year. BCF Increase represents 
portfolio of stocks with an increase in BCF index in year (t-1) compared to the previous year.  
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Table 4.8: Panel B 
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PAY FOR PERFORMANCE t  is also higher for firms which undergo decrease in 
anti-takeover provisions as compared to firms that undergo increase in anti-takeover 
provisions. With regard to pay-for-performance, there is no direct prediction under 
efficient contracting hypothesis whether increase or decrease of ATP would lead to 
higher pay-for-performance sensitivity. However, managerial power hypothesis predict 
that firms that undergo decrease in ATP would have higher pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. The higher mean pay-for-performance in portfolio of stocks that undergo 
decrease in ATP as compared to portfolio of stocks that undergo increase in ATP support 
managerial power hypothesis. The regression analysis in the next section allows us to 
disentangle between managerial power hypothesis and efficient contracting hypothesis in 
the context of effect of changes in takeover vulnerability on executive compensation 
schemes.  
 
4.4.2. Effect of Changes in Takeover Vulnerability on Cash and Total Compensation  
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Table 4.9 presents the effect of changes in takeover vulnerability on level of cash 
and total compensation of top executives using GIM index. In the regression analysis we 
are looking into the effect of changes in ATP in year (t-1) on executive compensation 
structure in the following year t. In models 1 to 5, we analyze the effect of changes of 
takeover vulnerability on CASH COMPENSATION. In models 6 to 10 we analyze the 
effect of changes of takeover vulnerability on TOTAL COMPENSATION. The 
definitions of these variables are provided in the previous section. The independent 
variable 1−∆ tGIM  is change in governance index in year (t-1) as compared to its previous 
year. GIM INCREASE 1−t is a dummy variable which takes the value one if GIM index 
increases in year t-1 as compared to its previous year, and 0 otherwise. GIM 
DECREASE 1−t is a dummy variable which takes the value one if GIM index decreases in 
year t-1 as compared to its previous year, and 0 otherwise. All other control variables are 
as defined in Table 4.  
In model 1, we observe that 1−∆ tGIM  has a negative significant coefficient over 
CASH COMPENSATION. In model 2 we observe that GIM INCREASE dummy also 
has a negative significant effect over CASH COMPENSATION. The results therefore 
suggest that when a firm’s anti-takeover provisions are increased, managers are provided 
with lower cash compensation in the following year after changes in ATP. These results 
are consistent with the efficient contracting hypothesis, suggesting that an increase in 
ATP would allow lowering current compensation of executives by deferring 
compensation to future, as high ATP reduces likelihood of hostile takeover. Next we 
examine whether the effect of changes in ATP on level of executive compensation varies 
with the existing level of managerial power of the firm. In model 3 we incorporate an 
interaction variable GIM INCREASE 1−t *LOW ATP, where LOW ATP represents 
portfolio of stocks with GIM index equal or below 5. The interaction variable allow us to 
observe whether the results implying efficient contracting hypothesis in model 1 and 2 is 
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Table 4.9: Effect of Changes in ATP on Executive Compensation: Analysis with GIM index  
This table represents the effect of changes in takeover vulnerability represented by changes in GIM index on the level of executive compensation. The dependent variable in model 1 to 5 is CASH 
COMPENSATION t , which represents salary plus bonus of executive for the year t. The dependent variable in model 6 to 10 is TOTAL COMPENSATION t , which represents total compensation of 




 CASH COMPENSATION t  TOTAL COMPENSATION t  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Intercept -387.07  -380.52 -381.98 -404.30 -403.27  -5570.39 -5566.47 -5567.26 -5647.93 -5640.56 
1−∆ tGIM  -18.15 **     
-101.86 *** 
(<0.0001) 
    
GIM INCREASE 1−t   -44.38 *** -49.98 ***    -187.20 *** -190.53 ***   
GIM INCREASE 1−t * LOW ATP   113.39 *     65.82   
GIM DECREASE 1−t     18.49 38.92    246.98 *** 326.56 *** 
GIM DECREASE 1−t * LOW ATP     -246.10 ***     -972.57 *** 
AGGREG ALL INST HOLD 1−t  -75.11 -76.05 -72.89 -76.57 -79.86 -785.81 *** -792.59 *** -790.70 *** -787.92 *** -798.33 *** 
AGGERG 5-PERC INST 1−t  40.32 40.64 41.17 42.47 44.47 630.64 *** 636.54 *** 636.58 *** 634.81 *** 631.81 *** 
ONE YEAR ABN RETURN 1−t  59.26 *** 59.56 *** 59.12 *** 59.01 *** 58.98 *** 335.57 *** 336.31 *** 336.03 *** 333.94 *** 333.99 *** 
TOBIN Q 1−t  -68.83 *** -69.26 *** -69.65 *** -69.14 *** -68.65 *** -31.27 -33.76 -33.97 -31.03 -29.09 
TOTAL ASSET 1−t  0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.009 *** 
SIZE 1−t  226.84 *** 226.99 *** 227.36 *** 227.76 *** 227.61 *** 1025.25 *** 1027.54 *** 1027.74 *** 1027.54 *** 1026.53 *** 
BKMK 1−t  49.21 *** 49.22 *** 49.64 *** 49.94 *** 52.02 *** 205.54 *** 206.91 *** 207.16 *** 207.45 *** 214.84 *** 
CEO DUMMY t  766.89 *** 767.08 *** 766.87 *** 766.97 *** 766.85 *** 2771.17 *** 2772.01 *** 2771.89 *** 2771.31 *** 2771.0 *** 
CEO CHAIR DUMMY t  -457.89 *** -460.07 *** -460.09 *** -457.55 *** -453.04 *** -1789.29 *** -1800.24 *** -1800.24 *** -1776.32 *** -1759.25 *** 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 20346 20346 20346 20346 20346 18871 18871 18871 18871 18871 
Adjusted 
2R  0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 
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stronger or weaker in firms weak in managerial power. We observe that in model 3, the 
interaction variable has a positive and significant effect on CASH COMPENSATION. 
This suggests that when a firm weak in managerial power increases its ATP, this does not 
lead to establish lower current compensation rather the increase level of managerial 
power play a role in setting up higher cash compensation for executives.   
In model 4, we observe that the effect of GIM DECREASE on cash compensation 
is positive but insignificant. Therefore, increase in takeover vulnerability does not seem 
to cause any effect on level of cash compensation. In model 5, we observe the effect of 
interaction variable GIM DECREASE 1−t *LOW ATP is negative and significant. This 
suggests that firms high in shareholder rights and weak in managerial power would 
experience a decrease in cash compensation following a decrease in ATP. Hence, low 
ATP firms display entrenchment phenomenon by decrease in cash compensation when 
firm eliminate some existing ATP and increase in cash compensation when firm 
incorporate additional ATP. 
In models 6 to 10, we analyze the effect of changes in external monitoring 
mechanism over TOTAL COMPENSATION of executives. We observe that the effect of 
1−∆ tGIM (model 6) and GIM INCREASE 1−t  (model 7) on total compensation are negative 
and significant, suggesting that firms that undergo increase in ATP would have lower 
total compensation following the changes.84 This again supports the efficient contracting 
hypothesis. The positive insignificant effect of the interaction term GIM 
INCREASE 1−t *LOW ATP in model 8 suggest that there is no significant difference 
between high ATP and low ATP portfolios with regard to effect of increase in ATP on 
executive total compensation.  
In model 9, we observe that GIM DECREASE 1−t has a positive significant effect 
on TOTAL COMPENSATION, suggesting that decrease in ATP would lead to increase 
                                                 
84 Additionally we perform regression with respect to percentage change in ATP, and the results are 
consistent.  
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in total compensation of executives, emphasizing efficient contracting hypothesis. In 
model 10, the negative significant effect (p-value 0.001) of the interaction variable GIM 
DECREASE 1−t *LOW ATP suggest that firms weak in existing managerial power would 
experience decrease in the total compensation of executives following decrease in ATP. 
Hence, management entrenchment hypothesis seem to drive the compensation outcome 
of low ATP firms following changes in ATP. The efficient contracting hypothesis 
following changes in ATP seems to be caused by the firms high in managerial power. We 
argue that when changes in ATP occur in firms weak in shareholder rights, management 
power play a role in settling up a compensation contract which protects them from the 
risk of not receiving deferred compensation. According to Knoeber (1986), ATP itself 
acts as a disciplinary mechanism in achieving efficient compensation contract by having 
lower compensation in high ATP firms. Contradicting this view, our results indicate that 
management entrenchment contribute in obtaining such a contract as a means of securing 
them from losing deferred compensation.85   
In Table 4.10, we observe the effect of changes in takeover vulnerability (using 
GIM index as a proxy) on subsequent percentage change in cash and total compensation 
of executives. The dependent variable in models 1 to 3 is % ∆ CASH COMPENSATION t , 
which is the percentage change in cash compensation in year t compared to previous year 
(t-1). The dependent variable in models 4 to 6 is % ∆ TOTAL COMPENSATION t , which 
is the percentage change in total compensation in year t compared to previous year (t-1). 
The independent variables are as defined in Table 9. The effects of 1−∆ tGIM  and GIM 
INCREASE 1−t on percentage change in cash and total compensation are insignificant. In 
models 3 and 6, GIM DECREASE 1−t has positive significant effect on percentage change  
                                                 
85 Additionally we control for other forms of internal governance mechanisms, such as, fraction of non-
executive directors on the board, board size, executives and directors’ stock ownership. The effect of 
changes of GIM index on executive compensation remains same. We do not report these results as 
inclusion of these variables decreases the sample size substantially.    
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Table 4.10: Effect of Changes in ATP on Percentage Change of Executive Compensation: 
Analysis with GIM index  
This table represents the effect of changes in takeover vulnerability represented by changes in 
GIM index on the level of executive total compensation. The dependent variable in model 1 to 3 
is % ∆ CASH CPMPENSATION t , which is the percentage change in cash compensation in year t 
compared to previous year (t-1). The dependent variable in model 4 to 6 is % ∆ TOTAL 
COMPENSATION t , which is the percentage change in total compensation in year t compared to 
previous year (t-1). The independent variable 1−∆ tGIM  is change in governance index in year (t-
1) as compared to its previous year. GIM INCREASE 1−t is a dummy variable which takes the 
value one if GIM index increases in year t-1 as compared to its previous year, and 0 otherwise. 
GIM DECREASE 1−t is a dummy variable which takes the value one if GIM index decreases in 
year t-1 as compared to its previous year, and 0 otherwise. All other control variables are defined 
in the Appendix. 
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Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 3807 3807 3807 3783 3783 3783 
Adjusted 
2R  0.12 0.12 0.12 0.1 0.1 0.1 
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in cash and total compensation. This implies that decrease in ATP would lead to 
subsequent percentage increase in cash and total compensation following changes in 
ATP. However, an increase in ATP would not lead to any significant percentage changes 
in cash or total compensation. The results support the notion that increase in takeover 
vulnerability cause increase in current compensation due to the increase likelihood of 
executives not receiving deferred compensation due to hostile takeover. However, 
decrease in takeover vulnerability does not necessarily lead to a decrease of the level of 
current compensation. This again emphasizes that when a firm’s potential for hostile 
takeover increases, management power influences in obtaining a positive percentage 
increase in current compensation. However, we do not find any significant difference 
between high ATP and low ATP firms with regard to effect of changes in ATP on 
percentage changes in cash and total compensation (results not reported).  
In Table 4.11, we examine the effects of changes in external monitoring on level 
and percentage change of executive cash and total compensation using the BCF index. 
The independent variable  1−∆ tBCF  is change in BCF index in year (t-1) as compared to 
its previous year. BCF INCREASE 1−t is a dummy variable which takes the value one if 
BCF index increases in year t-1 as compared to its previous year, and 0 otherwise. BCF 
DECREASE 1−t is a dummy variable which takes the value one if BCF index decreases in 
year t-1 as compared to its previous year, and 0 otherwise. All other dependent variables 
are as defined earlier. From models 1 and 4 we observe that changes in BCF index has a 
negative significant effect on cash compensation (model 1) and percentage change in 
cash compensation (model 4). This implies that as BCF index increases the cash 
compensation and percentage change in cash compensation decrease, supporting the 
efficient contracting hypothesis. The effect of BCF INCREASE is insignificant in model 
2. However, the effect of BCF INCREASE on percentage change in cash compensation 
(model 5) has a negative significant effect, suggesting firms that undergo increase in anti-
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takeover provisions would experience a negative percentage change in cash 
compensation in the following year.  
 In models 3 and 6, when we analyze the effect of the dummy BCF DECREASE, 
the indicator variable has a positive significant effect on cash compensation (model 3) 
and percentage change in cash compensation (model 6). This again implies that increase 
in takeover vulnerability lead to an increase in the level of cash and percentage change in 
cash compensation, emphasizing efficient contracting hypothesis. The results on TOTAL 
COMPENSATION also highlight similar implications, although the effects on 
% ∆ TOTAL COMPENSATION t are not significant. The results using BCF index do not 
seem to suggest that there is any significant difference between high ATP and low ATP 
firms with regard to the effect of changes in ATP on executive compensation structure 
(results not reported). We explain this by arguing that since BCF index is constructed 
with only six anti-takeover provisions, the difference between high ATP and low ATP 
portfolio is marginal with respect to changes in ATP. GIM index is constructed using 24 
provisions and the defined low ATP and high ATP portfolios represent significant 
difference in managerial power.    
 
Table 4.11: Effect of Changes in ATP on Executive Compensation: Analysis with BCF 
Index.  
This table represents the effect of changes in takeover vulnerability represented by changes in 
BCF index on the level of executive compensation. The dependent variable in model 1 to 3 is 
CASH COMPENSATION t , which represents salary plus bonus of executive for the year t. The 
dependent variable in model 4 to 6 is % ∆ CASH CPMPENSATION t , which is the percentage 
change in cash compensation in year t compared to previous year (t-1). The dependent variable in 
model 7 to 9 is TOTAL COMPENSATION t , which represents total compensation of executive 
comprising of salary, bonus, option grants, and other compensation. The dependent variable in 
model 10 to 12 is % ∆ TOTAL COMPENSATION t , which is the percentage change in total 
compensation in year t compared to previous year (t-1). The independent variable  1−∆ tBCF  is 
change in BCF index in year (t-1) as compared to its previous year. BCF INCREASE 1−t is a 
dummy variable which takes the value one if BCF index increases in year t-1 as compared to its 
previous year, and 0 otherwise. BCF DECREASE 1−t is a dummy variable which takes the value 
one if BCF index decreases in year t-1 as compared to its previous year, and 0 otherwise. All 
other control variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of 
Observations 
20129 20129 20129 3765 3765 3765 18664 18664 18664 3741 3741 3741 
Adjusted 
2R  0.30 0.30 0.30 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.10 0.10 0.10 
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4.4.3. Effect of Changes in Anti-takeover Provisions on Pay-for-Performance 
Sensitivity 
In this section, we examine the effect of changes in ATP on pay-for-performance 
sensitivity, and the results are presented in Table 4.12. The dependent variable PAY FOR 
PERFORMANCE t represents the change in the value of options granted to executive per 
dollar change in shareholder value.86 In models 1 to 4 GIM index is used for analysis and 
in models 5 to 8 BCF index is used for analysis. The independent variable 1−∆ tINDEX  is 
change in GIM (BCF) index in year (t-1) as compared to its previous year. INDEX 
INCREASE 1−t is a dummy variable which takes the value one if GIM (BCF) index 
increases in year t-1 as compared to its previous year, and 0 otherwise. INDEX 
DECREASE 1−t is a dummy variable which takes the value one if GIM (BCF) index 
decreases in year t-1 as compared to its previous year, and 0 otherwise. All other control 
variables related to institutional holdings, firm characteristics and performance variables 
are defined in the Appendix.87 
In models 1, we observe that increase in GIM index would lead to lower pay-for-
performance sensitivity of executives. The results in model 5 with respect to BCF index 
also provide similar implications. This supports the notion that increase (decrease) in 
managerial power would lead to subsequent decrease (increase) in pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. The effects of INDEX INCREASE in models 2 and 6 are insignificant. 
However, in models 3 and 7 we observe that effects of INDEX DECREASE are positive 
and significant. The results therefore indicate that the pay-for performance sensitivity 
increases significantly when managers increase takeover vulnerability by eliminating 
some existing anti-takeover provisions of the firm. Supporting the management 
                                                 
86 Explained in detail in section 4.2.1 
87 We also control for other internal governance mechanisms related to board size, fraction of independent 
directors, managerial and director ownership; and the results are consistent. We do not report these results 
as inclusion of these variables reduces the sample size significantly. 
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entrenchment hypothesis, the results suggest that decrease in managerial power likely to 
align management and shareholder interests.   
 
Table 4.12: Effect of Changes in ATP on Pay-for-Performance of Executive Compensation: 
This table analyzes the effect of changes in takeover vulnerability on pay-for-performance of 
executive compensation. The dependent variable PAY FOR PERFORMANCE t represents the 
change in the value of options granted to executive per dollar change in shareholder value. In 
model 1 to 3 GIM index is used for analysis and in models 4 to 6 BCF index is used for analysis. 
The independent variable 1−∆ tINDEX  is change in GIM (BCF) index in year (t-1) as compared 
to its previous year. INDEX INCREASE 1−t is a dummy variable which takes the value one if GIM 
(BCF) index increases in year t-1 as compared to its previous year, and 0 otherwise. INDEX 
DECREASE 1−t is a dummy variable which takes the value one if GIM (BCF) index decreases in 
year t-1 as compared to its previous year, and 0 otherwise. All other control variables are defined 
in the Appendix. 
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(<0.0001) 
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Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 2946 2946 2946 2946 2924 2924 2924 2924 
Adjusted 
2R  0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
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In order to separate out the effect of high ATP and low ATP portfolios, we 
introduce an interaction term INDEX DECREASE t * LOW ATP in models 4 and 8. We 
examine whether the positive correlation between increase in takeover vulnerability and 
pay-for-performance sensitivity varies with the existing level of managerial power. That 
is, we test whether the positive and significant coefficients of INDEX DECREASE in 
models 3 and 7 are mainly driven by firms strong in shareholder rights and weak in 
managerial power. In model 4, when we use GIM index, the effect of the interaction 
variable INDEX DECREASE t * LOW ATP is insignificant. This suggests that firms low 
in managerial power do not contribute to the positive relation between INDEX 
DECREASE and PAY FOR PERFORMANCE. The interaction variable in model 8 
(using BCF index) INDEX DECREASE t * LOW ATP has positive significant effect, 
whereas the effect of INDEX DECREASE becomes insignificant. The results therefore 
imply that considering BCF index, the pay-for-performance sensitivity with respect to 
decrease in ATP is mainly driven by firms strong in shareholder rights and weak in 
managerial power.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
We examine the effect of existing anti-takeover provisions of the firm and 
changes in such provisions on the executive pay structure and on the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. We test two competing hypotheses relating anti-takeover provisions with 
executive compensation structure: managerial entrenchment hypothesis and efficient 
contracting hypothesis. With regard to the existing level of ATP, our results are 
consistent with managerial entrenchment hypothesis, indicating higher managerial power 
in high ATP firms would results in higher cash and total compensation as compared to 
low ATP firms. The results further indicate that the pay-for-performance sensitivity is 
lower in high ATP firms, however the effect is weak.    
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With regard to changes in ATP we find that firms low in managerial power 
experience lowering of executive compensation when takeover vulnerability is increased 
and experience increase in current compensation when takeover vulnerability is reduced. 
Hence, when a low ATP firm experiences an increase in managerial power, this leads to 
an increase in compensation and when it experience a decrease in managerial power this 
leads to further decrease in compensation. The change in compensation as a result of 
change in existing level of ATP in low ATP firms conforms to managerial power 
hypothesis, which argue that increase (decrease) in managerial power would lead to 
increase (decrease) in compensation. On the other hand, firms high in managerial power 
experience increase in current compensation for executives following an increase in 
takeover vulnerability of the firm and decrease in current compensation following 
decrease in takeover vulnerability of the firm. The efficient contracting hypothesis seems 
to be consistent following changes in ATP in the firms already high in managerial power. 
We argue that when changes in ATP occur in firms weak in shareholder rights, 
management power play a role in settling up a compensation contract which protects 
them from the risk of not receiving deferred compensation. According to Knoeber (1986), 
ATP itself acts as a disciplinary mechanism in achieving efficient compensation contract 
by having lower compensation in high ATP firms. Contradicting this view, our results 
indicate that management entrenchment contribute in obtaining such a contract as a 
means of securing them from losing deferred compensation. The results further display 
that when a firm goes to higher managerial power to lower managerial power the pay-for-
performance sensitivity increases. This relation is mainly driven by the firms which 
already have higher shareholder rights to begin with, although this is not consistent across 
different specifications of managerial power. 
In summary, this paper analyzes the extent to which takeover disciplinary 
mechanisms undertake monitoring role in the design of executive compensation. The 
results support the notion that higher managerial power in high ATP firms generates 
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higher rents for executives. Moreover, the existing level of managerial power influences 
the effect of changes in takeover vulnerability on future executive compensation 
structure. Our results highlight the need to better understand the role of market for 
corporate control in the design of optimal contract to reduce the agency problem in the 






 The role of corporate governance mechanisms to reduce the agency problem is 
receiving increasing attention in recent years. In this dissertation we shed light on two 
very important corporate governance mechanisms: monitoring by institutional investors 
and market for corporate control.  
 In the first essay, we analyze mutual funds’ proxy voting behavior on shareholder 
proposals. We investigate three main questions. What are the factors that influence 
mutual funds’ voting behavior? What is the incentive structure of mutual funds for 
undertaking an activist role in voting for shareholder proposals? Finally, how do the 
funds trade surrounding proposal meeting date and voting record release date? The results 
indicate that mutual funds take management side when they belong to bigger fund 
families, when they have higher ownership stakes, in dual class stocks, and on proposals 
related to executive compensations. Mutual fund tend to vote against management on 
proposals that are likely to increase shareholder wealth and rights, in firms which are less 
likely to be disciplined by the takeover market, in firms with strong internal governance 
mechanism in place, and when the gain from monitoring is likely to be higher due to 
longer investment horizon. The results further indicate that there is a positive reputational 
effect for the funds which undertake monitoring role in their voting behavior. Mutual 
funds which provide higher support on shareholder proposals and vote against 
management experience a positive net asset flow in the following year of voting record 
release. Moreover, the effect is mostly driven by the repeal of anti-takeover related 
proposals, which have direct positive shareholder wealth implications. Finally, we find 
that mutual funds engage in selling their portfolio shares when they provide higher 
support for shareholder proposals. One explanation could be that mutual funds that 
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provide support to non-binding shareholder proposals are not very optimistic about the 
final outcome of the proposals and therefore reduce their holdings. This supports the 
notion that mutual funds engage in “Wall Street Walk” when they dislike managements’ 
policy. Nevertheless, they undertake an activist role before selling their shares in order to 
promote shareholders’ rights in these firms.   
 The second essay analyzes institutional investors trading behavior of acquiring 
firm stocks in response to merger announcement. This essay examines the information 
environment of institutions with regard to merger wealth implications and their ability to 
respond quickly and correctly to new information released upon merger announcement. 
We find significant differences between two groups of institutions in trading acquiring 
firms stocks. We refer investment companies and independent investment advisors as 
active institutions and find that they increase holdings of acquiring firm stocks 
significantly for value increasing proposals at the announcement quarter, implying that 
they are able to extract information from merger wealth implications. Moreover, we find 
that active institutions overreact to stock proposals at the announcement quarter on the 
basis of the recent price trend of stock acquirers. Active institutions gradually update 
their information set and at the final resolution make corrections to their overreaction 
behavior by displaying their aversion to stock proposals. The trading behavior of active 
institutions is consistent with “momentum-traders” as presented in Hong and Stein 
(1999). We find banks, non-bank trust and insurance companies, which we refer to as 
passive institutions, do not respond to merger wealth effect at the announcement quarter. 
However, at the final resolution, they update their beliefs and increase holdings of 
acquiring firm stocks for merger proposals that had a positive market response at the 
announcement. This suggests a strong under-reaction in passive institutions’ trading 
strategy. In the light of behavioral model presented by Hong and Stein (1999), passive 
institutions behave more like “news-watchers,” who are unable to draw inference from 
stock price and display under-reaction due to gradual diffusion of information. 
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 The third essay analyzes whether takeover defense mechanisms protect managers 
interests with higher compensation schemes, or they results in establishing efficient 
contract by deferring compensation in future due to lower probability of hostile takeover. 
By examining the effect of existing ATP and changes in ATP on executive compensation 
structure, we test two competing hypothesis, “Managerial Power Approach” and 
“Efficient Compensation Contracting Hypothesis.” With regard to existing level of ATP, 
our results are consistent with managerial power hypothesis, indicating higher managerial 
power in high ATP firms would results in higher cash and total compensation as 
compared to low ATP firms. With regard to changes in ATP, we find that firms already 
low in managerial power experience lowering of executive compensation when takeover 
vulnerability is increased and experience increase in current compensation when takeover 
vulnerability is reduced, which supports managerial power hypothesis. On the other hand, 
firms already high in managerial power experience increase in current compensation for 
executives following an increase in takeover vulnerability of the firm and decrease in 
current compensation following decrease in takeover vulnerability of the firm. The 
efficient contracting hypothesis seems to be consistent following changes in ATP in the 
firms high in managerial power. We argue that when changes in ATP occur in firms weak 
in shareholder rights, management power play a role in settling up a compensation 
contract which protects them from the risk of not receiving deferred compensation.  
Monitoring by institutional investors and market for corporate control are 
considered to be two important corporate governance mechanisms to reduce agency 
problem. Institutional investors are the major investor group in the U.S., therefore 
understanding their monitoring role and trading behavior in important corporate events is 
getting increasing attention in recent years. The first two essays contribute to the existing 
literature of the role played by institutional investors in the financial market by shedding 
light on institutional monitoring in proxy voting decisions and their ability to respond 
quickly and correctly to one of the most important corporate decisions – mergers and 
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acquisitions. The third essay analyzes the extent to which market for corporate control 
influence one of the most important and debatable corporate decisions – executive 
compensation. All the three essays together contribute to the existing literature of 
corporate finance by addressing some important and novel questions and suggest 






MUTUAL FUND VOTING ON SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS 
 
Appendix A1: Description of Variables of Mutual Funds Vote 
Dependent Variables 
PERCENT SUPPORT BY FAMILY pif  
Percentage of votes cast in support for 
shareholder proposal p of firm i by all funds in 
family f. 
FUND PERCENT HOLD CHANGE ijt  The change in percentage holdings of 
outstanding stock of firm i by the fund j in the 
quarter t as compared to the previous quarter.  
FUND FLOW j  Objective adjusted net asset flow of fund j over 
the following year of the filing date of the 
voting records 
Independent Variables 
Fund Related Variables: 
PERCENTGAE SUPPORT TO SHRHLD ji  Percentage of votes cast in support for 
shareholder by a fund j over all shareholder 
proposals for a stock i   
MEDIAN PERCENT SUPPORT BY FUND j  Median percentage of votes cast in support for 
proposal by a fund j over all shareholder 
proposals. First compute the percentage of 
support by a fund over all proposals for a 
particular stock, then taking the median of this 
percentage over all stocks by the fund. 
FAMILY SIZE  Logarithm of the total net assets of all the funds 
in the family in the year of shareholder 
proposal. 
FUND SIZE Logarithm of the total net assets of the fund in 
the year of shareholder proposal. 
BUSINESS TIES FAMILIES A dummy variable which is equal to one if the 
fund family is among one of the conflicted 
ones. Davis and Kim (2006) identify the six 
most conflicted fund companies in terms of 
business ties. These are Fidelity, Vanguard, 
American Funds, Putnam, AIM/Invesco, and T. 
Rowe Price.   
FUND AGE Logarithm of fund age (years) 
OAR Objective adjusted return of fund over the 
previous year of the filing date of the voting 
records.  
FOUR-FACTOR ALPHA 
The annualize 4-factor alpha. This is computed 
over the previous three-year period of the filing 
date of the voting records using monthly 




Tracking error is the annualized standard 
deviation of the residuals from the 3-facotr 
model regression. This is computed over the 
previous three-year period (filing date) using 
monthly return of mutual funds. 
PREV YEAR AVG NAF 
Fund objective adjusted net asset flows over 
the previous 12 months of the filing date of the 
voting records 
FEE 
Sum of expense ratio and one seventh of all 
loads charged by the fund. 
S&P STAR 
Standard & Poor’s Star Raking of the fund in 
the previous quarter of the voting record 
release. 
Firm Related Variables: 
FIRM SIZE Natural logarithm of market capitalization of 
firm in the previous quarter of the proposal 
 BOOK TO MKT Book-to-market ratio of the firm  in the 
previous quarter of the proposal 
EARNING-PRICE-RATIO Earnings to Price ratio of the firm in the 
previous quarter of the proposal 
RETURN PAST 90 DAYS Buy and hold abnormal return of the firm over 
90 days prior to proposal meeting date. 
HISTORICAL LONG RUN EXCESS 
RETURN 
Buy and hold abnormal return of the firm over 
five years prior to and ending three months 
prior to proposal meeting date. 
MAJOR STOCK LISTING Dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the 
stock is listed in one of the major stock market. 
GIM Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance 
score of the firm in the year of the proposal 
BCF Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) 
entrenchment index of the firm in the year of 
the proposal 
NUMBER OF PROPOSALS Number of shareholder proposals for a 
particular firm 
  
Fund and Other Institutional Holding Related Variables: 
  
PERCENT SHARE HOLD Percent of outstanding shares held by the fund 
family in the quarter of proposal 
PREV QTR PERC HOLD BY FUND Percent of outstanding shares held by the fund  
in the  previous quarter of proposal 
ALL INST HOLD Percent of outstanding shares held by all 
institutional investors in the previous quarter of 
proposal 
BLOCKHOLDER HOLD Percent of outstanding shares held by non-
management five percent bolckholder in the 
previous quarter of the proposal 
INSIDER HOLD Percent of outstanding shares held by managers 
and/or directors in the previous quarter of the 
proposal 
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Proposal Type (Dummy Variables): 
ANTITAKEOVER  Proposals related to anti-takeover provisions 
VOTING ISSUES Proposals related to voting issues 
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH AND RIGHTS Proposals related to shareholder wealth and 
rights 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION Proposals related to executive compensation 
DRIECTOR RELATED Proposals related to directors and board 
compensation, size, independence 
AUDIT  Proposals related to audit committee 




Appendix A2: Descriptive Statistics of the Shareholder Proposal Voting Records 
Appendix A2 presents the different kinds of proposals considered in our analysis. We categorize 
all the sample proposals into six types: ANTITAKEOVER are proposals related to the 
elimination of anti-takeover measures; VOTING ISSUES are proposals related to voting rules; 
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH AND RIGHTS are proposals related to shareholder wealth and 
rights; EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION are proposals related to executive compensation; 
DIRECTOR RELATED are proposals related director independence, compensation. or board 













Eliminate supermajority provision 343 0.798 0.199 0.003 0.000 
Poison pill 1380 0.796 0.187 0.011 0.006 
Declassify board 1883 0.629 0.357 0.014 0.000 
Golden parachutes 1083 0.531 0.458 0.011 0.000 
Opt out state takeover statute 6 0.333 0.667 0.000 0.000 
VOTING ISSUES 
One share one vote 29 0.931 0.000 0.069 0.000 
Elect nominating committee 76 0.632 0.158 0.184 0.026 
Confidential voting 7 0.429 0.571 0.000 0.000 
Cumulative voting 859 0.363 0.518 0.119 0.000 
Majority Vote Requirement for 
Directors’ Election 568 0.040 0.949 0.011 0.000 
VOTING LEVERAGE 15 0.000 0.800 0.200 0.000 
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH AND RIGHTS 
Share repurchase 3 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Shareholder rights 15 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Special meeting 17 0.882 0.000 0.118 0.000 
Recapitalization 69 0.725 0.275 0.000 0.000 
Expense stock options 1319 0.610 0.376 0.013 0.001 
Increase number of outstanding stock 115 0.296 0.635 0.070 0.000 
Preemptive rights 18 0.278 0.722 0.000 0.000 
Separate CEO chair 1990 0.254 0.727 0.016 0.004 
Reincorporation in Delaware 63 0.143 0.762 0.095 0.000 
Consider 66 0.121 0.727 0.076 0.076 
Stockholder communications 68 0.074 0.912 0.015 0.000 
Sell company 79 0.051 0.924 0.025 0.000 
Maximize shareholder value 59 0.034 0.966 0.000 0.000 
Report political contributions 2515 0.007 0.832 0.160 0.001 
Inst. voting recommendation 30 0.000 0.767 0.233 0.000 
Change company jurisdiction 128 0.000 0.953 0.047 0.000 
Change date annual meeting 117 0.000 0.940 0.060 0.000 
Insider notice stock trade 12 0.000 0.333 0.000 0.667 
Prohibit CEO in other board 6 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.333 
Refrain charitable contributions 525 0.000 0.792 0.208 0.000 
Review mutual fund policy 114 0.000 0.947 0.053 0.000 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
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Performance goal 498 0.289 0.683 0.028 0.000 
Limit severance 12 0.083 0.833 0.000 0.083 
Executive compensation 3244 0.076 0.887 0.027 0.010 
Restricted shares 498 0.052 0.932 0.012 0.004 
Limit awards to executives 1416 0.048 0.937 0.011 0.004 
Retention stock 226 0.040 0.925 0.035 0.000 
Options executives 306 0.029 0.866 0.095 0.010 
DIRECTOR RELATED 
Majority independent board 591 0.213 0.775 0.012 0.000 
Director others 529 0.185 0.750 0.053 0.011 
Independent board 42 0.167 0.833 0.000 0.000 
Board size 97 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Director compensation 148 0.000 0.980 0.000 0.020 
AUDIT 
Audit committee 196 0.418 0.531 0.051 0.000 
Auditor limit 251 0.084 0.900 0.004 0.012 
Audit independence 121 0.083 0.917 0.000 0.000 
Audit approval 32 0.000 0.813 0.063 0.125 
OTHERS 
Eeo1 report 112 0.286 0.527 0.188 0.000 
Sustainability report 370 0.149 0.616 0.235 0.000 
Diversity report 90 0.122 0.678 0.200 0.000 
Option by race & gender 275 0.040 0.778 0.182 0.000 
Genetically modified org 346 0.038 0.685 0.277 0.000 
Other proposals 2902 0.033 0.766 0.188 0.013 
Labor standards 553 0.031 0.731 0.239 0.000 
Greenhouse gas emission 181 0.028 0.691 0.282 0.000 
Foreign military sale 118 0.025 0.729 0.246 0.000 
Renewable energy 83 0.024 0.723 0.229 0.024 
Hazardous pesticides 50 0.020 0.780 0.200 0.000 
HIV aids pandemic 239 0.017 0.762 0.222 0.000 
Risk disclosure 354 0.014 0.847 0.133 0.006 
Environmental reporting 250 0.012 0.820 0.168 0.000 
Climate change residual 130 0.008 0.800 0.177 0.015 
Ethical military contracts 315 0.006 0.819 0.175 0.000 
Animal testing 264 0.004 0.807 0.189 0.000 
China principles 376 0.003 0.785 0.213 0.000 
Govt. use of product 100 0.000 0.820 0.180 0.000 
ILO code of conduct 18 0.000 0.667 0.333 0.000 
McBride principle 150 0.000 0.680 0.320 0.000 
Radioactive waste 36 0.000 0.611 0.389 0.000 
Recycling policy 32 0.000 0.750 0.250 0.000 
Vendor Standards 54 0.000 0.722 0.278 0.000 
Pay disparity 508 0.049 0.886 0.065 0.000 
Executive government ties 105 0.000 0.838 0.162 0.000 
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APPENDIX B 
INSTITUTIONAL TRADING IN M&A 
 
Appendix B1: Description of Variables of Institutional Trading in M&A 
 
ANN QTR HOLD CHNG Aggregate change in active (passive) 
institutional holdings of acquirer stock in the 
announcement quarter. 
FINAL QTR HOLD CHNG Aggregate change in active (passive) 
institutional holdings of acquirer stock in the 
final resolution quarter. 
BET ANN TO FINAL HOLD CHNG Aggregate change in active (passive) 
institutional holdings of acquirer stock in the 
quarter between merger announcement and 
resolution 
PREV QTR HOLD  Aggregate percentage holdings of acquirer 
stocks by active (passive) institutional investors 
in the previous quarter before announcement 
(final resolution). 
PREV QTR HOLD CHNG Aggregate change in active (passive) 
institutional holdings of acquirer stock in the 
quarter prior to merger announcement (final 
resolution). 
CAR  Cumulative abnormal return for the combined 
firm (acquirer and target) at the merger 
announcement for the event window (-1, +1). 
CAR DUMMY 
 
Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 when the 
combined announcement period abnormal 
return CAR is positive, and 0 otherwise. 
SUCCESS DUMMY Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the 
final outcome of the M&A proposal is a 
success and 0 otherwise. 
CASH DUMMY Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 when the 
method of payment of the merger is by cash 
and 0 when the method of payment is by stocks 
or a combination of cash and stocks. 
ACQ LOG ASSET Natural logarithm of market capitalization of 
acquirer stocks. 
DEAL VALUE Natural logarithm of dollar value of the merger 
proposal 
 
ACQ BOOK TO MKT Book-to-market ratio 
 
PREV RET 30 DAY Buy and hold abnormal return of the acquiring 
firm over 30 day prior to merger announcement 
(final resolution). 
PREV RET 90 DAY Buy and hold abnormal return of the acquiring 
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firm over 90 day prior to merger announcement 
(final resolution). 
BLOCKHOLDER HOLD Percentage holdings of five percent 
blockholder in the quarter of merger 
announcement (final resolution). 
INSIDER HOLD Percentage holdings of corporate insiders in the 




ATP AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
 
Appendix C1: Description of Variables of ATP and Executive Compensation 
 
CASH COMPENSATION t  Salary plus bonus of executive for the year t. 
TOTAL COMPENSATION t  Total compensation of executive comprising of 
salary, bonus, option grants, and other 
compensation. 
PAY FOR PERFORMANCE t  The change in the value of options granted to 
executive per dollar change in shareholder 
value. 
GIM t  Gompers-Ishii-Metirck governance measure in 
year t. 
GIM HIGH ATP t  Portfolio of stocks with GIM>=14 in year t.  
GIM LOW ATP t  Portfolio of stocks with GIM<=5 in year t. 
tGIM∆  Change in GIM index in year t as compared to 
its previous year. 
GIM INCREASE t  Dummy variable which takes the value one if 
GIM index increases in year t as compared to 
its previous year 
GIM DECREASE t  Dummy variable which takes the value one if 
GIM index decreases in year t as compared to 
its previous year 
BCF t  Bebchuk-Cohen-Ferrell governance measure 
for year t.  
BCF LOW ATP t  Portfolio of stocks with BCF<=2 in year t.    
tBCF∆  Change in BCF index in year t as compared to 
its previous year. 
BCF INCREASE t  Dummy variable which takes the value one if 
BCF index increases in year t as compared to 
its previous year 
BCF DECREASE t  Dummy variable which takes the value one if 
BCF index decreases in year t as compared to 
its previous year 
AGGREG ALL INST HOLD t  Aggregate percentage holding by institutional 
investors in year t 
AGGREG 5-PERC INST t  Aggregate holdings of institutions with 5-
percent or more holdings in year t 
PENSION FUND HOLD t  Aggregate holdings by pension funds in year t 
PERC INDPENDENT DIR 
Fraction of board of directors composed of 
non-executive directors 
BOARD SIZE Size of the board of directors 
ONE YEAR ABN RETURN t  Buy and hold abnormal return of the stock over 
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the previous one year 
TOBIN Q t  Ratio of market value of assets over its book 
value of assets. Market value of assets is 
computed as the book value of asset (item 6) 
minus the book value of common equity (item 
60) plus the market value of common equity 
(item 25*item 199) 
TOTAL ASSET t  Book value of assets of the firm in year t. (item 
6 of compustat)  
SIZE t  Natural logarithm of market capitalization of 
the stock in year t. 
ACQ BOOK TO MKT t  Book-to-market ratio of the stock in year t 
 
CEO DUMMY t  Dummy variable, which takes the value one if 
the executive is CEO in year t and zero 
otherwise 
CEO CHAIR DUMMY t  Dummy variable, which takes the value one if 
the CEO is also the chairman of the board in 
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